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Abstract 
Obwohl reichlich Literatur zum Thema Auswirkungen von Stress auf soziale 
Gruppenentscheidungen zurzeit verfasst werden (siehe Mather & Lighthall, 2012), befindet sich 
die Literatur über Stress und  sozialen Gruppenentscheidungen noch in ihren Anfängen. Um die 
bereits vorhandene Literatur zu erweitern, untersucht diese gegenwärtige Studie leitende 
Faktoren und Auswirkungen von Stress in sozialen Gruppenentscheidungen. Des Weiteren 
möchte diese Studie einen neuartigen Ansatz verfolgen, informationsverarbeitende und 
funktionalistische Perspektiven im Bezug auf akute Stressreaktionen zu vereinen. 
Duale Theorien behaupten, dass die emotionale Verarbeitung, die im Gegensatz zur kognitiven 
Verarbeitung steht, in einer frühen Phase der Informationsverarbeitung einsetzt und mit 
impulsgeleiteten Handeln assoziiert ist (Mischel & Metcalfe, 1999; Murphy & Zajonc, 1993). 
Um impulsive Handlungen während akuter Stressreaktionen leichter ausführen zu können, wird 
wahrscheinlich die emotionale Verarbeitung gesteigert. Während einer Stressreaktion könnte die 
emotionale Verarbeitung leichteres Eintreten von impulsiven Verhalten bewirken. Frühes 
Einsetzen von impulsgeleiteten Verhalten kann zur Prävention von lebensgefährlichen 
Situationen dienen, widerspiegelt also die angeborenen, reizgeleiteten und später inkorporierten 
und Elemente des Menschen. Dieses Argument beruht auf evolutionären Stress Perspektiven, 
welche die Funktion des psychologischen Stresses in der Mobilisierung des Körpers zur 
Handlungsbereitschaft sehen. (e.g., Tsigos & Chrousos, 2002). 
Dementsprechend könnte eine verstärkte emotionale Verarbeitung und die Hemmung der 
kognitiven Steuerung, verglichen zu normalen Gegebenheiten, zu einem früher einsetzendem 
und impulsiverem Verhalten führen. Außerdem können, als Antwort auf Reize in der Umgebung, 
jene schnelle und automatisch ablaufenden Verhaltensreaktionen sich in akuten Stresssituationen 
als nützlich erweisen, wie zum Beispiel in der Prävention von Störungen der Homöostase. Um 
jene schnellen und automatischen Verhaltensreaktionen zu ermöglichen, könnte während einer 
akuten Stresssituation die emotionale Verarbeitung gesteigert und die kognitive Verarbeitung 
gehemmt werden. Empirische Untersuchungen von der Belohnungswahrnehmung (siehe Mather 
& Lighthall, 2012) oder emotionalem Lernen (Luethi et al., 2008) stützen die Auffassung, dass 
akuter Stress ein intensiveres Wahrnehmen von jenen emotionalen Phänomenen erzeugt. 
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Wie auch immer, jene Verbesserung in der emotionalen Verarbeitung kann sich negativ auf 
soziale Entscheidungsfragen auswirken, so werden beispielsweise negative Emotionen, die sich 
durch unfaire Behandlung entwickeln können, verstärkt wahrgenommen, wenn sich Menschen in 
einer Stresssituation befinden. Gestresste Teilnehmer in einem Ulimatumspiel würden 
vermutlich öfters unfaire Angebote ablehnen als die ungestressten. Diese Arbeit testete diese 
Haupthypothese und untersuchte Tendenzen zur emotionalen Regulierung bzw. Mäßigung durch 
mittlere oder leitende Faktoren, im Hinblick auf akuten Stress und Ablehnungen von Angeboten 
im Ulitmatumspiel. Diese Argumente werden im Kapitel eins, zwei und drei der Dissertation 
ausgearbeitet. 
In zwei Experimenten nahmen die Teilnehmer an einem Ultimatumsspiel als Antwort-gebende 
teil, nachdem sie entweder eine Stress- oder Kontrollaufgabe erledigt hatten. Der Cold Pressor 
Test wurde als Methode zur Stressindizierung verwendet. Vor und nach dem Ultimatumspiel 
gaben die Teilnehmer eine Bewertung ihres emotionalen Bewusstseinszustandes an, sowie die 
allgemeine Fähigkeit, auftretende Emotionen zu regulieren. 
Ergebnisse vom ersten Experiment zeigen eine erfolgreiche Stressinduktion, angedeutet durch 
einen höheren Cortisolspiegel, verglichen mit der Kontrollgruppe. Außerdem zeigte Experiment 
1 einen signifikanten Stress x Anzahl der Interaktionen, mit durchschnittlich höheren Werten 
(statistisch auf einem nicht relevantem Level) von Ablehnungen unfairer Angebote (im 
Vergleich zu fairen Angeboten) seitens der gestressten Teilnehmer. Wie auch immer, die 
Ergebnisse der zwei Befragungen zum emotionalen Bewusstseinszustand wiesen nicht auf zu 
erwartende Muster hin. Also mit unpassenden korrelierenden Emotionen zur Eigenschaft fair 
oder zu unfairen Angeboten, wie auch unpassende Ergebnisse zur emotionalen Bewältigung, die 
sich durch reduzierte Ablehnungen von fairen Angeboten zeigt, keine Reduktion hingegen bei 
unfairen Angeboten aufweist. Das Experiment 2 wurde so konstruiert, um durch Manipulation 
negative Emotionen (namentlich die Partnertypen) hervorzurufen. Die Ergebnisse spiegeln nicht 
die diejenigen des ersten Versuches wieder, ergaben aber neue Ergebnisse zu den Korrelationen 
bezüglich der negativen Emotionen und des zugeordneten Partners. Teilnehmer, die mit einem 
menschlichen Partner (also nicht mit dem Computer) zusammengearbeitet haben, lehnten zum 
einen mehr unfaire Angebote ab, des Weiteren korrelierten in diesem Versuch faire bzw. unfaire 
6 
 
Ablehnungen mit den negativen Emotionen. Die Ergebnisse der Experimente sind im Kapitel 4 
beschrieben. 
Es ist schwierig felsenfeste Schlussfolgerungen von diesen Ergebnissen zu zeichnen, trotzdem 
bieten sie einen Startpunkt für zukünftige interessante wissenschaftliche Fragestellungen. Kapitel 
5 diskutiert einige Konsequenzen und Verwendungsmöglichkeiten wie auch Grenzen dieser 
wissenschaftlichen Arbeit. 
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Abstract 
Although a substantial literature is developing regarding the effects of stress on decision-making 
(cf. Mather & Lighthall, 2012), the literature on stress and social decision-making is still in the 
beginning stage. The present research extends this new literature by examining the mediating and 
moderating factors of the effect of stress on social decision-making. Furthermore, a novel aspect 
of the research is its effort to connect the information-processing and functional perspectives, 
with regard to the acute stress response.  
Dual-mode theories state that emotional processing, relative to cognitive processing, occurs early 
during information processing (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993) and is associated with stimulus-driven 
behaviors (Mischel & Metcalfe, 1999). Therefore, an intensification of emotional processing and  
inhibition of cognitive control processes may lead to an earlier and more stimulus-driven 
initiation of behavioral responses than under normal circumstances. Moreover, such quick, 
automatic behavioral responses to environmental stimuli may be particularly useful during an 
acute stress response in that such responses could help prevent disturbances to homeostasis 
(Nesse, 2005). In order to facilitate such quick, automatic behavioral responses, emotional 
processing may be intensified and cognitive processing inhibited, during an acute stress response. 
In support of this notion, empirical findings show that acute stress increases emotion-related 
phenomena, such as reward salience (cf. Mather & Lighthall, 2012) and emotional learning 
(Luethi, Meier, & Sandi, 2008).  
However, in a social decision-making context, such enhancement of emotional processing may 
negatively affect the social interactions, such that negative emotions from perceived unfairness 
may be amplified when people are undergoing an acute stress response. More specifically, in the 
context of an Ultimatum Game, people who are stressed may reject more unfair offers than 
people under normal conditions. This research tested this main hypothesis, and examined 
emotions and trait emotion regulation tendencies as mediating and moderating factors, 
respectively, of the relationship between acute stress and Ultimatum Game rejections. These 
arguments are elaborated in Chapters 1, 2, and 3 of this dissertation. 
In two experiments, participants played the Ultimatum Game as the Responder after completing 
a stress or control task. The Cold Pressor Test was used as the stress induction method. Before 
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and after the Ultimatum Game, participants completed state emotion ratings as well as trait 
emotion regulation questionnaires.  
Results from Experiment 1 showed a successful stress induction, indicated by higher cortisol 
levels in the stress, relative to control, group. Moreover, Experiment 1 revealed a significant 
Stress x Amount interaction, with stress having an effect on rejections of unfair offers, in 
comparison to fair offers. However, the emotion and emotion regulation results did not indicate 
the expected pattern, with emotions being uncorrelated with fair, nor unfair offers, and emotion 
regulation being associated with reduced rejections of fair, but not unfair, offers. In Experiment 2, 
an experimental manipulation designed to influence negative emotions, namely partner type, was 
employed. Results did not replicate the results of the first experiment, but unexpected results 
were found involving partner type and negative emotions, namely that participants who played 
with human partners, relative to those who played with computer partners, rejected more unfair 
offers and that negative emotions were positively correlated with rejections of fair and unfair 
offers. The experiments and their results are described in Chapter 4. 
It is difficult to draw firm conclusions from these results, but they do offer a starting point for 
interesting future research questions. Chapter 5 discusses some implications as well as 
limitations of the present research. 
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Dual-mode theories propose that human cognition and behavior reflect functioning of 
both reflexive, emotional processing and deliberate, cognitive processing (Chaiken & Trope, 
1999; Lieberman, 2007; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Murphy & Zajonc, 1993). According to such 
theories, emotional processing is strong during the early stages of information processing and is 
stimulus-driven, whereas cognitive processing is relatively weak during early information 
processing and may be more controlled (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Murphy & Zajonc, 1993). 
Furthermore, these two processes are not completely independent, but rather interact with each 
other (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999). For example, cognitive processing has been implicated in 
regulation of emotional processing in many situations, such as impulse control (Rodriguez, 
Mischel, & Shoda, 1989) and emotion regulation (Ochsner & Gross, 2005; Schmeichel, 
Volokhov, & Demaree, 2008). Employing a well-established social decision-making task, the 
current study examines how acute stress shifts the weight between emotional and cognitive 
processing in the context of social decision-making. 
Dual-mode theories have also proposed that quick and stimulus-driven behavioral 
responses would be adaptive during a stressful situation (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999). Given 
these characteristics of adaptive behaviors during an acute stress response, emotional processing 
may be enhanced during the acute stress response, leading to an early onset of behavioral 
response. In contrast, it may not be adaptive to employ cognitive processes as they may not allow 
for a rapid reaction to cope with challenging situations. Consistent with this notion, stress has 
been proposed to be a factor which enhances emotional processing (Loewenstein & O’Donoghue, 
2004; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999), and recent empirical research supports this claim. For example, 
acute stress enhances reward-salience (e.g., Lighthall, Gorlick, Schoeke, Frank, & Mather, 2013; 
Mather & Lighthall, 2012), and activity of brain regions associated with emotional experience 
(e.g., van Marle, Hermans, Qin, & Fernandez, 2010; see Arnsten, 2009 for a review). In contrast, 
acute stress inhibits high-order cognitive functions such as working memory (Luethi et al., 2008) 
and self-regulation (e.g., Shiffman & Waters, 2004) as well as associated brain regions (e.g., 
prefrontal cortex; Arnsten, 2009). Based on evolutionary views of stress (Nesse, 2005 ; Nesse, 
Bhatnagar, & Young, 2007), the present paper proposes that behavioral responses which have an 
early onset and are stimulus-driven should be adaptive during an acute stress response because 
they can prevent disturbances to homeostasis and automatically generate responses which are 
appropriate for the eliciting stimuli.  
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The two types of processing are hypothesized to be differentially associated with 
decision-making behaviors which involve emotions, such that emotional processing promotes 
impulsive behaviors, whereas cognitive processing controls and regulates the impulsive 
responses generated through emotional processes (Loewenstein & O’Donoghue, 2004, 2007; 
Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999).  For example, in the context of social decision-making, emotional 
processing may influence decisions by inducing a strong impulse to express emotions towards 
other people (Xiao & Houser, 2005). On the other hand, cognitive processing may control such 
impulsive responses through control mechanisms supporting emotion-regulation (e.g., working 
memory; Schmeichel et al., 2008). Trait emotion regulation has also been shown to be associated 
with the experience and expression of emotions (Gross & John, 2003) as well as with 
interpersonal functioning (Gross & John, 2003). Therefore, emotional processing may influence 
social decision-making behaviors, while cognitively-modulated trait emotion regulation may be 
associated with (but not directly influence) social decision-making behaviors. 
The present research builds on previous assertions regarding the relationship between 
stress and emotional as well as cognitive processing (e.g., Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999) to develop 
hypotheses about how acute stress will influence these two modes of functioning and their 
effects on behaviors in a social decision-making task, namely the Ultimatum Game. With stress 
increasing emotional processing and decreasing cognitive processing, stress may amplify the 
impact of emotions on Ultimatum Game behaviors, while trait emotion regulation tendencies 
may moderate this relationship. These hypotheses are tested in two experiments. 
Research concerning acute stress and non-social decision-making has accumulated (for 
reviews of this literature, see Mather & Lighthall, 2012; Starcke & Brand, 2012), but the 
literature on the effects of acute stress on social decision-making is still in the beginning stage 
(for a review, see Van den Bos, Jolles, & Homberg, 2013). The present research adds to the latter, 
relatively new, literature in several ways. First, although previous research has examined effects 
of acute stress on social decision-making, as well as effects of emotions and emotion regulation 
on social decision-making, no study seems to have examined emotion and trait emotion 
regulation as mediating and moderating factors in the relationship between acute stress and 
social decision-making. The current research examines this relationship in the context of the 
Ultimatum Game. Second, acute psychosocial stress has been employed in the studies which 
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have so far been conducted concerning acute stress and social decision-making, (Takahashi, 
Ikeda, & Hasegawa, 2007; von Dawans, Fischbacher, Kirschbaum, Fehr, & Heinrichs, 2012). 
The present research adds to this literature by examining whether acute physical stressors lead to 
similar social decision-making behaviors as acute psychosocial stressors. Finally, this paper 
makes an effort to combine the information processing perspective with the functional 
perspective, regarding the acute stress response, in order to explain both how and why acute 
stress influences psychological functioning. In combining the information processing and 
functional perspectives to explain the effects of the acute stress response on emotional and 
cognitive processing, this paper adds to previous syntheses of the functional and information 
processing perspectives (Tooby & Cosmides, 2005; Van den Bos et al., 2013). 
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Definitions 
Throughout this paper, related but different terms will be used to describe processes 
involved in acute stress response and social decision-making. The term stress describes 
experiences that are emotionally or physiologically challenging (Mather & Lighthall, 2012; 
McEwen, 2007). Accordingly, a stress response refers to the physiological and behavioral 
processes which occur in response to such experiences. Moreover, it should be noted that 
throughout the paper, there is a distinction between the physiological stress response and the 
behavioral responses with which they are associated (e.g., fighting or fleeing behaviors). In this 
paper, the physiological stress response, which is defined by increased sympathetic (and 
decreased parasympathetic) activity and activation of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenocortical 
(HPA) axis (Charmandari, Tsigos, & Chrousos, 2005; Tsigos & Chrousos, 2002), is supposed to 
underlie multiple behavioral stress responses. Furthermore, this relatively general physiological 
response is supposed, in this paper, to serve the function of mobilizing behavioral stress 
responses in a quick and uncontrolled, stimulus-driven manner. 
Second, the terms “early onset of behavioral response” and “stimulus-driven behavioral 
response” are used throughout the paper. The former term refers to the timing at which a 
behavioral response is initiated. Furthermore, there is a distinction between an early onset of 
behavioral response and early information processing. The relationship between the two 
constructs can be defined such that if a behavioral response is initiated after only the early 
processes, the behavioral response will have an early onset; whereas if later processes occur after 
the early processes, the behavioral response will have a later onset. This concept is explained in 
more detail in Chapter 1.  
The latter term mentioned above is not as clearly defined as the former. Stimulus-driven 
behavioral response refers roughly to automatic (e.g., Bargh, 1994), bottom-up (e.g., Barrett, 
Ochsner, & Gross, 2007), or reflexive (e.g., Lieberman, Gaunt, Gilbert, & Trope, 2002) 
behaviors. Such behaviors do not require any other input than the stimulus, and through 
automatic processes such as spreading activation (e.g., Rumelhart, Hinton, & McClelland, 1986), 
the stimulus can lead to a behavioral response. This construct is similar to the construct of early 
onset of behavior in that the stimulus-driven processing also occurs early, but stimulus-driven 
behavior differs from early onset of behavior in terms of the function it is supposed to serve. 
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That is, being stimulus-driven may serve the function of automatically identifying an appropriate 
behavioral response to the eliciting stimulus, whereas early onset of behavior may serve the 
function of preventing disturbances to homeostasis. This idea is built on previous assertions 
(Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999), and is also explained in more detail in Chapter 1. 
Third, as defined above, emotional and cognitive processing refer to distinct modes of 
psychological functioning. In this paper, emotional processes include affective evaluations (i.e., 
judgments of whether a target object is ‘good’ or ‘bad’; e.g., Fazio, 2001), sensitivity and 
reactivity to rewarding stimuli, and generation of specific emotional states. In contrast, cognitive 
processes in this paper include higher order processes such as working memory and logical 
thinking. As argued below, emotional processes, relative to cognitive processes, occur early and 
are stimulus-driven, whereas cognitive processes, such as working memory and self-regulation, 
are relatively slow and less stimulus-driven (Barrett et al., 2007; Lieberman et al., 2002; 
Loewenstein & O’Donoghue, 2004; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999). Therefore, with less intense 
cognitive processing and more intense emotional processing, the onset of behavioral responses 
may occur earlier and be more stimulus-driven and less controlled than under normal 
circumstances.  
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Chapter I - Increasing emotional processing while decreasing cognitive processing 
 
The main argument of this chapter is that the basic physiological mechanisms of the acute 
stress response facilitate early onset of stimulus-driven behavioral response by enhancing 
emotional processing, relative to cognitive processing. In order to describe empirical support for 
a link between the physiological mechanisms and early onset of stimulus-driven behavioral 
responses, this chapter first connects early onset of stimulus-driven behaviors to emotional as 
well as cognitive processing. After establishing the connection between early onset of stimulus-
driven behavioral responses and emotional and cognitive processing, the chapter reviews 
empirical findings which support the notion that emotional processing is enhanced, but cognitive 
processing is not, during the acute stress response.  
Previous theoretical work has made a connection between stress and emotional 
processing (Loewenstein & O’Donoghue, 2004; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999). More specifically, 
stress has been hypothesized to differentially influence the emotional and cognitive systems, 
enhancing emotional processing while inhibiting cognitive processing at low and high levels in 
the manner of the Yerkes-Dodson Law (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908 as cited in Metcalfe & Mischel, 
1999). Furthermore, these models suggest that this influence of stress on emotional processes 
serves an adaptive function, allowing the animal to produce “quick responding driven by innately 
determined stimuli or stimuli that have been conditioned to produce immediate responding” 
during acute stress (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; p.8). On the other hand, regarding cognitive 
processing, the same authors suggest that during acute stress, “it is not the time for cognitive 
complexity or rumination.” These arguments have been made in the context of the hot-cool 
systems approach (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999) as well as a mathematical model (Loewenstein & 
O’Donoghue, 2004). These previous arguments provide the basis for the argument presented in 
this chapter, namely that acute stress intensifies emotional processing, relative to cognitive 
processing, in order to facilitate behavioral responses which have an early onset and are 
stimulus-driven.  
This chapter is organized in four subchapters. In the first subchapter, in order to show 
how an acute stress response prepares an animal for physical activity, the physiological 
mechanisms of an acute stress response are described. Next, the psychological mechanisms 
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which may facilitate early onset of stimulus-driven responses during an acute stress response are 
described. As explained in this chapter, such mechanisms have been studied in the framework of 
dual-mode theories that draw a distinction between emotional and cognitive processing (e.g., 
Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Zajonc, 1980, 1984). More specifically, these theories suggest that 
emotional processing, relative to cognitive processing, occurs early during information 
processing and is stimulus-driven. Therefore, the second and third subchapters describe these 
dual-mode theories and supporting empirical findings which suggest that emotional, relative to 
cognitive, processing occurs early (subchapter 2) and is stimulus-driven (subchapter 3). The 
conclusion drawn from these subchapters is that a heightened activation of the emotional, as 
opposed to the cognitive, system should facilitate early onset of stimulus-driven behaviors. In 
other words, the intensification of emotional processing is the psychological mechanism which 
facilitates early onset of stimulus-driven behaviors. Moreover, this mechanism occurs during an 
acute stress response. The fourth subchapter describes empirical support for this conclusion. 
More specifically, the fourth subchapter describes findings which suggest that acute stress 
enhances emotional processing, inhibits cognitive processing, and influences the interaction 
between emotional and cognitive processes as shown by effects of acute stress on emotion and 
emotion-regulation.  
Preparations for activity during an acute stress response 
An underlying assumption in this paper is that the physiological mechanisms underlying 
an acute stress response serve to promote physical actions which aid immediate survival, such as 
fleeing from or fighting against a predator. This claim has been made in previous works (Nesse 
et al., 2007; Tsigos & Chrousos, 2002) and will be discussed first. More specifically, this 
subchapter describes how the physiological mechanisms underlying an acute stress response help 
prepare an animal for action and simultaneously inhibit vegetative functions.  
The physiological mechanisms underlying the acute stress response are carried out by the 
autonomic nervous system (ANS) and the hypothalamic pituitary adrenal (HPA) axis, with the 
ANS stress response preceding the HPA axis response (Tsigos & Chrousos, 2002). In the 
beginning stage of the response, activities of the sympathetic nervous system, the branch of the 
ANS associated with physical activity, are enhanced. For example, heart rate and contractility 
increases, leading to enhanced circulation; rate and depth of breathing increases, leading to 
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expedited gas exchange; blood is redirected from gut and skin to muscles; and blood clotting is 
increased , helping one to recover more easily from injuries (Cannon, 1929 as cited in Nesse et 
al., 2007). Furthermore, arousal and alertness are enhanced through the release of norepinephrine 
(NE) and epinephrine by the locus ceruleus (Tsigos & Chrousos, 2002). These mechanisms have 
been suggested to facilitate action, as opposed to rest (Nesse et al., 2007; Tsigos & Chrousos, 
2002).   
Similarly to the ANS stress response, during the HPA axis stress response, the body 
mobilizes for physical action by increasing its metabolic activities (Nesse et al., 2007). More 
specifically, during the HPA axis stress response, the liver breaks down glycogen into glucose 
which is used as energy (Munck, Guyre, & Holbrook, 1984). Furthermore, cells are changed so 
that glucose can enter the cells more easily (Munck et al., 1984). Thus, during an acute stress 
response, more energy in the form of glucose becomes available, and cells become better 
equipped to use the energy, mechanisms facilitating physical action (Nesse, 1999). In addition to 
increased metabolic activity and the resulting increase in available energy, fighting behaviors 
seem to be enhanced during the HPA axis response. More specifically, stimulation of the 
hypothalamus, an important part and starting point of the HPA stress response, is associated with 
aggressive behaviors (Siegel, Roeling, Gregg, & Kruk, 1999). For example, animal research 
shows that hypothalamic stimulation induces defensive rage as well as more general ‘multi-
purpose’ aggression (Siegel et al., 1999). These processes show an animal increasing available 
energy for potential action, such as fighting, during an acute stress response. 
 In contrast to the enhancement of physiological mechanisms underlying physical action, 
physiological mechanisms underlying vegetative states are inhibited during an acute stress 
response. Empirical support for this claim includes the inhibition of the activities of the 
parasympathetic nervous system, the branch of the ANS which is associated with vegetative 
functions (Nesse et al., 2007). The de-activation of the parasympathetic nervous system leads to 
inhibition of vegetative functions including digestive, reproductive, and growth functions (Nesse 
et al., 2007). In addition to vegetative functions, information which may distract an animal 
during a stress response, such as pain and hunger, are suppressed by components of the stress 
response, namely the beta-endorphin system and corticotropin-releasing hormone (CRH; Tsigos 
& Chrousos, 2002). More specifically, upon secretion of CRH, beta-endorphins suppress pain by 
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travelling to the pain control neurons of the hind brain and spinal cord (Charmandari et al., 
2005)1. Appetite is suppressed through influence on the appetite-satiety centers in the 
hypothalamus (Chamandari et al., 2005). These mechanisms indicate inhibition of vegetative 
functions and suggest a suppression of information which may distract the animal during an 
acute stress response. 
 Similar to the inhibition of parasympathetic nervous system functions, sexual, growth, 
and immune functions are inhibited during the HPA stress response (for a review, see 
Charmandari et al., 2005). As described by Charmandari and colleagues (Charmandari et al., 
2005), the HPA stress response inhibits growth hormone activity in several ways. First, HPA 
axis hormones, namely CRH and glucocorticoids, indirectly inhibit target tissues through various 
intermediary hormones. More specifically, the release of CRH from the hypothalamus stimulates 
the release of somatostatin, which inhibits the activity of growth hormone (GH). The decrease in 
growth hormone activity then reduces activity of the insulin-like growth factor I (IGF-I), which 
then reduces the development of target tissues. Furthermore, glucocorticoids released by the 
adrenal gland simultaneously inhibit growth hormone activity and target tissues. These 
mechanisms suggest that vegetative functions, such as growth functions, are suppressed during 
the HPA stress response.  
While enhancement of action and suppression of vegetative functions may facilitate 
physical activities needed during an acute stress response, such mechanisms may have 
maladaptive consequences as well, especially in the long-run. For example, prolonged 
suppression of growth functions can manifest physically, for example, as short stature 
(Charmandari et al., 2005), and prolonged suppression of sexual functions can be detrimental to 
reproduction abilities, leading to low testosterone levels in males and in females, amenorrhea 
(Charmandari et al., 2005), the absence of menstrual periods. Therefore, the physiological 
                                                          
1 Pain is a particularly interesting function in that although it is suppressed during an acute stress response, 
it could also be a stimulus which initiates an acute stress response (e.g., Cold Pressor Test; Bullinger et al., 
1984). The distinction between pain as a stressor and pain as a function which is suppressed during stress 
may be that, while pain is a useful function designed to protect an animal from tissue damage (Nesse, 
1999), once an acute stress response has been initiated, pain may no longer serve a useful purpose for the 
animal’s survival, instead, distracting the animal and making it more difficult to focus on its survival 
strategy. 
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mechanisms underlying an acute stress response appear to especially enhance short-term, relative 
to long-term, survival. 
To summarize, the physiological mechanisms of an acute stress response indicate a 
preparation for physical action as opposed to rest. More specifically, physiological systems and 
hormonal activities which support action, such as the sympathetic nervous system and 
glucocorticoid activity, are enhanced during a stress response; whereas systems and hormones 
associated with vegetative functions, including the parasympathetic nervous system and growth 
hormone, are inhibited (Charmandari et al., 2005; Nesse et al., 2007; Tsigos & Chrousos, 2002). 
Having discussed this basic assumption of the paper, the next subchapter elaborates the first 
main argument of this chapter, namely that early onset of behavioral responses during an acute 
stress response is facilitated by emotional, relative to cognitive, processing.  
Increasing speed through emotional processing 
This subchapter explains the notion of “affective primacy,” which states that emotional 
processes, relative to cognitive processes, dominate early information processing (Murphy & 
Zajonc, 1993; Zajonc, 1980, 1984). The subchapter first describes empirical findings, in 
particular, from the affective priming paradigm, which suggest that emotional processing, 
relative to cognitive processing, dominates the early stage of information processing. Next, 
empirical findings are described suggesting that cognitive processes occur after emotional 
processing. An implication of the affective primacy is that behavioral responses based primarily 
on emotional processing would have an earlier onset than behavioral responses which occur after 
cognitively modulated control processes modify the initial response based on emotional 
processing.  
Dual-mode theories of psychological functioning (e.g., Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; 
Zajonc, 1980, 1984) have drawn a distinction between emotional and cognitive processing. 
According to these theories, in the early stages of information processing, emotional processing 
is stronger than cognitive processing, a phenomenon which has been called ‘affective primacy’ 
(Zajonc, 1984). The affective priming experimental paradigm (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993) 
provides an illustration of this hypothesis. In this paradigm, participants were shown either 
suboptimal (4 millisecond duration) or optimal (1000 ms duration) images of happy or angry 
faces before being shown a novel stimulus (i.e., an unknown Chinese ideograph). After seeing 
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the prime and the novel stimulus, participants rated how much they liked the novel stimulus 
(Murphy & Zajonc, 1993). The results showed that suboptimal affective primes (i.e., the faces), 
but not optimal affective primes, led to ratings of the novel stimulus which were congruent with 
the affective valences (i.e., negative or positive) of the primes. That is, when participants had 
only four msec to process an emotional prime, the prime reliably influenced the affective 
judgment of a subsequent novel stimulus; whereas this effect did not occur when more time was 
given to process the emotional prime. This result was interpreted as meaning that affective 
processing is stronger than cognitive processing during the very early stages of processing 
(Murphy & Zajonc, 1993; p.727).  
Not only do empirical findings suggest that early processing is dominated by emotional 
processing, but the findings also suggest that cognitive processes, such as identification of a 
stimulus, do not occur as early as emotional processes. For example, in the affective priming 
paradigm (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993, pp. 725-726), participants were given a memory task, in 
which they were first shown the prime stimulus for four msec, and then shown two faces, one 
which was identical to the prime stimulus just shown, and another which was different from the 
prime stimulus. In this task, participants could only correctly identify the prime stimulus, on 
average, 5.78 times out of 12 trials. This finding has been interpreted to mean that although 
participants could determine the affective value of the prime stimulus during the four msec, they 
could not yet identify the stimulus during the same amount of time (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993; 
p.727). Therefore, the cognitive process of stimulus identification may occur later, and not yet at 
the time that affective processing does. 
Neuroanatomical findings involving the neural systems underlying emotional and 
cognitive processes provide further support for the claim that affective processing, relative to 
cognitive processing, dominates early information processing. More specifically, researchers 
have found a connection between the thalamus, the sensory relay center, and amygdala, a brain 
region strongly associated with the processing and expression of emotions (LeDoux, 2003), with 
a length of only one synapse (LeDoux, Iwata, Cicchetti, & Reis, 1988). In contrast, the 
connection between the thalamus and hippocampus, a brain region associated with episodic 
memory functions (Phelps, 2004), is several synapses long (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993). Therefore, 
the sensory information from the thalamus can travel to the amygdala more quickly than it can to 
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the hippocampus, suggesting that the amygdala can respond to a stimulus before the 
hippocampus can (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993). Such early emotional processing may enable a 
response at an earlier point in time than cognitive processing can (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993, p. 
737).  
This characteristic of emotional processing may be adaptive during an acute stress 
response, because the affective information regarding a stimulus (e.g., “this stimulus is bad”) 
could enable an earlier response to the stimulus if the information is obtained early. In turn, the 
early onset of a behavioral response to the stimulus (e.g., a stalking lion), based on early 
affective judgments, may help to prevent a disturbance from the stimulus. Put differently, during 
an acute stress response, the early emotional processes may be strengthened, and the later 
cognitive processes may be weakened, leading to an earlier initiation of a behavioral response to 
the stressor. 
To summarize, in theories distinguishing between emotional and cognitive processing, 
emotional processing, relative to cognitive processing, is supposed to dominate early information 
processing. This claim is supported by empirical findings from the affective priming paradigm 
(Murphy & Zajonc, 1993), as well as neurological studies (e.g., LeDoux et al., 1988). The strong 
emotional influence on early stages of processing suggest that emotional processing, relative to 
cognitive processing, may enable early onset of behavioral responses (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993) 
to an acute stressor. 
Stimulus-driven processing is associated with emotional processing 
 As with early onset of behavioral responses, automatic, stimulus-driven behavioral 
responses should be adaptive during an acute stress response. The rationale for this argument is 
that, as suggested by Metcalfe and Mischel (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; p.8), such behavioral 
responses may be driven by adaptive unconditioned or conditioned stimulus-response links 
activated by the stimulus in question. Such stimulus-response links may have been shaped 
through natural selection, or learned during one’s lifetime, but in either case, they may serve as 
adaptive shortcuts regarding the behavior to produce in response to a specific stimulus. This 
subchapter describes how stimulus-driven behavioral responses may be enhanced, for example, 
during an acute stress response. The main argument of the subchapter is that without control 
processes, an emotional response can take place automatically with only the stimulus as input. 
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Empirical support for the argument, in particular, findings from the delay of gratification 
paradigm, is described.   
The hot-cool systems theory (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999) draws an explicit connection 
between the ‘hot’ emotional system and stimulus-driven behaviors. In this model, the “hot 
emotional system is specialized for quick emotional processing and responding on the basis of 
unconditional or conditional trigger features” whereas the “cool cognitive system is specialized 
for complex spatiotemporal and episodic representation and thought” (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; 
p. 4). According to this theory, the hot system, comprised of “hot spots” with little 
interconnectivity with each other, is stimulus-driven in that upon perception of a hot stimulus, 
the activation of hot spots leads to the initiation of an impulsive behavioral response (Metcalfe & 
Mischel, 1999). In other words, in the presence of a hot stimulus, the ‘default’ response is driven 
by the stimulus and mediated by activation of hot spots. Importantly, the hot system is associated 
with emotional, as opposed to cognitive, processing (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999). Similarly to the 
hot-cool systems approach, the ‘modal model’ of emotion (Barrett et al., 2007) also suggests that 
emotions are associated with automatic, stimulus-driven behavioral response. More specifically, 
the modal models of emotion suggest that emotional responses are themselves automatically 
elicited by stimuli (Barrett et al., 2007). Of the modal models of emotion, the basic emotion 
theories (e.g., Ekman, 1972) posit that certain basic emotions (e.g., anger, fear, happiness, 
sadness, disgust) are automatically triggered by specific stimuli, and lead to corresponding 
physiological and behavioral responses (Barrett et al., 2007; p. 178). An important idea 
underlying the basic emotion theories is that emotions occur through hardwired neural circuits 
which are automatically activated upon perception of an eliciting stimulus (Ekman, 1972). 
In contrast to the hot system, the cool system is comprised of highly interconnected “cool 
nodes” which can modify the default response generated by the hot system (Metcalfe & Mischel, 
1999), leading to a more controlled response. The hot spots and cool nodes are hypothesized to 
be interconnected, with activation of hot spots leading to activation of cool nodes and vice versa 
(Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999). Similarly, in the basic emotion theories, after an emotional response 
is generated, cognitive control processes can intervene and modify the emotional response 
(Barrett et al., 2007; pp. 178-179). In short, the theories discussed above state that by default, 
24 
 
responses to ‘hot’ stimuli are emotional, but those emotional, impulsive responses can be 
modified by later cognitive control processes.  
The activities of the hot and cool systems, as well as their interactions can be illustrated 
by behaviors exhibited during the delay of gratification paradigm (Mischel, Ebbesen, & Zeiss, 
1972). In this experimental paradigm, children between ages three and five were offered two 
rewarding stimuli (i.e., a marshmallow or a pretzel), and indicated their preferred reward. In the 
context of the hot/cool systems model (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999), the preferred reward is the 
‘hot stimulus’ which activates the hot spots.  The children were informed that if they waited for 
the experimenter to come back to the room, the preferred stimulus would be given to them, but if 
they chose to bring the experimenter back earlier by ringing a bell, they could receive the other 
object, but not the preferred object. Importantly, some children were given distractor activities, 
including playing with a toy (external distractor) or thinking of entertaining things (internal 
distractor), while others were simply told the instructions for waiting with no mention of 
distractors. In the context of the model (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999), the distractors may activate 
cool nodes which control the activity of hot spots, allowing the child to wait for the preferred 
reward. Results from the study showed that indeed, without distraction, children could not wait 
for the experimenter to come back, and took the not-preferred reward after waiting an average of 
only 0.5 minutes. In contrast, children waited on average between 8-12 minutes when a distractor 
was available (Mischel et al., 1972). These results seem to support the notion that impulsive, 
stimulus-driven behavioral response is the default, when in the presence of a hot stimulus, but 
that this default response can be modified by cool cognitive strategies such as distraction. 
The stimulus-driven processes through which impulsive behavioral responses may occur 
have been specified in greater detail (Barrett et al., 2007) in the context of the parallel distributed 
processing (PDP) framework (e.g., Rumelhart et al., 1986). In the PDP framework (e.g., 
Rumelhart et al., 1986), upon input of the stimulus, units analogous to neurons in the brain 
become activated, spreading the activation through the units to which they are connected 
(Rumelhart et al., 1986). Spreading activation proceeds automatically upon perception of the 
stimulus, and is therefore stimulus-driven without ‘top-down’ control. This spreading of 
activation is constrained only by the activation levels of the units to which it is connected (a 
mechanism called parallel constraint satisfaction; Lieberman et al., 2002).  
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There are supposed to be two stages of emotional processing which proceed through 
spreading activation, namely constraint matching and constraint interpretation (Barrett et al., 
2007). In constraint matching, the representation of the stimulus is matched with one from 
perceptual memory to determine whether the stimulus is familiar or not (Barrett et al., 2007). 
Moreover, the affective evaluation of the stimulus, that is, whether the stimulus is good or bad, is 
determined during constraint matching, resulting in the establishment of a general affective state 
(Barrett et al., 2007). This stage is supposed to involve brain regions related to fear (i.e., 
amygdala) and reward (i.e., striatum; Barrett et al., 2007), both constructs which are related to 
emotions. Then, during constraint interpretation, the stimulus is categorized, and representations 
of the emotional states likely to ensue from the stimulus are activated, and a more specific 
emotional episode can ensue (Barrett et al., 2007; pp. 196-198). In sum, through the parallel 
processes of constraint matching and constraint interpretation, an affective state and an 
emotional episode can arise with the stimulus as input and no control. Moreover, without 
modification by cognitive control processes, the emotion generated through stimulus-driven 
processes gains access to action planning (Barrett et al., 2007). Therefore, this model seems to 
support the notion that stimulus-driven processing, underlying the generation of emotion, can 
lead directly to a behavioral response, if there are no subsequent control processes. 
As mentioned above, stimulus-driven processing directly leads to an emotional response, 
given that control processes do not intervene. This claim begs the question of under which 
circumstances control processes come into play. Control processes may modify the initial 
representations generated under several circumstances. For example, constraint seeking may 
come into play if there is a conflict between multiple representations or if existing goal states 
constrain the representations further (Barrett et al., 2007). In Lieberman and colleagues’ model 
(Lieberman et al., 2002) as well, serial processes are supposed to detect conflicts, place 
additional constraints on the perceived object, and help one to remember previous times when 
such control was required. Under such circumstances, the initial stimulus-driven representation is 
supposed to be modified before the final behavioral response is initiated.  Importantly, these 
processes are associated with brain regions which are closely related to cognitive functions such 
as working memory (i.e., prefrontal cortex) and episodic memory (i.e., hippocampus; Lieberman 
et al., 2002). These arguments seem consistent with the model of Metcalfe and Mischel 
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(Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999), which states that emotional processes are the default, and that the 
initial impulsive responses can be controlled at a later stage by cognitive processes. 
It should be noted that although the hot-cool systems approach and basic theories of 
emotion posit that emotional responses are stimulus-driven, other theories do incorporate 
controlled cognitive processes into the generation of emotions and emotional responses. More 
specifically, appraisal theories of emotion (e.g., Frijda, 1988) assert that cognitive processes 
which interpret the meaning of a situation are a crucial part of emotion generation. In these 
theories, emotional responses are a result of the cognitive interpretation of a stimulus event, in 
particular, with respect to the relevance that the stimulus event has to the self (Barrett et al., 
2007).  
The main argument of this subchapter is that stimulus-driven behavioral responses are 
associated with emotional processing. More specifically, the automatic link between stimulus 
and response is mediated by emotion. This claim has been stated or suggested in many previous 
theories. The most explicit statement of this claim is made in the hot/cool systems theory 
(Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999), which states that a ‘hot stimulus’, or a rewarding stimulus, activates 
hot spots, and leads to a default, impulsive behavioral response. This default response to the 
stimulus, mediated by the emotional system, can be modulated by the cognitive system, or more 
specifically, by cognitive control strategies. The hot-cool systems approach and the emotion 
theories both argue that without control processes, an emotional response can take place through 
purely stimulus-driven processes, such as spreading activation (Barrett et al., 2007). In the modal 
model theories of emotion (e.g., Ekman, 1972; Frijda, 1988) as well, the stimulus is directly 
linked to an emotion, which then leads to a response. Unlike the hot system, the cognitive system 
can modify the initial default response (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999). These theories suggest that 
without modulation by the cognitive system, a stimulus-response link, mediated by emotional 
processes, would be carried out. Based on these arguments, the present subchapter argues that 
stimulus-driven behaviors are associated with emotional processing. 
Influence of stress on the hot system, the cool system, and their interaction 
In the present chapter, so far, it has been concluded that emotional processes start earlier 
than cognitive processes, and can occur through only stimulus-driven processes without top-
down control. Therefore, during an acute stress response in which early onset of stimulus-driven 
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behavioral responses are assumed to be adaptive (see page 16 of this chapter), emotional 
processes may be enhanced, relative to cognitive processes. The purpose of this subchapter is to 
present empirical support for this hypothesis.  
Before presenting the empirical findings, laboratory methods of stress induction will be 
briefly described. Empirical support (described in detail later in this subchapter) for the argument 
that acute stress increases emotional processing while decreasing cognitive processing come 
mainly from studies using two types of stress induction – the Cold Pressor Test (CPT; Bullinger 
et al., 1984), a physical stressor, and the Trier Social Stress Test (TSST; Kirschbaum, Pirke, & 
Hellhammer, 1993), a psychosocial stressor. The CPT is a physical stressor, where stress is 
induced by immersing one’s hand in ice water (0-3 degrees Celsius) for an extended period of 
time (e.g., three minutes; Lighthall, Mather, & Gorlick, 2009). The TSST is a psychological 
stress task, where participants are required to do a task (e.g., giving a speech) in front of multiple 
judges (cf. Kirschbaum et al., 1993). In contrast to the CPT, this task contains element of social 
evaluation and has been shown to produce stronger physiological stress responses than the CPT 
(McRae et al., 2006).  
Emotional processes during an acute stress response 
Empirical findings concerning the effect of acute stress on reward (and risk) salience and 
emotional experience are consistent with the claim that emotional processing is enhanced during 
an acute stress response. First, findings on reward salience indicate that acute stress influences 
sensitivity to reward and risk, in the context of risk-taking (e.g., Lighthall, Mather, & Gorlick, 
2009; Lighthall et al., 2013) as well as learning (e.g., Lighthall et al., 2013; Petzold, Plessow, 
Goschke, & Kirschbaum, 2010). For example, participants who experienced an acute physical 
stressor, namely the CPT, compared to those in a control condition, showed different responses 
in a measure of risk-taking behavior (i.e., balloon analogue risk task; Lejuez et al., 2002), with 
men becoming more risk-seeking and women becoming less risk-seeking under stress (Lighthall 
et al., 2009; Lighthall et al., 2013). From these results, the authors concluded that acute stress 
may amplify existing sex differences in sensitivity to reward and risk (Lighthall et al., 2009). 
With regard to reward-based learning, studies employing both physical and psychosocial 
acute stressors found that stressed participants learned better from positive feedback than non-
stressed participants (Lighthall et al., 2013; Petzold et al., 2010). More specifically, after 
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completing a physical stress task or a control task, participants saw novel stimuli (i.e., unknown 
Japanese characters) which were associated with either positive or negative feedback (Lighthall 
et al., 2013). Then, in a test phase, participants had to choose stimuli which were associated with 
positive feedback, while avoiding those which were associated with negative feedback. Results 
showed that stressed participants, compared to non-stressed participants, chose more correct 
positive-feedback stimuli. This pattern of results was also found with a psychosocial stressor 
(Petzold et al., 2010), suggesting that acute stressors can enhance associative learning with 
rewarding stimuli. Furthermore, avoidance of no-longer rewarding stimuli was impaired in 
stressed participants (Schwabe & Wolf, 2009), suggesting that the impact of reward lasts longer 
under stress, than under normal conditions. More specifically, participants first learned behaviors 
to obtain two types of food, and even after becoming satiated with one of the foods, stressed 
participants still continued to perform the behavior associated with that food (Schwabe & Wolf, 
2009). In other words, although non-stressed participants quickly learned that the association 
between the behavior and rewarding stimulus had ended, stressed participants’ association 
between the reward and behavior persevered longer. These findings were interpreted to mean 
that acute stress can result in a bias towards potential rewards (Mather & Lighthall, 2012). 
Finally, in addition to behavioral findings concerning stress and reward-related behaviors, 
neurological findings suggest that acute stress influences activity of brain regions associated with 
reward, such as the striatum (Lighthall et al., 2013). Together, these findings suggest that acute 
stress may enhance the salience of reward in learning. More generally, these findings seem to 
suggest that acute stress may increase the impact of ‘hot’ stimuli on psychological mechanisms. 
In the hot-cool system framework, hot representation of a stimulus activates “affect and 
emotional reactions related to that stimulus” (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; p. 7). Accordingly, if 
acute stress enhances hot system activity, an increase may be observed in the emotional 
experience and responses to ‘hot’ stimuli presented after the stressor. Empirical findings from an 
experimental study (Luethi et al., 2008) concerning emotion learning support this claim. As with 
reward-related stimuli, stress has been shown to influence subsequent emotional learning. More 
specifically, participants in the stress condition completed a psychosocial stress task (i.e., TSST) 
and then learned associations between neutral stimuli (i.e., Pokemon characters) and positive and 
negative stimuli (i.e., positively valenced words/pictures or negatively valenced words/pictures). 
In a subsequent test phase, participants rated the Pokemon characters in terms of positive or 
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negative valence. Results showed that stressed participants, relative to control participants, gave 
more negative ratings to the novel stimuli with negative associations, suggesting that they had 
learned negative associations better than non-stressed participants (Luethi et al., 2008). 
Furthermore, previous research (Korte, De Boer, Kloet, & Bohus, 1995) suggests that not only 
emotional learning, but also emotional behaviors are affected by acute stress. More specifically, 
animals which had been given glucocorticoid receptor (GR) antagonists, which reduce the 
binding of the stress hormone to its receptors, displayed less anxious behaviors (i.e., spent more 
time in open arms of a maze) than stressed animals who had not been given the antagonists 
(Korte et al., 1995). Together, these findings suggest that acute stress influences both emotional 
learning and expression. 
In addition to responding differently to stimuli seen after stress, stressed participants also 
showed differences in subjective emotions and emotion-related brain regions after exposure to 
acute stressors. In an experiment with stressful cues, alcohol-related cues, and neutral cues, 
participants who saw guided imagery of a personalized stressful past event2, relative to those 
who saw neutral cues, subsequently reported significantly greater negative emotions and anxiety, 
as well as significantly lower positive emotions (Sinha et al., 2008). In another study, 
participants reported feeling greater anxiety after a high-stress task (i.e., a mental arithmetic task) 
than after a low-stress control task (Wang et al., 2005). In addition to the self-reported anxiety, 
the high-stress task was associated with increased activity in the ventral right prefrontal cortex 
(RPFC), a brain region associated with negative emotions as well as vigilance (Wang et al., 
2005). Based on these findings, the authors suggested that acute stress induces negative emotion 
and vigilance. Furthermore, the activity of the amygdala, another brain region associated with 
negative emotions such as fear and anxiety, is increased by high levels of catecholamines, the 
stress chemicals released during the ANS phase of an acute stress response (Debiec & LeDoux, 
2006 as cited in Arnsten, 2009). Glucocorticoids, released by the adrenal gland during the HPA 
axis response, also play an important role in emotional experience. For example, glucocorticoids 
                                                          
2 The personalized stressful events were created by asking participants to describe a recent past stressful 
event, and the stressful events used for cues were rated eight or above on a 10-point scale (1=not at all 
stressful, 10=the most stress they felt recently in their life). Participants in the stress condition, relative to 
the neutral condition, showed more behavioral distress responses including muscle twitching, muscle 
tremor, restlessness, muscle tension, muscle ache, headache, quickened breathing, yawning, talking/facial 
movements, crying, sweating, and stomach/abdominal changes. 
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were shown to attach to melanocorticoid receptors (MRs) in the limbic brain regions including 
the amygdala, and  inhibition of these receptors reduced fear-motivated immobilization in rats 
(Korte et al., 1995), suggesting that glucocorticoid activity in limbic regions may contribute to 
fear-motivated immobility. 
Finally, correlational findings further suggest an association between stress and 
emotional experience. For example, in a diary method study, acute stressors were found to be 
associated with higher negative affect and lower positive affect (Smyth et al., 1998). In another 
study, daily stressors explained more than 20% of the variance in emotional experience, 
including anxiety, hostility, and depression (Bolger, DeLongis, Kessler, & Schilling, 1989). 
Furthermore, high and low levels of cortisol3, an important stress hormone, were associated with 
negative and positive affect, respectively, suggesting a link between a physiological stress 
response and emotions (Smyth et al., 1998).  
In sum, these findings show that stress influences emotion-related processing of stimuli 
encountered after exposure to an acute stressor. Acute stress influences sensitivity of and 
associative learning involving hot, reward stimuli (e.g., Lighthall et al., 2009; Petzold et al., 
2010). Moreover, acute stress influences associative learning with emotionally valenced stimuli 
as well as emotional expression (e.g., Korte et al., 1995; Luethi et al., 2008). In addition, 
emotional experience has been shown to be influenced by and associated with stress (e.g., Sinha 
et al., 2008; Smyth et al., 1998). So this seems to support the notion that emotional processing is 
enhanced during an acute stress response. Next, empirical findings regarding the influence of 
acute stress on cognitive processing are discussed. 
Cognitive mechanisms during an acute stress response 
As argued above, whereas emotional processing may be enhanced during an acute stress 
response, cognitive processing, due to their slow and effortful nature, may not be adaptive during 
an acute stress response and therefore may not be enhanced and even inhibited. Empirical 
findings from studies investigating the effects of acute stress on higher cognitive processes such 
as cognitive flexibility and working memory seem to support this argument.  
                                                          
3 Emotions were reported 25 minutes before the cortisol sampling. 
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Behavioral studies have shown that higher-order cognitive processes are inhibited by 
acute stress (Alexander, Hillier, Smith, Tivarus, & Beversdorf, 2007; Luethi et al., 2008).  For 
example, cognitive flexibility has been shown to be affected by acute psychosocial stress 
(Alexander et al., 2007). To describe in more detail, using the TSST (Kirschbaum et al., 1993) as 
the stressor, cognitive flexibility, measured with the Compound Remote Associates  test4 
(Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003), was decreased when participants were stressed relative to 
when they were not. Furthermore, differences in cognitive flexibility under acute stress and no 
stress disappeared when subjects were given propranolol5, a beta-adrenergic antagonist which 
blocks receptors for norepinephrine (Alexander et al., 2007). These findings suggest that acute 
stress decreases cognitive flexibility, and that this effect may be mediated by the actions of 
norepinephrine, an important neurotransmitter in an acute stress response.  
Working memory, or the ability to temporarily store as well as to update and manipulate 
the stored information (Baddeley, 2001), is another cognitive process which is affected by acute 
stress. In a study involving multiple measures of working memory, acute stress induced by the 
CPT impaired performance on the O-Span and digit span backward task, relative to a control 
condition (Schoofs et al., 2009). Since these tasks measure executive function, that is, the ability 
to operate on stored information, these finding suggest an impairment of this specific working 
memory function during an acute stress response. Furthermore, performance on these tasks was 
negatively correlated with cortisol (Schoofs et al., 2009), an important stress hormone, 
suggesting that physiological mechanisms underlying the stress response are associated with 
psychological effects of stress. The detrimental effect of acute stress on higher cognitive 
functions was also found with the stressor being the TSST (Kirschbaum et al., 1993). More 
specifically, working memory, measured with a modified reading span task, was impaired in the 
stress condition, relative to the no-stress condition (Luethi et al., 2008).  These results seem to 
support the general argument that stress does not enhance cognitive processing. 
In addition to the cognitive processes, acute stress has been negatively associated with the 
activity of the prefrontal cortex (Qin, Hermans, van Marle, Luo, & Fernandez, 2009; Sinha, 
Lacadie, Skudlarski, & Wexler, 2004), a brain region which is associated with higher cognitive 
                                                          
4 It is noteworthy that in these tasks, no emotional stimuli were used, whereas in the studies mentioned 
above, emotionally valenced stimuli were used in the tasks. 
5 Participants were given propranolol before exposure to the stressor. 
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functions such as working memory (Qin et al., 2009) and cognitive flexibility (Rougier, Noelle, 
Braver, Cohen, & O’Reilly, 2005). In addition to working memory and cognitive flexibility, the 
prefrontal cortex has also been associated with keeping goals and progress toward goals in mind 
(Lieberman et al., 2002), suggesting that when acute stress disrupts prefrontal cortex activity, 
goal-oriented, purposive behaviors may also be disrupted. Furthermore, the prefrontal cortex 
contains many glucocorticoid receptors (Meaney & Aitken, 1985; Patel, Katz, Karssen, & Lyons, 
2008; Patel et al., 2000; Perlman, Webster, Herman, Kleinman,& Weickert, 2007 as cited in 
Schoofs et al, 2009), suggesting that glucocorticoid activity during acute stress may be 
associated with the impact of acute stress on higher cognitive functions.  
To summarize, this section discussed empirical support for the argument that cognitive 
processes are not enhanced, and potentially inhibited, by acute stress. This argument has been 
supported by findings that acute stress (both physical and psychosocial) diminishes higher 
cognitive functions, such as cognitive flexibility and working memory (e.g., Alexander et al., 
2007; Schoofs et al., 2009). Furthermore, research has shown negative associations between 
acute stress and a brain region related to higher cognitive processes (i.e., prefrontal cortex; Qin et 
al., 2009; Sinha et al., 2004). These empirical findings support the argument that cognitive 
processing is not enhanced by acute stress. 
Interactions between emotional and cognitive processing during an acute stress response 
Emotional and cognitive processes interact, and one intersection of their interaction is 
emotion regulation, whereby cognitive and behavioral strategies regulate the experience and 
expression of emotions. Empirical findings have demonstrated that both experimental induction 
of emotion regulation strategies and individual differences in emotion regulation tendencies are 
associated with emotional responses. Therefore, trait emotion regulation tendencies may 
moderate the relationship between stress and emotions, as well as stress and social decision-
making. On the other hand, however, stress could also adversely affect momentary emotion 
regulation abilities by reducing cognitive functions which facilitate emotion regulation. 
Emotional and cognitive processing are supposed to be interconnected and to 
interactively influence behaviors (e.g., Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999). Emotion regulation (Gross, 
1998; Koole, 2009) is an intersection of emotional and cognitive processing in that emotion 
regulation strategies are facilitated by cognitive processes (e.g., Schmeichel et al., 2008). 
Emotion regulation is defined as “the processes by which individuals influence which emotions 
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they have, when they have them, and how they experience and express these emotions” (Gross, 
1998),6 and includes several emotion regulation strategies (see Webb, Miles, & Sheeran, 2012 
for a review). Two well-studied emotion regulation strategies include reappraisal, which involves 
“changing how we think about a situation in order to decrease its emotional impact,” and 
suppression, which involves “inhibiting ongoing emotion-expressive behavior” (Gross, 2002). 
These emotion regulation strategies (as well as others) have been shown to be associated with 
emotional responses in many studies (for reviews, see Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 
2010; Augustine & Hemenover, 2009; Webb et al., 2012). For example, participants who were 
shown aversive visual images (e.g., people crying, dead animals) reported significantly lower 
negative affect on trials where they received reappraisal instructions to “reinterpret the content of 
the picture so that it no longer elicited a negative response,” compared to when they were asked 
to naturally experience their emotions (Phan et al., 2005). Furthermore, reappraisal was found to 
have a larger effect (d+=0.36), compared to suppression
7 (d+=0.16; for a meta-analytic review, 
see Webb et al., 2012). 
Not only experimental, but also individual difference studies have shown that people can 
effectively regulation their emotions. More specifically, individual differences in long-term 
tendencies to engage in specific emotion regulation strategies (e.g., reappraisal and suppression) 
are associated with emotion-related outcomes, such as the tendency to experience and express 
positive and negative emotions (Gross & John, 2003). Furthermore, this research shows that 
different emotion regulation strategies are differentially associated with patterns of emotional 
responses. For example, it was found that reappraisal was positively correlated with the 
experience and expression of positive emotions, whereas it was negatively correlated with the 
                                                          
6 Emotion regulation strategies, divided into two broad categories of antecedent and response-focused 
processes, include situation selection, situation modification, distractivity and concentration (attentional 
deployment processes), reappraisal (cognitive change process), and suppression of emotion (behavioral 
modulation process; Gross, 2003; Gross & Thompson, 2007). 
7 A recent meta-analysis (Webb et al., 2012) has found that reappraisal and suppression respectively have 
small-to-medium and small effects on emotion regulation. Suppression decreases behavioral expression, 
but tends to increase physiological responding. For example, using a short film showing an amputation to 
elicit disgust, Gross (1998) asked participants to think about the film in a way that they would not feel 
anything or to hide their emotional response to the film. Results showed that both strategies lowered 
disgust expression, relative to a control (i.e., “watch”) group, but that sympathetic response and 
experience of disgust was higher in the suppression condition than in the reappraisal condition. 
Furthermore, in contrast to findings with negative emotions, suppression has been shown to effectively 
decrease the experience of positive emotions (Gross & Levenson, 1997). 
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experience and expression of negative emotions (Gross & John, 2003). Suppression showed a 
different pattern, however, with people experiencing greater negative emotions and less positive 
emotions, as well as less expression of negative emotions, with higher suppression (Gross & 
John, 2003). Research has also shown that reappraisal and suppression are differentially 
associated with psychopathology (Aldao et al., 2010), for example, with trait anxiety and 
depression (Dennis, 2007). In sum, both experimental and correlational studies show that 
emotion regulation can effectively modify emotion-related outcomes and correlational studies 
suggest that trait reappraisal and suppression are differentially associated with emotion-related 
outcomes. 
In the context of the present research, this influence of emotion regulation on emotional 
responses suggests that emotion regulation may be able to moderate the effect of stress on 
emotions and subsequent social decisions. However, it may also be that emotion regulation 
abilities may be changed due to stress, because stress has a detrimental effect on cognitive 
processes which facilitate emotion regulation. For example, of the factors discussed in the 
previous section, working memory may be one cognitive component which facilitates the 
regulation of emotions. Support for this claim comes from a study in which participants’ working 
memory, measured with the O-Span task, was negatively associated with the expression of 
emotions (disgust and amusement) in response to video clips (Schmeichel et al., 2008). In the 
same study, the experience of emotions (disgust, amusement, and sadness) was also negatively 
associated with working memory (measured with the O-span task and spatial and verbal 2-back 
task). These findings suggest that working memory is negatively associated with the expression 
and experience of emotions, suggesting that working memory aids the regulation of emotional 
expression and experience. Given that acute stress reduces working memory capacity, as the 
previously discussed findings suggests, acute stress may reduce the regulation of emotion as well. 
Therefore, even people with high emotion regulation capacities might not be able to control their 
emotions very well if they are stressed.  
Recent findings suggest a link between stress and emotion regulation. For example, self-
reported stress has been positively correlated with maladaptive coping strategies (e.g., self-blame, 
blaming others, rumination, and catastrophizing) and negatively correlated with adaptive ones 
(e.g., positive refocus, positive reappraisal; Martin & Dahlen, 2005). Moreover, a number of 
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studies indicated that prefrontal cortex, which is significantly impaired by stress as discussed 
above, plays a crucial role in emotion regulation (for reviews, see Ochsner & Gross, 2005; Quirk 
& Beer, 2006). For example, in a within-subject design, participants saw highly aversive pictures 
and were instructed to ‘maintain’ and ‘reappraise’ the emotion the picture induced (Banks, Eddy, 
Angstadt, Nathan, & Phan, 2007). Results showed that in the Reappraise blocks, successful 
emotion regulation, measured by self-reported negative emotion, was predicted by the 
connectivity between amygdala and mPFC as well as orbitofrontal cortex (Banks et al., 2007). 
These results suggest that the mPFC may down-regulate the activity of the amygdala, resulting in 
successful emotion regulation. In turn, the link between emotion regulation and mPFC activity 
was moderated by chronic cortisol levels (Urry et al., 2006). More specifically, in participants 
who were asked to decrease, increase, or attend to negative pictures, mPFC activity was 
negatively correlated with subjective negative emotion and amygdala activity. Importantly, 
participants showing less down-regulation of amygdala activity by the mPFC showed flatter 
diurnal cortisol slopes, which is related to stressful events (Urry et al., 2006). These findings 
seem to indicate a negative association between stress and emotion regulation.  Furthermore, 
activity of the vmPFC, which is positively associated with emotion regulation, is reduced by high 
levels of catecholamines (i.e., epinephrine and dopamine), which are released during an acute 
stress response (Arnsten, 2009).  
This subchapter presented empirical findings supporting the argument that stress should 
increase emotional, but not cognitive, processing. Specifically, findings were described, which 
show that stress increases reward sensitivity and learning, as well as emotional learning and 
expression. Furthermore, findings show that cognitive processes, such as cognitive flexibility and 
working memory, are not facilitated by acute stress. Of particular relevance, working memory is 
related to emotion regulation, which is the intersection of emotional and cognitive processing. 
That is, working memory aids emotional regulation strategies, such as reappraisal and 
suppression, but working memory is negatively affected by stress, and that may, in turn, also 
negatively affect emotion regulation abilities. On the other hand, trait emotion regulation 
tendencies have been effective in regulating emotions and thus, trait emotion regulation may 
moderate the effect of stress on emotional experience and expression. 
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Chapter II - The functions of the acute stress response 
 
 The previous chapter argued that emotional processing, relative to cognitive processing, 
would lead to early onset of stimulus-driven behavioral responses. But why should early onset of 
stimulus-driven behavioral responses be adaptive during an acute stress response? As an answer 
this question, this chapter presents the argument that the early onset of stimulus-driven 
behavioral responses in an animal undergoing an acute stress response may first, help prevent 
disturbances to homeostasis and second, enable appropriate responses to trigger stimuli without 
time-consuming considerations of multiple behavioral responses. More specifically, this chapter 
argues that early onset of a behavioral response may facilitate an animal during acute stress by 
allowing the animal to initiate precautionary behavioral responses even before a disturbance 
occurs. Complementarily to early onset of behavioral responses, stimulus-driven processing may 
be adaptive during an acute stress response, because it may facilitate a reliable response which is 
appropriate for the stimulus in the situation by activating hardwired or learned stimulus-response 
links. This chapter starts with an introduction to the evolutionary psychology perspective, applies 
this perspective to the acute stress response, and elaborates the main arguments concerning early 
onset of stimulus-driven behavioral responses during an acute stress response.  
A functional view of the acute stress response 
Adaptive problems (e.g., digestion) required adaptive solutions (e.g., intestines; Tooby & 
Cosmides, 2005). Such solutions were created through genetic combinations corresponding to 
phenotypic features, including neural features and their corresponding behaviors, which were or 
were not adaptive for the problem at hand (Tooby & Cosmides, 2005). Natural selection refers to 
the process through which the adaptive genetic combinations, but not the maladaptive ones, 
propagated into future generations (Tooby & Cosmides, 2005). More specifically, the genetic 
combination which helped an organism to survive until reproduction would be carried on into 
future generations by the offspring of that organism, as well as by organisms which were more 
likely than others to carry the genes of that organism (i.e., kin who are not offspring; Tooby & 
Cosmides, 2005). In contrast, genetic combinations which did not help an organism to survive 
until reproduction would be less likely to be carried on into future generations, due to the death 
before reproduction of the organism carrying that combination (Tooby & Cosmides, 2005). 
37 
 
Through this mechanism of natural selection, the more adaptive genetic combinations become 
more prevalent in future populations, while less adaptive ones become less prevalent (Tooby & 
Cosmides, 2005).  
An evolutionary psychological perspective applies the mechanisms of evolution, in 
particular, natural selection, to psychological and behavioral phenomena. One evolutionary 
psychological account states that certain behaviors, or more specifically, certain information-
behavior links, are more adaptive than others (Tooby & Cosmides, 2005). To illustrate, while the 
behavior of running would not per se help an animal, running away at the sight of a stalking lion 
would increase its chances of survival (Tooby & Cosmides, 2005). Many examples of adaptive 
information-behavior links can be found in the animal literature. For example, when cats get 
frightened, their hair stands up and their backs arch (Marks & Nesse, 1994), serving to make 
them look bigger than they are; when squid get approached by a predator, they spray ink and 
escape (Marks & Nesse, 1994), making it difficult for the predator to follow them; and blood or 
injury cues can cause fainting (i.e., bradycardiac syncope), which may help reduce blood loss 
after injury and inhibit further attack by a predator (Marks, 1988). The existence of such specific 
information-behavior links seems to support the notion that certain responses (e.g., the arching of 
a cat’s back) are more adaptive than others (e.g., grooming) for specific stimuli (e.g., a barking 
dog).  
According to contemporary theories in evolutionary psychology (Nesse et al., 2007; 
Tooby & Cosmides, 2005), natural selection leads to adaptive psychological and behavioral 
mechanisms which are more or less domain-specific. Domain-specific processing systems have 
been hypothesized to be efficient in solving adaptive problems, because such systems are 
designed to process specific types of information (Tooby & Cosmides, 2005). For example, 
empirical findings have shown that psychological mechanisms, such as attention, are sensitive to 
the nature of the information being processed.  More specifically, participants in a change 
detection paradigm were able to notice changes involving animals (human and non-human) in 
visual scenes better than they could notice changes involving inanimate objects, such as 
buildings and motor vehicles (New, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2007). This result was interpreted to 
mean that the attentional system may have a domain-specific subsystem designed to process 
information involving animals (New et al., 2007; Tooby & Cosmides, 2005). This sort of 
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specificity has been demonstrated not only with attention, but also with memory, learning, and 
inferential systems (Tooby & Cosmides, 2005). This sensitivity to specific content is supposed to 
give an adaptive advantage to domain-specific, relative to domain-general, information 
processing architectures by allowing distinct inference rules to specific types of information, 
creating favored hypotheses, thereby reducing the time required for problem-solving, and by 
enabling an organism to “fill in the blanks” when perceptual information is not available (for a 
more detailed explanation, see Tooby & Cosmides, 2005; pp. 46-48).  
While the contemporary theories of evolutionary psychology discussed above seem to 
agree that adaptive mechanisms are domain-specific, they also acknowledge some variance in 
the degree of domain-specificity among adaptive mechanisms. Taking the example of attention 
again, in some cases, attention can be focused on any task-relevant object in a visual scene, 
regardless of what kind of object it is (Tooby & Cosmides, 2005). This suggests that some less 
domain-specific mechanisms of attention do not take the type of information into account. 
In the context of stress responses, both domain-specificity and domain-generality seem to 
be present to some extent. One example of domain-specificity would be the distinct behavioral 
responses comprising the fight-flight and tend-befriend behavioral stress responses (cf. Taylor et 
al., 2000). Large behavioral differences exist between these two patterns of responses to stress, 
with the fight-flight response being characterized by aggressive or fleeing behaviors; and the 
tend-befriend response being characterized by nurturing behaviors and the development of a 
social support system (Taylor et al., 2000). Unlike the behavioral responses however, the 
physiological mechanisms underlying the fight-flight and tend-befriend responses are more 
similar, and a common physiological mechanism (i.e., autonomic and HPA axis activation) 
seems to underlie both behavioral responses (Taylor et al., 2000; pp. 413, 415). Therefore, some 
aspects of stress responses, such as the physiological stress response, may be more general than 
others (Buss, 1995; Tooby & Cosmides, 2005), such as the behavioral responses comprising the 
fight-flight and tend-befriend stress responses.  
The common physiological response underlying the fight-flight and tend-befriend 
responses is relatively general. Supporting this claim is the fact that some aspects of this 
response are common to all vertebrates (Nesse et al., 2007). More specifically, all vertebrates 
have the proopiomelanocortin molecule (POMC) and can produce corticosteroids, two important 
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components of the autonomic nervous system (ANS) and HPA axis physiological stress response 
(Nesse et al., 2007). Therefore, these components of the acute stress response may underlie 
multiple distinct behavioral stress responses which are displayed by different vertebrates. 
Furthermore, it has been suggested that these components of the acute stress response have 
stayed stable for hundreds of millions of years, and that the reason for this stability is that the 
mechanism serves multiple functions (Nesse et al., 2007; p. 966). In sum, important mechanisms 
underlying multiple stress responses, may also be common mechanisms underlying the fight-
flight and tend-befriend stress responses. The differences between the fight-flight and tend-
befriend stress responses may arise from modifications to these general physiological 
mechanisms. For example, although the same general physiological mechanism underlies both 
acute stress responses, especially in females, oxytocin release is increased, leading to the 
behavioral patterns described by the tend-befriend stress response (Taylor et al., 2000). 
To summarize, evolutionary psychological theory states that adaptive psychological and 
behavioral mechanisms are selected through natural selection and are more or less domain-
specific (Tooby & Cosmides, 2005). There are varying degrees of specificity, and relatively 
general mechanisms, such as the physiological mechanisms underlying the fight-flight and tend-
befriend stress responses (Taylor et al., 2000), may underlie multiple relatively specific 
mechanisms . This paper mainly focuses on the relatively general acute stress mechanisms (i.e., 
the physiological mechanisms). 
Early onset of stimulus-driven behavioral responses: the function of the acute stress response 
This subchapter presents two arguments, namely that the general physiological 
mechanisms underlying an acute stress response function to first, aid early onset of behavioral 
responses in response to stressors and second, to aid stimulus-driven behavioral responses in 
response to stressors. Moreover, this argument focuses on why early onset of stimulus-driven 
behavioral responses, facilitated by such mechanisms, would be adaptive during an acute stress 
response. In short, early onset of a behavioral response may help prevent a disturbance to 
homeostasis which may have occurred without the early initiation of the behavioral response. 
Furthermore, the stimulus-driven nature of the response may help ensure that the initiated 
response is appropriate for the eliciting stimulus. Such early onset of stimulus-driven behavioral 
responses may not always be adaptive, such as when one has enough time to logically consider 
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the best option from multiple behavioral options. However, in the case of a stress response, 
where time is limited, and urgent behavioral responding is needed, early onset of stimulus-driven 
behavioral responses would be better than a time-consuming, logical consideration of multiple 
options. 
As mentioned above, the first argument of this subchapter is that early onset of 
behavioral responses in response to cues of danger are adaptive. Previous literature has described 
the mechanisms of a stress response in the context of control systems (Nesse, 2005). In these 
descriptions, behavioral responses can be taken both before and after a disturbance has occurred. 
In the former case, an early onset of a behavioral response to a cue of potential danger, made 
possible through mechanisms such as classical conditioning, may help to prevent a disturbance. 
For example, once an animal has associated exposure to sunlight with a rise in body temperature, 
the animal may move into a cooler location upon exposure to sunlight, even before its body 
temperature actually rises (Nesse, 2005; p.91). In this case, the early onset8 of moving to a cooler 
location, made possible through classical conditioning, helps the animal to prevent the 
disturbance of homeostasis associated with exposure to sunlight, namely an increase in body 
temperature. Similarly, running away upon hearing rustling noises can be adaptive for an impala, 
because it can help the impala to escape from a predator which may have made that noise before 
being caught by the predator (Nesse, 2005). Put together, early onset of behavioral responses 
may be useful for an animal during a stressful situation because such responses can help the 
animal to prevent disturbances ranging from relatively small ones, such as a rise in body 
temperature from exposure to sunlight, to relatively large ones, such as attack from a 
predator. As with behaviors which occur before the occurrence of a stress response, this paper 
assumes that responses to potential cues of danger should also occur early even after a stress 
response has been initiated, in order to prevent new disturbances which may occur as a result of 
the danger encountered after initiation of the stress response. 
Interestingly, when viewed in terms of costs and benefits in a signal-detection context 
(Nesse, 2005), such early onset of defensive responses may be beneficial in the long-run, even if 
                                                          
8 This type of defense should, however, be distinguished from a response which is carried out with greater 
speed. The early onset of the unconditioned or conditioned response is defined by an earlier onset of the 
response, rather than a faster speed with which the response is carried out.  
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many of the individual responses are false alarms (i.e., the response occurs to a non-threatening 
cue). To paraphrase an example (Nesse, 2005; p. 95), if the defensive response of running away 
at the sound of rustling leaves has a cost of 300 kilocalories and the cost of harm from the 
predator is 300,000 kcal, it would be worthwhile to engage in 999 false alarms in the long run, in 
order to avoid one actual attack. In other words, when the cost of a disturbance is greater than the 
cost of a defensive response, it may be worthwhile to engage in preventive behavioral responses 
even if they are false alarms, in order to eventually prevent an actual disturbance. Given the 
adaptive value of early onset of behavioral responses to cues of danger, processes which 
facilitate such early onset of behavioral responses may be enhanced by basic physiological 
mechanisms of an acute stress response. 
This paper argues that while early onset of behavioral responses may help prevent 
disturbances from potential dangers, such early onset of responses may be facilitated by 
automatic, stimulus-driven responses. Put differently, early onset of a behavioral response and 
the stimulus-driven nature of that response are complementary in that early onset of the response 
can help to prevent a disturbance from occurring, and the stimulus-driven nature of the 
behavioral response can help ensure that the response taken is appropriate for the eliciting 
stimulus. Therefore, the early onset of the behavioral response can be adaptive in a temporal 
manner, but the stimulus-driven nature of the response can be adaptive in terms of determining 
the type of response taken. Stimulus-driven responses can help an animal to carry out responses 
which are appropriate for the specific stimuli in a situation. More specifically, unconditioned 
stimulus-response links such as the response of salivating upon perception of food (Pavlov, 
2003), may not only enable early onset of responses, but also enable a response (e.g., salivation) 
which is appropriate for the specific stimulus (e.g., food) encountered. Therefore, stimulus-
driven responses may facilitate early onset of appropriate responses, particularly for 
unconditioned stimuli (e.g., a rattlesnake).  
The unconditioned stimulus-response links mentioned above, relative to conditioned 
stimulus-response links which are obtained through associative learning, may have been shaped 
by natural selection and seem to serve adaptive functions. As mentioned above, examples of such 
adaptive, unconditioned stimulus-response links include the arching of a cat’s back in response 
to a threatening object, spraying behavior of squid in response to a predator, and bradycardiac 
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syncope (for a list of defensive responses to events and situations, see Nesse, 2005; p.93). 
Among learned stimulus-response links as well, the existence of learning biases (e.g., Mineka, 
Davidson, Cook, & Keir, 1984) suggests that certain stimulus-response links are more adaptive 
than others, and therefore are more easily learned. For example, rhesus monkeys are born 
without a fear of snakes, but after seeing another monkey get scared by a snake, rhesus monkeys 
learned to fear snakes although they did not exhibit the same learning pattern after seeing another 
monkey get scared by a flower (Mineka et al., 1984). In other words, although the fear response 
is not an unconditioned response to a snake in rhesus monkeys, it was nonetheless learned 
preferentially, relative to a fear response to flowers, through operant conditioning (Mineka et al., 
1984). These findings seem to suggest that a learning bias exists for evolutionarily relevant 
stimuli such as snakes. Thus, stimulus-driven behavioral responses may be adaptive during a 
stress response not only because they occur early and are appropriate for the specific stimuli in a 
given situation, but also because they are responses which have been reliably adaptive through 
evolutionary time. 
To summarize, this subchapter argues that the function of the physiological responses 
underlying an acute stress response is to facilitate mobilization for early onset of stimulus-driven 
behavioral responses. These characteristics may be adaptive during an acute stress response 
because first, early onset of behavioral responses may help prevent potential disturbances from 
occurring. Second, stimulus-driven behavioral responses help the animal to not only quickly 
generate a response, but also to generate a response which is appropriate for the stimulus at hand. 
The rationale for this argument is that stimuli can activate adaptive stimulus-response links 
which have developed through natural selection. 
Chapter summary 
 This chapter discussed the evolutionary psychological view that information-behavior 
links have been selected through the process of natural selection, with adaptive information-
behavior links being more or less domain-specific. The physiological mechanisms underlying the 
fight-flight and tend-befriend acute stress responses is claimed to be a relatively general stress 
response, whose functions include hastening the onset of and reducing the control of behavioral 
responses during an acute stress response. Early onset of behavioral responses to potentially 
threatening stimuli is hypothesized, in this paper, to be adaptive, because it can prevent a 
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potential disturbance to homeostasis (e.g., such as when an animal moves into the shade upon 
exposure to sunlight, before body temperature rises). Stimulus-driven responses during an acute 
stress response are hypothesized to be adaptive in that they could quickly activate adaptive 
stimulus-response links which are appropriate for the specific stimuli in a given situation. The 
two adaptive functions are complementary in that the early onset of a response would only be 
adaptive if it is appropriate for the stimulus to which it is a response. Conversely, a stimulus-
driven response may occur earlier than a response which is made after considering multiple 
possible responses. The next chapter discusses the psychological characteristics facilitating early 
onset of stimulus-driven behavioral responses. 
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Chapter III - Influence of emotional and cognitive processes on social decision-making 
outcomes 
 
As argued in the previous chapter, the physiological mechanisms underlying an acute 
stress response may enhance emotional processing, but not cognitive processing (Metcalfe & 
Mischel, 1999). In turn, these two types of processing may influence decision-making behaviors 
differently, as dual-process theories of decision-making have stated (Loewenstein & 
O’Donoghue, 2004, 2007; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999). Given the relationships between 
emotional and cognitive processing and decision-making behaviors, the current chapter examines 
the emotional and cognitive processes which influence behaviors in the Ultimatum Game, a 
social decision-making task. More specifically, this chapter describes the effects of emotion and 
emotion-regulation in the context of the Ultimatum Game and reviews findings which suggest 
that emotions and emotion regulation alter behaviors in the game. 
Before reviewing the relationship between emotion, emotion regulation, and social 
decision-making, previous research which has examined the relationship between stress and 
social decision-making will be described. Previous research has examined the effect of 
psychosocial stress on social decision-making behaviors, with results suggesting that 
psychosocial stress increases prosocial decision-making between individuals (von Dawans et al., 
2012; but see also Takahashi et al., 2007). To describe in more detail, employing tasks which 
measure prosocial behaviors and antisocial behaviors, the study found that psychosocial stress, 
relative to control, increases prosocial behaviors while not influencing antisocial behaviors (von 
Dawans et al., 2012).  
The Ultimatum Game (Guth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982) is a decision-making 
task in which two players, a Proposer and a Responder, decide how to split a sum of money (e.g., 
10 dollars) between the two people. The Proposer is given a fixed amount of money to split it 
with the Responder and is told to offer a portion of the money to the Responder, keeping the rest 
of the money for himself/herself. The Responder then has the choice to either accept the offer, 
resulting in both parties receiving the amount proposed by the Proposer; or to reject the offer, in 
which case both parties would receive no money.  
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According to the traditional assumptions of economic theory, the Responder, caring only 
about maximizing monetary utility, would be willing to accept any positive sum of money 
(Camerer, 2003). Knowing this, the Proposer would offer the least possible non-zero amount of 
money to the Responder. This prediction however, has been disconfirmed in many experiments 
(cf. Camerer, 2003). On average, Proposers offer $4 to $5 out of $10 to the Responder, and 
Responders reject about half of the offers of $2 or less (Camerer, 2003).  
These empirical results are not explicable by theories which assume that decision-makers 
value only monetary rewards, but they can be explained by theories which incorporate non-
monetary values, such as fairness (e.g., Rabin, 1993), into an individual’s utility function. To 
elaborate the model of Rabin (1993), in a two-person interaction, each person’s utility function is 
comprised not only of the monetary amount the person receives from the interaction, but also of 
the perceived kindness of the other person, as well as the kindness of oneself, directed towards 
the other person9. This model incorporates the concept of reciprocity, whereby perceived 
unkindness from one’s interaction partner would result in a negative utility, and this negative 
utility would be minimized only if the person were to reciprocate the perceived unkindness with 
unkindness toward the interaction partner. On the other hand, if one perceives their partner to be 
kind, their utility from this perceived kindness would be positive, and this positive utility would 
                                                          
9 Mathematically, this utility function is described with the following expression: 
 
, , = , + , ∗ [1 + , ] 
 
Where  is the overall utility of person i.  is the strategy of person i,  is the strategy of person j, and 
 is the expectation of person i, regarding the strategy of person j.  
,  represents the monetary payoff for person i, given the strategies of both persons. ,  
represents the fairness of person j, as perceived by person i. this terms takes into account the actual 
strategy of person j, and the expectation of person i, regarding person j’s strategy. ,  is the fairness 
of person i towards person j, given the strategies of both i and j.  
Both ,  and ,  range between -1 and +1/2. Thus, if ,  is negative (i.e., person j is 
perceived as being unfair), the overall utility of person i is reduced (i.e., disutility from perceived 
unfairness). In turn, since the lower limit of ,  is -1, and the term 1 + ,  cannot be negative, 
the overall utility would be maximized When the term 1 + ,  is zero, thereby neutralizing any 
disutility from perceived unkindness. Thus, in case person i perceives person j’s activity to be unfair, 
person i would maximize their utility by being unfair in return to person j. 
Conversely, if ,  is positive, the overall utility of person i would be maximized if ,  is also 
positive (specifically, +1/2), whereas person i’s overall utility would be diminished if ,  were 
negative. 
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be maximized by returning a kind behavior, as opposed to an unkind behavior (see footnote 10 
for a detailed mathematical description). Through this mechanism, Rabin’s model incorporates 
reciprocity, based on perceived kindness or unkindness, into an individual’s utility function10. 
Putting the concept of disutility into measurable psychological terms, Pillutla and 
Murnighan (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996) propose that hurt pride and anger lead to spiteful 
behaviors. More specifically, they describe a mechanism whereby perceived unfairness creates a 
sense of hurt pride in the receiver of unfairness and anger, which may lead to a reciprocal act of 
unfairness toward the interaction partner, namely rejecting the unfair offer(Pillutla & Murnighan, 
1996; p. 211). Within this framework, hurt pride and anger may be seen as the disutility11 from 
perceived unkindness, and this disutility could be neutralized by a reciprocal act of unkindness, 
or a rejection of an unfair offer.  
This model was tested in an Ultimatum Game experiment in which Proposers made 
offers of $1 or $2 to Responders who had the choice of accepting the offer, rejecting the offer, or 
taking an outside option (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996). Perceived fairness was experimentally 
varied by informing or not informing Responders about the total sum of money ($20, $4, or $2) 
being divided by the Proposer (Information), as well as informing or not informing the 
Responder whether the Proposer knew of their outside option or not (Common knowledge). 
Furthermore, participants wrote down how they felt after each offer, providing self-reports of 
perceived fairness as well as anger. Results showed that Responders who knew how much total 
was being divided (i.e., complete information) saw more offers as being unfair than those who 
did not know (i.e., partial information), and that anger was increased when Responders knew that 
the Proposer knew of their outside options (i.e., common knowledge), compared to when they 
did not know (i.e., no common knowledge). Importantly, a combination of complete information 
and common knowledge led to more rejections than any other condition, suggesting that a 
combination of perceived unfairness and anger lead to rejections of Ultimatum Game offers. 
These results seem to support the argument that a sense of hurt pride from unfair treatment leads 
                                                          
10 In the context of an Ultimatum Game, overall utility in Rabin’s (1993) model may not be maximized 
through reciprocal behavior, as reciprocal behavior on the part of the Responder would reduce , , 
or the utility from monetary payoff to zero. 
11 Although not mentioned in Pillutla and Murnighan (1996), utility from perceived kindness may be 
operationalized as gratitude or joy, leading to reciprocal acts of kindness. 
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to anger, which leads to inefficient negotiations (Pilluta & Murnighan, 1996) and furthermore 
seem consistent with Rabin’s (1993) argument that perceived unfairness creates disutility which 
can be alleviated through reciprocal behaviors. 
In sum, rejections in the Ultimatum Game cannot be explained with theories assuming 
that individuals gain utility only from monetary rewards. The rejections can be explained by 
theories which incorporate social preferences such as fairness into the individual’s utility 
function (Rabin, 1993). The concept of disutility from unfairness (Rabin, 1993) can be 
operationalized in terms of emotions such as anger (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996) and 
experimental results have confirmed that perceived unfairness leads to a negative emotion (i.e., 
anger), which then increases rejections of offers perceived to be unfair (Pillutla & Murnighan, 
1996). These emotions, in turn, can be regulated by cognitively modulated emotion-regulation 
strategies such as reappraisal and suppression. Therefore, in the context of an Ultimatum Game, 
negative emotions should be positively associated with rejections of unfair offers, whereas 
emotion regulation should be negatively associated with rejections of such offers. The remainder 
of this section describes the empirical support for these claims. 
Effect of emotion on Ultimatum Game decisions 
Empirical support for the hypothesis that negative emotions increase rejections of unfair 
offers comes from studies which have measured emotional responses to the unfair offers (i.e., 
integral emotions; Pham, 2007; Rick & Loewenstein, 2007) as well as studies which have 
induced emotional states irrelevant to the Ultimatum Game offers (i.e., incidental emotions; 
Pham, 20007; Rick & Loewenstein, 2007). For example, rejections of unfair offers are reduced 
when participants are given another method for expressing negative emotions (Xiao & Houser, 
2005). More specifically, when participants were given a chance to write a message to their 
partner after a one-shot Ultimatum Game, they expressed their emotions (79% of Responders 
who received an offer of 20% or lower wrote a message expressing a negative emotion) through 
the written message. Importantly, participants in this emotion expression group rejected fewer 
unfair offers, relative to a no-emotion-expression group. Based on these results, the authors 
suggested that rejections of unfair offers may be an expression of negative emotions when no 
direct method of expression (in their case, a written message) is available (Xiao & Houser, 2005; 
p. 7401). Brain imaging studies have further illustrated the role of emotions in social decision 
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making. For example, amygdala activity, which is associated with emotions (Hamann & Mao, 
2002), was correlated with rejections in the Ultimatum Game (Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, 
Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003). These findings support the claim that negative emotions are 
positively associated with Ultimatum Game rejections12. 
Even incidental emotions, or emotions which are not directly associated with the 
decision-making task, have been shown to influence behaviors in the Ultimatum Game (e.g., 
Harle & Sanfey, 2007, 2010; Moretti & di Pellegrino, 2010), suggesting that emotions per se, 
and not only those which are induced by unfair offers, influence Ultimatum Game behaviors13. 
Within the framework of fairness theories, this could be construed as ‘disutility’ (or ‘utility’) 
from factors other than perceived unfairness (or fairness) as influencing Ultimatum Game 
behaviors. While the studies in the previous paragraph focused on emotions induced by the 
partner’s offer during the game, the studies described below examined the effects of emotions 
induced by stimuli which were irrelevant to the game, such as movie clips (amusement and 
sadness; Harle & Sanfey, 2007), pictures (sadness and disgust; Moretti & Pellegrino, 2010), and 
negative social evaluations (Fabiansson & Denson, 2012). For example, experimentally induced 
positive (i.e., amusement) and negative emotions (i.e., sadness) influenced rejection rates in a 
subsequent Ultimatum Game. Specifically, results showed higher rejections in the sadness than 
in the amusement condition, suggesting that emotional valence influences Ultimatum Game 
rejections, specifically with negative valence increasing rejections of unfair offers. These 
findings further support the claim that emotions, particularly negative emotions, influence 
decisions in the Ultimatum game by showing that the experience of emotions per se influences 
their behaviors in the game. Together, the above suggest that emotions, especially negative 
emotions, both those which are induced by unfair offers, as well as those which exist 
independently of the Ultimatum Game, influence Responders’ rejections of unfair offers.  
                                                          
12 Negative emotions influence behaviors in other experiments, in similar ways. For example, in a public 
good game with costly punishment, participants assigned costly punishment with no current or future 
monetary benefit to group members who contributed little to a resource pool (Fehr & Gaechter, 2002). 
Importantly, in hypothetical scenarios, participants also reported more negative emotions, namely anger 
and annoyance, toward a member of their group who contributed significantly less than the other 
members of the group. Given these findings, the authors suggested that emotions are a mechanism 
underlying costly punishments in public good games. 
13 This seems to be a different mechanism than the one described by Rabin (1993) or Pillutla and 
Murnighan (1996).  
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Finally, it should be noted that these effects of negative emotions may not necessarily 
play a harmful role, at least in terms of monetary gain, in social decision-making studies. For 
example, the anticipation of emotional responses from a partner, whether monetary or non-
monetary, seem to induce more fair behaviors from players in the public good game (e.g., Fehr & 
Gaechter, 2002) and from givers in the Dictator game (Ellingsen & Johannesson, 2008; Xiao & 
Houser, 2009). These findings suggest that although in certain situations, such as in one-shot 
games, negative emotions may lead to reduced monetary gains (as they can increase rejection 
rates), in other situations where a rejection of an unfair offer can prompt more fair behaviors in 
the future, negative emotions may eventually lead to increased monetary gains. Moreover, 
depending on the nature of one’s utility function (i.e., whether it includes only monetary utility 
or other social factors), the expression of negative emotions may increase or decrease one’s 
utility in general.  
In conclusion, emotions have been shown to influence Ultimatum Game decisions (e.g., 
Sanfey et al., 2003). Negative emotions have been particularly well-studied, and have been 
shown to increase rejections of unfair offers (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996). Furthermore, 
emotions may not necessarily be adaptive or maladaptive for efficient decision-making, rather 
interacting with the specific situations in which the decisions are being made. These findings 
lend support to the argument (e.g., Sanfey et al., 2003) that emotions, not only those experienced 
in response to perceived unfairness, but also incidental emotions which are not related to the 
decision-making task, underlie rejections of unfair offers in the Ultimatum Game. 
Effect of emotion regulation on Ultimatum Game decisions 
Compared with the literature on the effect of negative emotions on Ultimatum Game 
behaviors, there is less empirical support for the hypothesis that emotion regulation strategies 
which reduce the ‘disutility’ from perceived unfairness decrease rejections of unfair offers. 
Nonetheless, emotion regulation strategies have been associated with lower rejection rates in the 
Ultimatum Game. For example, general emotion regulation abilities have been associated with 
decisions in the game (Koenigs & Tranel, 2007), with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex (vmPFC), a brain region linked with emotion regulation (Burgess and Wood, 1990), being 
associated with higher rejections of unfair offers in the Ultimatum Game (van’t Wout, Chang, & 
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Sanfey, 2010). The use of emotion regulation strategies14 may result in milder behavioral 
responses to unfair offers by decreasing the experience of negative emotions associated with 
such offers. For example, distraction was effective in reducing rejections, compared with 
affective rumination (Wang et al., 2011). More specifically, during a time delay after getting 
anger-inducing offers (i.e., $2 out of $10) in the Ultimatum Game, Responders who were asked 
to “start writing numbers, starting at 1… until the next page appears”  rejected less than those 
who engaged in affective rumination during the time delay (Wang et al., 2011). In another study, 
participants in an Ultimatum Game who were instructed to engage in reappraisal of Ultimatum 
Game offers, rejected fewer unfair offers, compared to participants in the control and 
suppression conditions (van’t Wout et al., 2010). Together, these findings support the hypothesis 
that the use of certain (although not all) emotion regulation strategies can reduce rejections of 
unfair offers in the Ultimatum Game. 
 Emotion-regulation strategies vary in terms of their effects on behaviors, however, and 
not all strategies may lead to reduced rejections of unfair offers. Specifically, reappraisal is 
associated with lower experience of negative emotions, whereas suppression is associated with 
higher experience but lower expression of negative emotions (Gross & John 2003). Thus, not all 
emotion-regulation strategies may decrease Ultimatum Game rejections. Indeed, empirical 
findings regarding suppression suggest that, unlike reappraisal, it does not reduce the rejection of 
unfair offers. More specifically, participants who were asked to suppress their emotions during 
an Ultimatum Game showed no difference in terms of rejection rates, compared to a control 
group (van’t Wout et al., 2010). Given the varying effects of specific emotion regulation 
strategies on Ultimatum Game decisions, the present research examined two well-studied 
strategies, namely reappraisal and suppression, with differing effects on Ultimatum Game 
behaviors. 
In conclusion, emotion regulation strategies may influence Ultimatum Game rejections 
by controlling the experience and expression of the emotions associated with unfair offers. 
Reappraisal may reduce rejections of unfair offers by reducing the negative emotions 
experienced in response to such offers. Furthermore, although theoretically, suppression may 
                                                          
14 For example, one may rationalize the unfairness by telling oneself that unfairness is a normal part of 
life which cannot be avoided (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996). 
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reduce rejections by reducing the expression of negative emotions experienced by the person, 
previous empirical findings suggest that suppression is at least not as effective as reappraisal in 
reducing rejections of unfair offers.  
Chapter summary 
Models of social decision-making which incorporate social preferences can explain 
rejections of unfair offers through constructs such as reciprocity (Rabin, 1993). Reciprocity, the 
returning of kindness for kindness and unkindness for unkindness (Rabin, 1993), has been 
proposed to be one mechanism underlying rejections of unfair offers in the Ultimatum Game 
(e.g., Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996). Many experimental studies have provided empirical support 
for the claim that reciprocity plays an important role in social decision-making (e.g., Knoch, 
Pascual-Leone, Meyer, Treyer, & Fehr, 2006). Moreover, emotions, particularly negative 
emotions, have been shown to be a crucial component of reciprocal behaviors (e.g., Xiao & 
Houser, 2005). More specifically, negative emotions, both integral (Xiao & Houser, 2005) and 
incidental (Harley & Sanfey, 2007), have been shown to increase rejections of unfair offers. 
Furthermore, emotion regulation strategies, such as reappraisal, have been shown to be effective 
in reducing rejections of unfair offers (van’t Wout et al., 2010), perhaps by modulating the 
negative emotional responses to those offers.  
Introduction summary 
Based on previous predictions (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999), the present paper posits that 
processing of emotional aspects of stimuli is associated with the ability to engage in early and 
stimulus-driven responses. Therefore, as previously suggested (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999), 
enhancement of emotional processing may facilitate early onset of stimulus-driven behavioral 
responses during an acute stress response. Cognitive processing may not be enhanced during an 
acute stress response however, since it occurs later than and is more controlled than emotional 
processing (Barrett et al., 2007; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Murphy & Zajonc, 1993; Zajonc, 
1980, 1984). Empirical findings provide general support for the notion that stress enhances both 
processing of emotional stimuli after encountering the stressor (e.g., Luethi et al., 2008), and that 
stress intensifies emotional experience (Wang et al., 2005). On the other hand, cognitive 
processing such as working memory and cognitive flexibility seem not to be enhanced (e.g., 
Alexander et al., 2007).  
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Furthermore, based on previous arguments (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999), this paper 
presents two reasons that early onset of stimulus-driven behaviors should be adaptive during an 
acute stress response. Specifically, early onset of a behavioral response to a stressor may help 
prevent a disturbance from that stressor, and a stimulus-driven response may facilitate the 
selection of appropriate responses for eliciting stimuli. 
Putting this into the context of a social decision-making task, specifically in the context 
of the Ultimatum Game, an enhancement of emotional processing may intensify the negative 
emotions felt in response to unfair offers, and thereby lead to higher rejections of such offers. 
However, emotion regulation may counteract the influence of negative emotions on decisions to 
some degree (e.g., van’t Wout et al., 2010). Given these arguments, the current research aimed to 
examine whether acute stress would increase rejections of unfair Ultimatum Game offers, 
whether this effect would be mediated by increased negative emotions, and whether the effect of 
negative emotions on rejections would be moderated by trait emotion regulation tendencies. 
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Chapter IV – Experiments 
 
Overview of studies 
As mentioned earlier, there is a burgeoning literature on the effects of acute stress on 
social decision-making (cf. van den Bos et al., 2013), but this literature does not seem to yet 
examine mediating and moderating factors of the link between stress and social decision-making. 
One main aim and contribution of this research is to address this gap by examining the mediating 
and moderating roles, respectively, of emotions and emotion regulation tendencies. Generally, 
acute stress is expected to increase emotional processing, but not cognitive processing. In 
particular, acute stress has been shown to be associated with, and to increase emotional reactions 
to subsequent stimuli (e.g., Petzold et al., 2010) and experience of negative emotions (e.g., Wang 
et al., 2005); whereas it reduces working memory capacity (Schoofs et al., 2009), a cognitive 
modulator of the regulation of emotion (Schmeichel et al., 2008). Based on previous findings 
(e.g., van’t Wout et al., 2010; Xiao & Houser, 2005), emotion and emotion-regulation are in turn, 
expected to affect social decision-making behaviors, namely in the Ultimatum Game. More 
specifically, negative emotions, which have been shown to both be influenced by stress (e.g., 
Wang et al., 2005) and to increase rejections of unfair offers (e.g., Xiao & Houser, 2005), may 
mediate the effect of acute stress on Ultimatum Game rejections. On the other hand, trait 
emotion-regulation tendencies such as the tendency to employ cognitive reappraisal, have been 
shown to effectively regulate negative emotions (e.g., Gross & John, 2003), and may moderate 
the relationship between acute stress and rejections of unfair offers.  
While previous studies have examined the effects of psychosocial stress on social 
decision-making, the current study employed a physical stress induction procedure which has 
been shown to have different effects from physical stress in animal studies (Pacak, 2000). 
Specifically, the present research employed the Cold Pressor Test (CPT; Bullinger et al., 1984), 
which requires participants to leave their hand in either ice water (experimental condition) or 
warm water (control condition) for up to three minutes. After completing the stress manipulation, 
participants completed the Ultimatum Game (Guth et al., 1982), a decision-making task in which 
a Proposer offers a portion of 10 Euros to the Responder. To recapitulate, the Responder can 
choose to accept the offer, resulting in both parties receiving the amount proposed by the 
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Proposer; or to reject the offer, in which case both parties would receive no money. In both of the 
studies presented here, all participants played in the role of Responder.   
Given that stress increases emotional reactivity, increasing negative emotions in 
particular (Sinha et al., 2008; Wang et al., 2005), individuals under stress may experience and 
express more negative emotions than those not under stress. The emotion-decision link is related 
to stress in that Ultimatum Game rejections are positively associated with negative emotions, 
whether or not they are relevant to the Ultimatum Game (e.g., Harle & Sanfey, 2007; Sanfey et 
al., 2003; Xiao & Houser, 2005). Therefore, stressed participants, experiencing more negative 
emotions in response to unfair offers (but not fair offers), than non-stressed participants, may 
reject more unfair offers in the Ultimatum Game than participants in the control condition. This 
rationale leads to the first hypothesis: 
• Participants in the stress condition would reject more unfair offers, but not fair offers, 
relative to participants in the control condition (H1). 
Based on the findings discussed above, stress was expected to increase negative emotions. 
This hypothesis was tested in Study 1, using explicit measures of both specific emotions and 
general negative-positive valence. Given the theoretical and empirical background discussed in 
previous chapters, negative emotions were expected to be associated with higher rejection rates 
of unfair offers. This second set of hypotheses is summarized below: 
• Based on previous findings relating negative emotions to stress, negative emotions were 
expected to be higher in the stress condition than in the control condition (H2a). 
• Negative emotions were expected to be associated with higher rejections of unfair offers 
(H2b). 
Hypotheses 1, 2a, and 2b comprise the mediation hypothesis that acute stress would increase 
rejections of unfair offers, mediated by negative emotions. 
Trait emotion regulation tendencies have been associated with emotional experience and 
expression (Gross & John, 2003). Specifically, reappraisal, reinterpreting the meaning of a 
situation, is associated with less experience and expression of negative emotions, whereas 
suppression, not showing how one feels, is associated with less expression, but not experience of 
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negative emotions (Gross & John, 2003). So it may be that reappraisal may help reduce the 
experience of negative emotions even in the stress condition, thereby leading to high reappraisers 
being less affected by stress in terms of negative emotions than low appraisers. On the other 
hand, suppression may not help to reduce the experience of negative emotions, and there may not 
be a difference between high and low suppressors in terms of negative emotions in the stress or 
control groups. Therefore, reappraisal may moderate the effect of stress on rejection rates by 
reducing the negative emotions experienced in both the stress and control conditions, whereas 
suppression may moderate the effect of stress on rejection rates, not by reducing the experience 
of negative emotions, but by reducing the expression of negative emotions. This argument leads 
to the third set of hypotheses: 
• The effect of stress on rejection rates is expected to be moderated by trait emotion 
regulation tendencies. Specifically, among the stressed participants, but not among 
control participants, low re-appraisers and low suppressors, collectively referred to as low 
emotion regulators, are expected to reject more unfair offers than high emotion regulators 
(H3a).  
Interestingly, although re-appraisal and suppression may have similar moderating effects on 
the stress-rejections link, they may affect the underlying emotions differently. More specifically, 
compared with high re-appraisers, low re-appraisers may reject more unfair offers because they 
experience more negative emotions. On the other hand, low suppressors, relative to high 
suppressors, may reject more unfair offers because low-suppressors cannot suppress the 
expression of their negative emotions. High suppressors, although they are able to suppress their 
negative emotions, may experience the same amount of negative emotions as low suppressors, 
whereas high re-appraisers should experience and express less negative emotions than low re-
appraisers (Gross, 1998). This leads to the following additional hypotheses: 
• High reappraisers should experience less negative emotions than low appraisers, 
particularly in the stress condition (H3b).  
• High and low suppressors in either the stress or control conditions should not differ in 
terms of experience of negative emotions (H3c). 
Hypotheses 3a-3c comprise the moderation hypotheses regarding emotion regulation. 
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A different possibility from the above hypotheses should be noted however. Specifically, 
while trait emotion regulation may help reduce negative emotions under stress, stress may also 
reduce emotion regulation abilities, due to its negative influence on working memory. This 
reduction of emotion regulation abilities would in turn, increase the experience and expression of 
negative emotions in the context of the Ultimatum Game (i.e., rejection of unfair offers). More 
specifically, even individuals with high reappraisal tendencies may feel negative emotions in 
response to unfair offers, and thus show no difference from the low reappraisers in negative 
emotions or rejections. Similarly, individuals low in suppression tendencies may be less likely to 
suppress during a stress response, compared to individuals high in suppression or non-stressed 
individuals.  
Last but not least, because an early onset of behavioral response is thought to be crucial 
under acute stress, participants under stress are hypothesized to show faster reaction times than 
those who are not stressed. This is stated in the following hypothesis. 
• Stressed participants will show faster decision times than non-stressed participants (H4). 
 
Experiment 1 
Methods 
 In order to test the hypotheses above, the first experiment employed a 2 (stress: stress vs. 
control) x 2 (amount: fair vs. unfair) design, with stress being a between-subject and amount 
being a within-subject factor. Self-report ratings of state emotions and a trait emotion regulation 
measure were employed. 
Participants 
Fifty-four participants (34 females) took part in the experiment for payment or course 
credit.  In addition, they received money earned from the experiment. There were 29 participants 
in the stress (18 females) and 25 in the control condition (16 females). The average age of 
participants was 25.07 (SD=6.28; range=18-42). Participants did not have a history of heart 
disease (including coronary artery disease, angina, or arrhythmia), peripheral vascular disease, 
diabetes, Reynaud's phenomenon, cryoglobulinemia, vasculitis, or lupus. All were non-smokers 
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who were not currently taking hormone birth control or any other hormone replacement 
medications, and not taking corticosteroid medications or beta-adrenergic agonists. Participants 
were told to avoid eating, drinking (except water), or sleeping within 2 hours of the study, and to 
avoid exercising within 1 hour of the experiment.  
Tasks and Measures 
Scales and Questionnaires 
 The Faces Pain Scale (FPS; Bieri, Reeve, Champion, Addicoat, & Ziegler, 1990) and 
Visual Analog Scale (VAS; Carlsson, 1983) were used to measure the amount of pain 
participants experienced before and during the stress (or control) task. The FPS (Bieri et al., 1990) 
consists of six faces, starting with a neutral expression, indicating no pain, and the sixth face 
expressing and indicating extreme pain. Participants were asked to point to the face which 
corresponded to either their level of pain at the time of measurement (before the stress or control 
task) or the highest pain level felt during the stress or control task. The VAS (Carlsson, 1983) 
consists of a horizontal line, with the left end indicating “No Pain” and the right end indicating 
“Worst Possible Pain”. Participants were asked to mark with an ‘X’ the level of pain they felt, 
before and during the peak of the stress or control task. Participants completed the scales 
immediately before and after the stress or control task.  
 Participants were asked to report 10 state emotions, including anger, pride, happiness, 
sadness, shame, excitement, pleasant relaxation, nervousness, anxiety, and boredom on a five-
point Likert scale (1-not at all, 5-extremely). 
 A modified version of the Affect Grid (Russell, Weiss, & Mendelson, 1989) was used to 
measure state emotions in terms of negative or positive valence and low or high arousal. The 
Affect Grid in the present study consisted of a 9 x 9 grid, with the left indicating “Extremely 
Positive” valence and the right indicating “Extremely Negative” valence. The top indicated high 
arousal (i.e., “Extremely Aroused”) and the bottom indicated low arousal (i.e., “Extremely 
Inactive”).  
The Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross & John, 2003) was used to measure 
participants’ tendency to reappraise and suppress their emotions. The 10-item scale contains two 
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subscales assessing reappraisal and suppression tendencies and assesses the tendency to 
reappraise or suppress positive and negative emotions. The reappraisal subscale included six 
items (e.g., “When I want to feel more positive emotion (such as joy or amusement), I change 
what I’m thinking about.”) and the suppression subscale included four items (e.g., “I control my 
emotions by not expressing them.”). The items were rated on a 7-point Likert scale (1-strongly 
disagree, 7-strongly agree).  
Cold Pressor Test 
The Cold Pressor Test (Bullinger et al., 1984; Mather, Lighthall, Nga, &Gorlick, 2010) 
was used as a stress induction method and saliva samples were collected for cortisol data. 
Participants submerged their non-dominant hand up to their wrist in cold (0.6-3 degrees Celsius; 
M=1.60, SD=.72) or warm (37-40 degrees Celsius; M=38.11, SD=.87) water, respectively, for 1-
4 minutes (M=2.33,SD=.90). In order to intensify the stress response, participants were told that 
they would do the CPT in the same condition 30 minutes after doing it the first time (Mather et 
al., 2010), but in fact, participants underwent the CPT only once. 
Cortisol Assessment 
Saliva samples were collected by drooling into a tube before the CPT (Time 1), 15 
minutes after the CPT (or 5 minutes before the UG; Time 2), and 30 minutes after (Time 3) the 
CPT (Buchanan, Tranel, & Adolphs, 2006; Lighthall et al., 2009). Participants drank an eight 
ounce cup of plain water at least ten minutes before providing their first saliva sample in order to 
ensure clean samples. For each saliva sample, participants gathered at least 1mL of saliva in total 
(Mather et al., 2010) by drooling through a straw into two plastic tubes (Innovation Beyond 
Limits). Each tube was labeled and stored at -30 degrees Celsius (Lighthall et al., 2009) after 
collection and shipped via ground transport to the IBL analysis center.  
Ultimatum Game 
The design of the Ultimatum Game followed a within-subject format similar to designs 
used in previous research (e.g., Moretti & Pellegrino, 2010; Sanfey et al., 2003). Participants 
played 24 rounds of the Ultimatum Game and were informed that they would interact with 
people in different locations to split 10 Euros in each trial. Participants were informed that 10% 
59 
 
of their earnings would be paid at the end of the experiment. The experimenter then asked 
participants to play a computer lottery to decide whether they would play the game as a 
Responder or a Proposer. In fact, all participants were assigned to the Responder role and the 
role remained the same throughout the experiment. 
The Ultimatum Game had six trials each with 50% (5 out of 10 Euros), 30% (3 out of 10 
Euros), 20% (2 out of 10 Euros), and 10% (1 out of 10 Euros) offers. In order to prevent 
participants from strategically rejecting offers in order to get higher offers in future rounds, 
participants were informed that they would not interact with a particular Proposer more than 
once.  Participants did not know the total number of rounds in the Ultimatum Game.  
At the beginning of each trial, participants saw question marks on the screen, 
representing potential partners, and chose a partner by clicking on a question mark. For each trial, 
participants saw a picture of their partner (i.e., the Proposer) while waiting for the partner to 
make their offer. Half of the Proposers for each offer amount were female, and the other half 
were male, and Proposers’ pictures were presented in a different random order for each 
participant. The duration of the waiting period was variable, ranging between 5-10 seconds. 
After the waiting period, the offer made by the Proposer (e.g., “You get 3€. He gets 7€.”) was 
presented for 1 second. Then, the computer asked for a decision (“Accept or reject?”). 
Participants were given up to 10 seconds to make their decision and forfeited the offer if they 
took longer. Participants pressed one of two keys to indicate either an accept or a reject response. 
Following the response, the outcome of their decision was presented (e.g., “You accepted the 
offer. You get 3€. He gets 7€.”) and stayed on the screen until participants pressed a key to 
continue to the next trial. Before participants started the task, they played two practice trials to 
ensure that they understood the procedures and rules of the game. Stimuli were presented using 
EPrime 2.0 software (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA), and faces of Proposers were 
taken from the FACES database (Ebner, Riediger, &Lindenberger, 2010).   
Procedure 
Upon arrival, participants drank an eight ounce cup of water and gave their first saliva 
sample (Time 1) at least 10 minutes (M=21.94, SD=6.29) after drinking the water. Participants 
provided informed consent, and filled out the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross & 
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John, 2003) as well as several additional personality questionnaires. Approximately 10 minutes 
(M=8.21, SD=4.94) after the first (i.e., baseline) saliva sample, participants completed the CPT. 
Participants gave pain ratings (Cahill, Gorski, & Le, 2003; Smeets, Otgaar, Candel, & Wolf, 
2008) using the Faces Pain Scale(FPS; Bieri et al., 1990) and Visual Analogue Scale (VAS; 
Carlsson, 1983) immediately before and after the CPT. Participants read UG instructions and 
neutral reading materials for 15 minutes (Buchanan et al., 2008; Lighthall et al., 2009) after 
completing the CPT. Participants then provided their second saliva sample approximately 15 
minutes (M = 14.44, SD=2.29) after the CPT (Time 2). The second saliva sample collection was 
followed by the UG, which started about 20 minutes (M=20.19, SD=3.26) after the CPT. Before 
and after the UG, participants completed ratings for 10 discrete state emotions (i.e., anger, pride, 
happiness, sadness, shame, excitement, pleasant relaxation, nervousness, anxiety, and boredom) 
on a five-point Likert scale (1-not at all, 5-extremely) as well as the Affect Grid (Russell et al., 
1989). After the UG (approximately 30 minutes after the CPT; M=30.66, SD=4.30) participants 
provided their third saliva sample (Time 3) and completed demographics as well as other 
questionnaires. The experiment was conducted between 12pm and 6pm. 
Results 
Data from one participant, whose reaction times on the decision-making task were 2 SDs 
higher than average, was removed. Reaction time outliers were calculated by averaging all 
reaction times for each individual (yielding 54 mean scores in total), obtaining the standard 
deviation of these 54 scores, and finding mean scores which were 2 SDs higher or lower than the 
average of the 54 scores. Trials in which participants took longer than 10 seconds to make their 
decision were treated as missing data. For the dependent variable, the rejection rates for the 5 
Euro trials were treated as a baseline, and two dependent variables were created. First, the 
average of 1 and 2 Euro rejection rates was subtracted from the 5 Euro rejection rate, and second, 
the 3 Euro rejection rate was subtracted from the 5 Euro rejection rate in order to obtain rejection 
rates for unfair and fair offers, respectively. The former dependent variable is referred to as 
rejections of “unfair” offers and the latter dependent variable is referred to as rejections of “fair” 
offers. The use of this dependent variable is similar to previous studies which have grouped 10-
30% offers as “fair” and 40-50% offers as “unfair” offers (Harley & Sanfey, 2007, 2010). 
Although 30% offers are still unfair, previous papers have grouped 10-20% offers as the offers 
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which are rejected most frequently (60% in Xiao & Houser, 2005; about 50% in Camerer, 2003). 
Thus, in the present research, 30% and 50% offers were considered to be fair, relative to 10-20% 
offers. 
Manipulation checks 
To check whether the CPT was successful in inducing pain and an acute stress response, 
pain ratings and cortisol levels of stress and control conditions were compared. A one-way 
(stress: stress vs. control) analysis of variance (ANOVA) on ratings of peak pain during the CPT, 
averaged across participants, yielded a significant difference between the stress (VAS: M=56.32, 
SD=26.10; FPS: M=3.91, SD=1.32) condition, and control (VAS:M=1.61, SD=2.64; FPS:M=1.04, 
SD=.20) condition, VAS: F(1,53)=109.37, p<.001; FPS: F(1,53)=115.678, p<.001.  
A 3 (Time: 1, 2, vs 3) x 2 (Stress: stress vs. control) mixed model ANOVA on cortisol 
levels revealed a significant Time x Stress interaction, F(2,102)=3.17, p<.05, η2=.06, (see Figure 
1). Specifically, post-hoc analyses of covariance (ANCOVAs) with baseline cortisol level as a 
covariate revealed that stressed participants had significantly higher cortisol levels, compared to 
control participants, at both Time 2 (stressed: M=.45, SD=.22, control: M=.34, SD=.18), 
F(1,53)=4.33, p<.05, η2=.08, as well as Time 3(stressed: M=.44, SD=.26, control: M=.30, 
SD=.15), F(1,53)=5.26, p<.05, η2=.10. There was no main effect of time on cortisol levels, 
F(2,102)<1.  
These results indicate that participants in the stress, relative to control, condition 
experienced more peak pain during the stress task. Moreover, controlling for baseline cortisol 
levels, participants in the stress, relative to control, condition showed higher levels of cortisol at 
15 and 30 minutes after the stress task. 
Figure 1. Cortisol levels at three time intervals (before, 15 minutes after, and 30 minutes after 
the stress/control task) in Experiment 1. 
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Behavioral Results 
Next, the hypothesis that stress, compared to control, would increase rejections of unfair 
offers (H1) was tested. Additionally, since sex differences in acute stress response have been 
reported in previous research (Lighthall et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2007), sex was entered as an 
additional factor. Means and standard deviations (SDs) for rejection rates are presented in Table 
1.  
A 2 (amount: fair vs. unfair) x 2 (stress: stress vs. control) x 2 (sex: male vs. female) 
mixed model ANOVA on rejection rates revealed a significant main effect of offer amount on 
rejection rates, F(1, 49)=75.51, p<.001. The Amount x Stress interaction for rejection rates was 
also significant, F(1,49)=4.22, p<.05, η2=.08. Mean scores of rejection rates showed a 
statistically non-significant trend for higher rejection of unfair offers in the stress condition 
(M=81.96%, SD=26.01%) than in the control condition (M=68.67%, SD=35.62%). Nonetheless, 
the difference between stress and control conditions for rejections of unfair offers did not reach 
statistical significance (p=.12). Therefore, the first hypothesis was partially confirmed in that, as 
shown by the significant Amount x Stress interaction, stress had an effect on rejections of unfair, 
relative to fair, offers.  
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The results reported above were not significantly modulated by sex. Specifically, neither 
the Stress x Amount x Sex interaction (p=.60) nor the Sex x Amount interaction were significant 
(p=.06). These results indicate that stress interacted with the fairness of offers, with mean 
rejection rates indicating the expected direction, but not statistically significant, with stressed 
participants showing higher rejections of unfair offers than non-stressed participants. 
Figure 2. Mean rejection rates as a function of stress and offer amounts in Experiment 1. 
 
 
Table 1. Mean rejection rates as a function of stress and offer amounts in Experiment 1. 
 Control  Stress 
 M SD  M SD 
Rejections of 
unfair offers 0.69 0.36  0.82 0.26 
Rejections of 
fair offers 0.36 0.40  0.31 0.38 
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Means and SDs for emotion ratings are presented in Table 2. Two measures of negative 
emotions were calculated. The first measure of negative emotions was calculated by subtracting 
the pre-UG valence scores of the Affect Grid from the post-UG valence scores of the Affect Grid. 
The second measure of negative emotions was calculated by taking the post-pre-UG difference 
of each of the 10 discrete emotions, and calculating the average of the difference scores of the six 
negative emotions (i.e., sadness, anger, boredom, anxiety, nervousness, and shame). The 
analyses for H2a and H2b were conducted using the valence difference score from the Affect 
Grid as well as the average difference scores of the six negative emotions. 
 
Table 2. Means and standard deviations for emotion ratings in stress and control conditions in 
Experiment 1. 
 Control Stress 
 M SD M SD 
Negative 
emotion change 0.00 0.38 -0.06 0.29 
Positive 
emotion change -0.13 0.35 -0.13 0.49 
Valence change -0.07 1.80 -0.49 1.89 
Arousal change -0.04 0.38 0.40 1.68 
 
To test the first hypothesis in the second set of hypotheses (H2a), one-way ANOVAs 
(stress: stress vs. control) were conducted on difference scores calculated by subtracting negative 
emotions before the Ultimatum Game from negative emotions after the Ultimatum Game 
(negative emotion change). This analysis showed no differences between stress and control 
groups for any of the dependent variables, ps>.2. This result indicates that participants in the 
stress, relative to control, condition did not significantly differ in the pre-post change in self-
reported negative emotions. Furthermore, ANOVAs on the difference scores of positive 
emotions (positive change) showed no differences between stress and control conditions. 
To test the second hypothesis in the second set (H2b), negative emotion change scores 
were correlated with rejection rates of unfair offers. Unexpectedly, negative emotions were not 
correlated with rejections of unfair offers, p>.15. To examine whether this null effect was due to 
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differences between stress conditions, a partial correlation was conducted, with stress condition 
as a controlling variable. The results again showed no significant correlation between negative 
emotion change and rejections of unfair offers, p>.2. 
Since previous research has shown effects of acute stress on discrete emotions, 
supplementary analyses were conducted, testing for effects of stress on self-reported emotions 
(see Table 3 for means and standard deviations). Univariate ANOVAs revealed no significant 
differences between stressed and non-stressed participants in any of the 10 emotions for pre-
post-UG difference scores, ps>.1. Additionally, a one-way ANOVA (stress: stress vs control) on 
pre-post UG difference scores of arousal (Affect Grid) showed no significant difference between 
stress and control conditions, F<1, p>.4. 
Table 3. Means and standard deviations for ratings of 10 discrete emotions in stress and control 
conditions in Experiment 1. 
 Control Stress 
 M SD M SD 
Pleasant 
relaxation 0.00 1.00 0.15 0.80 
Excitement -0.52 1.23 -0.26 0.64 
Happiness -0.12 0.83 -0.40 0.83 
Pride -0.08 0.81 0.00 0.67 
Shame -0.12 0.67 -0.07 0.38 
Boredom -0.08 0.64 -0.18 0.55 
Nervousness -0.40 0.58 -0.41 0.73 
Sadness 0.16 0.80 0.00 0.39 
Anger 0.16 1.31 0.62 0.91 
Anxiety -0.20 0.58 -0.29 0.46 
 
Trait emotion regulation 
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Before conducting analyses to test the third set of hypotheses, the average scores for 
overall emotion regulation15 as well as each type of emotion regulation were calculated for all 53 
participants, and high and low regulators were defined as those with scores above and below the 
average (M=4.45 for overall, M=4.80 for reappraisal, M=3.93 for suppression), respectively. 
There were 28 high emotion regulators (16 in stress condition), 25 low emotion regulators (12 in 
stress condition), 10 high reappraisers (7 in stress condition), 43 low reappraisers (21 in stress 
condition), 29 high suppressors (12 in stress condition) and 24 low suppressors (16 in stress 
condition).  
To test H3a, a 2 (amount: fair vs unfair) x 2 (stress: stress vs control) x 2 (emotion 
regulation: high vs low) mixed model ANOVA was conducted on rejection rates. No significant 
interaction effects on rejection rates were found between Amount x Stress x Emotion regulation, 
p>.4, Amount x Stress, p>.05, or Amount x Emotion regulation, p>.1. Additional analyses 
revealed no significant interactions when Reappraisal and Suppression were entered separately. 
More specifically, a 2 (amount: fair vs unfair) x 2 (stress: stress vs control) x 2 (reappraisal: high 
vs low) ANOVA and a 2 (amount: fair vs unfair) x 2 (stress: stress vs control) x 2 (suppression: 
high vs low) ANOVA revealed no significant interactions, ps>.05.  
Only high reappraisers were expected to differ in terms of negative emotions. 
Specifically, they were expected to show less negative emotions than low reappraisers, 
particularly in the stress, relative to control, condition (H3b). First, a 2 (stress: stress vs. control) 
x 2 (reappraisal: high vs. low) ANOVA on negative emotion change revealed no significant 
Stress x Reappraisal interaction, F(1,53)<1.  Next, as a test of H3c, a 2 (stress: stress vs. control) 
x 2 (suppression: high vs. low) ANOVA on negative emotions was conducted (see Table 4). 
Unexpectedly, this analysis showed a significant Stress x Suppression interaction, F(1,53)=7.64, 
p<.01. Post-hoc ANOVAs showed that among control participants, low suppressors showed a 
significantly smaller increase in negative emotions (M=-.24, SD=.42) than high suppressors 
(M=.08, SD=.26), F(1,25)=5.06, p<.05. In contrast, among stressed participants, low suppressors 
showed a greater increase in negative emotions (M=.04, SD=.20) than high suppressors (M=.24, 
SD=.42), which did not reach statistical significance, F(1,28)=2.45, p>.1.  
                                                          
15
 For this factor, the average of all 10 emotion regulation items (six reappraisal items and four 
suppression items) was calculated. 
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Table 4. Pre-post Ultimatum Game change in negative emotions by stress and suppression 
groups in Experiment 1. 
Control Stress 
Low Suppress High Suppress Low Suppress High Suppress 
M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Negative emotion 
change -0.25 0.43 0.08 0.26 0.03 0.21 -0.13 0.32 
Additional analyses were conducted, to examine whether overall emotion regulation 
tendencies influence rejections of offers. Specifically, a 2 (emotion regulation: high vs. low) x 2 
(amount: fair vs. unfair) mixed-model ANOVA was conducted on rejection rates. Results 
showed a marginally significant Emotion Regulation x Amount interaction, F(1,51)=2.95, p=.09. 
Interestingly, post-hoc tests revealed no difference between high and low emotion regulators for 
unfair offers, F(1,53)<1, but revealed a significant difference between high emotion regulators 
(n=28) and low emotion regulators (n=25) for 3 Euro offers, F(1,53)=4.64,  p<.05, with high 
regulators rejecting less (M=45.33%, SD=40.12%) than low regulators (M=23.21%, SD=34.65%).  
Reaction Times 
To test the hypothesis that stressed participants, relative to non-stressed participants, will 
display faster reaction times in their decisions, a one-way ANOVA (stress: stress vs. control) was 
conducted on average reaction times, collapsed across trials. A marginally significant effect of 
stress was found, F(1,53)=3.56, p=.07. The mean scores indicated, however, that the stressed 
participants were slower to make their decisions (M=2327.70 msec, SD=554.60 msec) than 
control participants (M=1995.34 msec, SD=724.78). Therefore, the fourth hypothesis could not 
be confirmed, although an unexpected result was nonetheless found. 
Discussion 
 Experiment 1 tested the hypothesis that acute stress response would increase rejection 
rates in an Ultimatum Game. This hypothesis was based on the argument that acute stress, 
enhances emotional processing, especially increasing the experience of negative emotions. This 
effect of acute stress on negative emotions, would in turn, lead to an increase in rejections of 
unfair, but not fair, Ultimatum Game offers. Furthermore, this effect would be moderated by 
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emotion-regulation strategies, namely reappraisal and suppression. Therefore, after confirming 
that the stress manipulation effectively induced a stress response, mediation and moderation 
analyses were conducted in Experiment 1.  
Pain ratings confirmed that participants experienced more peak pain during the stress, 
relative to control, task. More importantly, cortisol levels at 15 and 30 minutes after the CPT, 
controlling for baseline levels, were higher in stressed participants than in non-stressed 
participants. These results confirm that the CPT stress induction was successful in inducing an 
acute stress response. The next analyses showed that, as in previous studies, the offer amount had 
a highly significant effect on rejection rates. More interestingly, in a test of the central hypothesis 
of Study 1, a significant Amount x Stress interaction was found. Nonetheless, the post-hoc tests 
of the effect of stress on unfair offers, perhaps due to insufficient statistical power, did not show 
a statistically significant difference between stress and control groups. Therefore, the first 
hypothesis (H1) was only partially confirmed, with stress, relative to control, influencing 
rejection rates . 
 In contrast to expectations, negative emotions, measured as the difference between post 
and pre-UG negative emotions, were not increased by acute stress, nor did they correlate with 
rejections of unfair offers. These results do not confirm the second set of hypotheses that stress 
increases negative emotions (H2a) and that negative emotions increase rejections of unfair offers 
(H2b). Thus, the mediation hypothesis was not confirmed. 
The third set of hypotheses, namely that trait emotion regulation would moderate the 
stress-rejection link, was tested. First, the results showed that none of the measures of emotion 
regulation (i.e., overall emotion regulation, reappraisal, suppression) interacted with stress and 
offer amount to affect rejection rates. Therefore, emotion regulation did not moderate the 
relationship between stress and rejection rates, failing to confirm H3a. Furthermore, neither H3b 
nor H3c could be confirmed. First, the hypothesis that high reappraisal would lead to lower 
negative emotions, particularly in the stressed participants (H3b), could not be confirmed, as 
high and low reappraisers showed no difference in self-reported negative emotions. In contrast 
with reappraisal, trait suppression did interact with stress condition, such that under stress, low 
suppressors, relative to high suppressors, showed a greater increase in negative emotions from 
pre to post UG, whereas the opposite was true in the control condition. This result nonetheless 
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fails to confirm the hypothesis that suppression would not interact with stress to influence 
negative emotions (H3c). 
Several unexpected but interesting results also emerged. First, although emotion 
regulation did not influence rejections of unfair offers, high regulators did reject less fair offers 
than low regulators. This may mean that while trait emotion regulation does not modulate 
rejections of offers to the degree of reducing unfair offers, it does modulate rejections of offers 
that are typically seen to be fair, although they are not perfectly fair (i.e., 50/50 split). In other 
words, trait emotion regulation may not be strong enough to reduce rejections of unfair offers, 
but it can reduce rejections of offers which are relatively fair. Second, although suppression was 
expected to not influence self-reported negative emotions, suppression interacted with stress such 
that in the control, but not stress condition, high suppressors showed greater negative emotions 
than low suppressors. This result seems consistent with previous findings showing that 
suppression is associated with greater experience of negative emotion (Gross & John, 2003). 
Finally, a marginally significant effect of stress on reaction times indicated that, contrary to 
expectations, stressed participants made slower decisions than control participants.  
In sum, the main hypothesis concerning stress and rejection rates could be partially 
confirmed. More specifically, a significant Amount x Stress interaction was found, with mean 
scores going in the expected direction. The mediation hypothesis could not be confirmed, 
however, as there was no effect of stress on negative affect and no correlation between negative 
emotion and rejection rates. Similarly, the moderation hypothesis was not confirmed, with no 
expected interactive effects between amount, stress, and emotion regulation on rejection rates or 
negative emotions.  
 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 1 tested the hypothesis that acute stress response would increase rejections of 
unfair Ultimatum Game offers. This hypothesis was partially confirmed through a significant 
Amount x Stress interaction, with stress, compared to control, affecting rejection rates. One aim 
of the present experiment was to replicate the findings of the first study, in particular, the 
Amount x Stress interaction. Moreover, Experiment 2 tried to address a null finding in the 
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previous experiment concerning negative emotions. More specifically, the main hypothesis of 
the previous experiment was based on the rationale that acute stress response would increase the 
activation of emotional states, which would in turn increase rejections of unfair offers. However, 
stress did not show an effect on explicit emotion ratings, failing to confirm the mediation 
hypothesis. Therefore, the present experiment took a different approach and experimentally 
manipulated the level of emotional experience by adding partner type as a third factor to the 
design of Experiment 1.  
The rationale for adding the partner type factor stems from empirical findings suggesting 
that the partner type influences the degree of emotional reactivity that Responders experience in 
response to unfair offers (Knoch et al., 2006; Sanfey et al., 2003). For example, participants who 
received unfair offers from a computer, relative to a human, partner accepted more unfair offers 
and perceived the unfair offers to be less unfair than participants in the human partner condition 
(Knoch et al., 2006). Furthermore, the activity of the bilateral anterior insula, which was 
correlated with rejection decisions for unfair offers, was higher for unfair offers from human, 
relative to computer, partners (Sanfey et al., 2003). These findings suggest that rejections of 
unfair offers are increased, as well as associated brain activity, when unfair offers are given by a 
human, relative to a computer, partner. Given these findings, when an unfair offer is made by a 
computer, rather than a person, the negative emotions from the unfair offer may be reduced.  
If the stress-rejection link disappears with a manipulation designed to reduce those 
negative emotions, it would be strong support for the hypothesis that the stress-rejection link is 
mediated by negative emotions. That is, if the stress-rejection link is mediated by negative 
emotions, and getting an unfair offer from a computer instead of a human reduces negative 
emotions, rejection rates should not increase even in the stress condition, as long as the partner is 
a computer. This manipulation provides a different method for testing the mediation hypothesis, 
since the results of the first study did not support this hypothesis. In other words, although 
explicit measures of negative emotions did not show a mediation relationship between stress, 
negative emotions, and rejections of unfair offers, this experimental manipulation could reveal a 
mediation relationship between the three variables. This approach differs from entering negative 
emotion scores as mediating factor for the stress-rejection link, in two ways. First, this is an 
experimental manipulation of negative emotions, whereas the covariate approach is correlational. 
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Second, while the influence of partner type on negative emotions may be explicit as well, partner 
type may also influence implicit negative emotions, which may lead to increased rejections of 
unfair offers. 
In order to test the hypothesis regarding partner type, Experiment 2 employed a 2 
(amount: fair vs. unfair) x 2 (stress: stress vs. control) x 2 (partner: human vs. computer) design. 
As discussed above, if the stress-rejection link is mediated by negative emotions, rejections of 
unfair offers should increase in the stress, relative to the control, condition only when the offers 
are perceived as coming from a human, rather than a computer. Therefore, the first hypothesis 
for Study 2 was formulated as below: 
• In the computer-partner condition, no differences will be shown between stress and 
control conditions in terms of rejection rates (H5a). 
• On the other hand, in the human-partner condition, stressed participants should reject 
more unfair offers than control participants (H5b). 
Since negative emotions were supposed to mediate the relationship between stress and 
negative emotions, the hypotheses concerning rejections are as follows: 
• In the computer-partner condition, no differences will be shown between stress and 
control conditions in terms of negative emotions (H6a). 
• In the human-partner condition, stress will increase negative emotions in comparison to 
the control group (H6b). 
As in Experiment 1, measures of state emotion and trait emotion regulation were included 
to test the mediation and moderation hypotheses, respectively. Due to the failure to confirm the 
mediation and moderation hypotheses in Experiment 1, however, an implicit measure of emotion 
was added in Experiment 2. The emotional go/no-go task (Wessa et al., 2007; Schulz et al., 2007) 
was used as a measure of implicit emotion. The emotional go/no-go task is designed to measure 
a participant’s ability to inhibit a response to neutral and emotional stimuli (i.e., neutral and 
emotional faces; Schulz et al., 2007). More specifically, participants are presented with go and 
no-go stimuli, the former to which they produce a response (i.e., a button press) and the latter to 
which they produce no response. Since there are more go trials than no-go trials, the go trials are 
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supposed to create a prepotent tendency to produce a response, and on the no-go trials, this 
response tendency must be inhibited (Schulz et al., 2007). Errors on no-go trials (i.e., pressing 
the button on a no-go trial), called commission errors, have been used as measures of behavioral 
inhibition, and reaction times on go trials as measures of behavioral execution (Schulz et al., 
2007). Additionally, different measures of trait emotion regulation (described in detail later) 
were used.  
In addition to emotions, Experiment 2 examined the relationship between stress and trait 
as well as state impulsivity. A previous study has shown a relationship between trait impulsivity 
and cumulative stress (Fox, Bergquist, Gu, & Sinha, 2010), suggesting that chronic stress may be 
related to trait impulsivity. Since chronic and acute stress may have different relationships with 
trait impulsivity, trait impulsivity was explored without a priori hypotheses. Furthermore, state 
impulsivity was measured as another exploratory factor. 
 
Methods 
Participants 
Sixty-eight participants (41 females) participated in the experiment for payment or course 
credit in addition to money earned from the experiment. The average age of participants was 
25.56 (SD=7.71, range=18-51). There were 40 participants in the human partner condition (21 
stress, 24 female) and 28 participants in the computer partner condition (14 stress, 17 female). 
Inclusion criteria were the same as in Experiment 1. The CPT was conducted in the same way as 
in Experiment 1, except that saliva samples were not collected. In the stress condition, for both 
human and computer partner conditions, participants submerged their non-dominant hand up to 
their wrist in cold (0.9-3 degrees Celsius; M=2.22, SD=.68) water for 1-3 minutes (M=1.34, 
SD=.68). In the no-stress condition, participants submerged their non-dominant hand in warm 
(37-40 degrees Celsius; M=38.60, SD=1.07) water for 1-3 minutes (M=2.68, SD=.64). The UG 
started about 20 minutes (M=21.94, SD=7.11) after withdrawal from water. 
Measures 
73 
 
Trait impulsivity was measured with the Impulsiveness and Venturesomeness subscales 
of the I7 Impulsiveness Questionnaire (Eysenck, Pearson, Easting, & Allsopp, 1985) after it was 
translated to German. The Impulsiveness subscale contains 19 items (e.g., “Do you generally do 
and say things without stopping to think?”) and the Venturesomeness subscale contains 16 items 
(e.g., “Do you quite enjoy taking risks?”). Items are rated with either a “Yes” or “No”.  
The State Impulsivity Questionnaire (STIMP; Wingrove & Bond, 1997) was used to 
assess state impulsivity. The questionnaire contains 14 items (e.g., “I behave spontaneously”) 
and are rated on a four-point Likert scale (1-not at all, 4-very).  
The emotional go/no-go task was a shortened and modified version of a procedure used 
in previous research (Schulz et al., 2007). The task included two blocks with 60 trials each (42 
(70%) go trials, 18 (30%) no-go trials), with no-go trials randomly intermixed among go trials. In 
one block, emotional faces were go stimuli and neutral faces were no-go stimuli, and in the other 
block, neutral faces were go, and emotional faces were no-go stimuli. The order of presentation 
of the blocks was counterbalanced across participants. The stimuli were pictures of faces (six 
male, six female) expressing either fear (emotional) or emotional neutrality (neutral). Four of the 
six male (female) faces were shown in five trials each, and two of the six male (female) faces 
were shown in two trials each. Each block started with instructions concerning which stimulus to 
produce the response to. Participants were instructed to respond as quickly as possible to go 
stimuli. At the start of each trial, a fixation cross was presented at the center of the computer 
screen for 2000 msec. Next, the go (or no-go) stimulus was presented on the screen for 500 msec. 
In trials where participants gave a response within the 500 msec, the stimulus disappeared from 
the screen, but the fixation cross for the next trial nonetheless occurred after the whole 500 msec. 
The Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS; Gratz & Roemer, 2004) was used 
to measure trait emotion regulation, instead of the ERQ (Gross & John, 2003). Three of the six 
subscales of DERS were used. Specifically, participants rated on a five-point Likert scale (1-
almost never, 5-almost always) the 5-item Goals subscale (e.g., “When I’m upset, I have 
difficulty getting work done.”), designed to measure the ability to engage in goal-directed 
behavior when experiencing negative emotions; the 6-item Impulse subscale (e.g., “When I’m 
upset, I have difficulty controlling my behaviors.”), designed to measure the ability to refrain 
from impulsive behavior when experiencing negative emotions; and the 8-item Strategies 
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subscale (e.g., “When I’m upset, I believe that wallowing in it is all I can do.”), designed to 
measure access to emotion regulation strategies when experiencing negative emotions. 
Procedure 
The procedure for Experiment 2 was similar to that of Experiment 1 with three main 
differences. First, saliva samples were not collected. Second, in addition to the 10 state emotions, 
participants completed the State Impulsivity Questionnaire. Third, an implicit measure of 
negative emotion, the emotional go-no/go task, was used to measure implicit emotions after the 
Ultimatum Game. Besides these changes, the procedures for the human partner condition were 
identical to Experiment 1.  
Participants played 24 rounds of the Ultimatum Game as the Responder. The CPT and 
Ultimatum Game designs were identical to that in Experiment 1, except for the following 
changes. Participants completed state impulsivity ratings in addition to emotion ratings 15 
minutes after the CPT, shortly before starting the Ultimatum Game. In the computer partner 
condition, the instructions emphasized that each offer made by the computer was random and 
independent of the participant’s decisions. Thus, rejecting or accepting a particular offer amount 
would not affect the computer’s future offers. Similarly, participants in the human partner 
condition were explicitly informed that their decisions would not influence future offers. For 
each trial, in the computer partner condition, participants saw a computer and two die, rather than 
a person’s face, while waiting for the computer to make the offer. After completing the 
Ultimatum Game and providing explicit emotion ratings, participants completed the emotional 
go/no-go task. 
Results 
Reaction time outliers, data from time-out trials, and the dependent variables were 
calculated and treated identically to Experiment 1. Data from three reaction time outliers were 
excluded. 
Manipulation checks 
To check whether the CPT was a successful method of pain induction, pain ratings of the 
stress and control conditions were compared. A one-way ANOVA (stress: stress vs control) on 
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ratings of peak pain, averaged across participants, during the CPT yielded a significant 
difference between the stress (VAS: M=45.36, SD=20.42; FPS: M=3.03, SD=1.02) condition, 
and control (VAS: M=4.13, SD=9.82; FPS: M=1.22, SD=.42) condition, VAS: F(1,65)=106.62, 
p<.001; FPS: F(1,65)=87.38, p<.001. These results indicate that the CPT successfully induced 
pain in the stress, relative to control, condition. 
Rejection rates in the UG  
Means and SDs for rejection rates are presented in Table 5. In order to replicate the 
interaction from the first experiment and to test the hypothesis that no effect of stress should be 
found in the computer-partner condition, a 2 (amount: fair vs. unfair) x 2 (partner: human vs. 
computer) x 2 (stress: stress vs. control) x 2 (sex: female vs. male) ANOVA was conducted on 
rejection rates. This analysis revealed a significant main effect of offer amount on rejection rates, 
F(1, 57)=50.07, p<.001. No Amount x Stress interaction was found, F<1, and the Experiment 1 
result could not be replicated. All other interactions, except for two, were also not significant, 
Fs<1. The two exceptions included a significant Amount x Partner interaction, F(1,57)=6.60, 
p<.05, and a significant Amount x Partner x Sex interaction, F(1,57)=4.49, p<.05. These 
interactions are explored in more detail (see below). 
Although the results of Experiment 1 were not replicated, H5a and H5b were nonetheless 
tested by conducting two 2 (amount: fair vs. unfair) x 2 (stress: stress vs. control) x 2 (sex: 
female vs. male) ANOVA, one for each partner type condition. These analyses revealed no 
interaction or main effects (human: p>.15; computer: p>.05), except for the highly significant 
main effect of offer amount on rejection rates (human: F(1,34)=52.58, p<.001; computer: 
F(1,23)=9.59, p<.01). 
Overall, the results regarding rejection rates from the first experiment could not be 
replicated, and the first hypothesis of Experiment 2 could not be confirmed by the results. 
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Table 5. Mean rejection rates in Experiment 2 as a function of stress condition and partner type. 
  Control Stress 
Computer Human Computer Human 
M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Rejections of  
unfair offers 0.32 0.37 0.66 0.34 0.39 0.37 0.65 0.43 
Rejections of  
fair offers 0.10 0.27 0.31 0.35 0.21 0.33 0.27 0.45 
 
Additional analyses concerning Partner type 
Due to the significant offer x partner interaction found in the initial analysis of rejection 
rates, separate analyses for the two partner conditions were conducted for rejections. First, a 2 
(amount: fair vs. unfair) x 2 (partner type: human vs. computer) ANOVA on rejections 
confirmed the significant interaction effect, F(1,63)=4.27, p<.05 (see Figure 3). Separate 
analyses revealed that in both the human-partner and computer-partner conditions, participants 
rejected unfair offers more than fair offers. However, separate analyses of fair and unfair offers 
revealed that participants rejected significantly more unfair offers in the human-partner condition 
(M=65.61%, SD=35.12%) than in the computer-partner (M=35.12%, SD=36.81%) condition, 
F(1,65)=10.17, p<.01; whereas no significant differences were found between human and 
computer conditions for fair offers, p>.1. 
The effect of partner on negative emotions was also explored with a one-way ANOVA on 
negative emotion change with partner (human vs. computer) as the factor. Results showed no 
difference between the human and computer partner groups, F(1,65)<2, p>.2. 
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Figure 3. Mean rejection rates as a function of partner type and offer amounts in Experiment 2.
 
Emotion ratings 
Means and SDs for emotion ratings are presented in Table 6. To test hypotheses H6a and 
H6b, two sets of one-way (stress: stress vs. control) ANOVAs were conducted on the pre-post-
UG differences in negative emotions (negative emotion change)16, one on the human, and one on 
the computer condition. The results showed no significant interactive or main effects of the two 
factors on negative emotion, Fs<1. Furthermore, a 2 (stress: stress vs. control) x 2 (partner: 
human vs. computer) ANOVA across partner types showed that the Stress x Partner interaction 
was non-significant, Fs<1. No differences in negative emotion changes were found between 
stress and control groups nor for human and computer partner groups, p>.2. These results show 
that as in Experiment 1, stress did not significantly influence explicit ratings of negative 
emotions. Furthermore, partner type did not significantly influence explicit negative emotions. 
  
                                                          
16 The two measures of negative emotions included pre-post UG difference scores of valence of the Affect 
Grid and the average of the difference scores of the six negative emotions (i.e., sadness, anger, boredom, 
anxiety, nervousness, and shame) in the 10-item discrete emotion scale.  
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Table 6. Means and standard deviations for explicit emotion ratings by condition in 
Experiment 2. 
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Additional analyses were conducted to examine whether negative emotion change17 was 
correlated with rejection rates of unfair offers. A marginally significant correlation between 
change in negative emotions and rejections of unfair offers was found, r(65)=2.40, p=.05. 
Furthermore, a marginally significant positive correlation was found between change in negative 
emotions and rejections of fair offers, r(65)=.22, p=.08, as well as a marginally significant 
negative correlation between change in positive emotions and rejections of unfair offers, r(65)=-
.23, p=.07. As in Experiment 1, partial correlations were conducted between negative emotion 
change and rejections of unfair offers, with stress condition as a controlling variable. The results 
showed the same pattern as those from the bivariate correlation analyses above. When partner 
condition was also controlled for, significant correlations emerged between unfair offer 
rejections and negative emotion change, r(61)=.33, p<.01, and fair offer rejections and negative 
emotion change, r(61)=.26, p<.05. The correlation between unfair offer rejections and positive 
emotion change remained marginally significant as well, r(61)=-.22, p=.09. Finally, Arousal 
change was greater in the human partner (M=.74, SD=1.45) condition than in the computer 
partner (M=-0.26, SD=1.23) condition, F(1,63)=8.47, p<.01. These results show that when the 
factors of stress and partner type are controlled, rejections of unfair as well as fair offers are 
significantly correlated with change in negative emotion. 
Since previous research has shown effects of acute stress on discrete emotions, 
supplementary analyses were conducted, testing for effects of stress on each discrete self-
reported emotion. Table 7 shows the means and standard deviations for the 10 discrete emotion 
ratings. Univariate ANOVAs revealed no significant differences between stress and control 
conditions in terms of pre-post-UG difference scores of nine of the 10 emotions, ps>.1.  The 
exception was that stressed participants reported marginally lower change in pride (M=-0.09, 
SD=.77) than control (M=-0.47, SD=.84) participants, F(1,65)=3.59, p=.06. Univariate ANOVAs 
revealed no significant differences between computer-partner and human-partner participants in 
terms of pre-post-UG difference scores of nine of the 10 emotions, ps>.1.  The exception was 
that human-partner participants reported a decrease in boredom from before to after the UG (M=-
.26, SD=1.00) whereas computer-partner participants reported an increase in boredom (M=.22, 
SD=.70), F(1,65)=4.68, p<.05. 
                                                          
17 These results are for the average of the six negative emotions from the 10-item discrete emotion scale. 
No significant correlations were found When using the valence difference scores. 
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Table 7. Means and standard deviations for ratings of 10 discrete emotions by condition 
in Experiment 2. 
Control Stress 
Computer Human Computer Human 
M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Happiness -0.07 0.62 -0.06 0.80 -0.08 1.32 -0.55 0.83 
Anger 0.21 0.58 0.44 1.38 0.38 0.77 0.45 1.10 
Pride -0.14 0.66 -0.72 0.89 -0.23 0.83 0.00 0.73 
Anxiety -0.14 0.36 -0.39 0.78 -0.15 0.38 -0.15 0.59 
Shame 0.14 0.36 -0.11 0.58 0.15 0.80 -0.10 0.72 
Excitement -0.64 1.01 -0.22 0.88 -0.46 1.05 -0.45 1.28 
Sadness -0.07 0.73 0.00 1.19 -0.08 0.49 0.10 0.79 
Nervousness -0.14 0.77 -0.50 0.51 -0.38 0.77 -0.40 0.75 
Pleasant 
relaxation -0.14 0.95 -0.61 0.78 -0.31 1.11 -0.15 1.18 
Boredom 0.29 0.73 -0.17 0.99 0.15 0.69 -0.35 1.04 
 
To test the hypotheses concerning the effects of stress on implicit measures of negative 
emotions (H6a and H6b), 2 (stress: stress vs control) x 2 (partner: human vs computer) ANOVAs 
were conducted on six dependent variables from the emotional go/no-go task, including 
commission errors (i.e., making the button press on a no-go trial) from fear-nogo and calm-nogo 
blocks, omission errors (i.e., not making the button press on a go trial) from fear-go and calm-go 
blocks, and reaction times to go trials in fear-go and calm-go blocks. Means and SDs for these 
dependent variables are shown in Table 8. No significant Stress x Partner interaction effects were 
found, Fs<2, ps>.2, failing to confirm the hypotheses that partner type would moderate the 
relationship between stress and negative emotions. Nonetheless, a significant main effect of 
partner type on commission errors in calm-nogo blocks was found, showing more commission 
errors on calm-nogo trials in the human (M=3.50, SD=2.66) than in the computer (M=2.37, 
SD=1.24) condition, F(1,63)=4.21, p<.05. Furthermore, a marginally significant Stress x Partner 
interaction effect on calm-go RTs was found, F(1, 61)=3.78, p=.05.  
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Trait emotion regulation 
Emotion dysregulation comprised of mean scores from three subscales (i.e., Goals, 
Impulse, and Strategies) of the Dysfunction of Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS; Gratz & 
Roemer, 2004). The average scores for overall emotion dysregulation as well as each type of 
emotion regulation were calculated for the 65 participants, and high and low regulators were 
defined as those with scores above and below the average (M=2.25 for overall, M=2.88 for goals, 
M=1.90 for impulse, M=2.11 for impulse), respectively. There were 19 high emotion 
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dysregulators (7 in stress condition), 46 low emotion regulators (26 in stress condition), 26 high 
goal dysregulators (12 in stress condition), 39 low goal dysregulators (21 in stress condition), 6 
high impulse dysregulators (one in stress condition), 59 low impulse dysregulators (32 in stress 
condition), 12 high strategies dysregulators (four in stress condition), 53 low strategies 
dysregulators (29 in stress condition).  
To test H3a in this experiment, two sets of analyses18 were conducted. More specifically, 
a 2 (amount: fair vs unfair) x 2 (stress: stress vs control) x 2 (emotion dysregulation: high vs low) 
and a 2 (amount: fair vs unfair) x 2 (partner type: human vs computer) x 2 (emotion 
dysregulation: high vs low) mixed model ANOVA were conducted on rejection rates. No 
significant interaction effects on rejection rates were found between Amount x Stress x Emotion 
Dysregulation, p>.4, Amount x Stress, p>.05, or Amount x Emotion Dysregulation, p>.1. 
Additional analyses revealed no significant interactions when average scores for Goals 
Dysregulation, Impulse Dysregulation, and Strategies Dysegulation were entered separately. 
More specifically, a 2 (amount: fair vs unfair) x 2 (stress: stress vs control) x 2 (goals 
dysregulation: high vs low) ANOVA, a 2 (amount: fair vs unfair) x 2 (stress: stress vs control) x 
2 (impulse dysregulation: high vs low) ANOVA, and a 2 (amount: fair vs unfair) x 2 (stress: 
stress vs control) x 2 (strategies dysregulation: high vs low) revealed no significant interactions, 
ps>.05. Next, no significant interaction effects on rejection rates were found between Amount x 
Partner Type x Emotion Dysregulation, p>.6, or Amount x Emotion Dysregulation, p>.5. 
Additional analyses revealed no significant interactions when average scores for Goals 
Dysregulation, Impulse Dysregulation, and Strategies Dysegulation were entered separately. 
More specifically, a 2 (amount: fair vs unfair) x 2 (partner type: human vs computer) x 2 (goals 
dysregulation: high vs low) ANOVA, a 2 (amount: fair vs unfair) x 2 (partner type: human vs 
computer) x 2 (impulse dysregulation: high vs low) ANOVA, and a 2 (amount: fair vs unfair) x 2 
(partner type: human vs computer) x 2 (strategies dysregulation: high vs low) revealed no 
significant Amount x Partner Type x Emotion Dysregulation, p>.8, or Amount x Emotion 
Dysregulation interactions, p>.2. In sum, no interactive or main effects of emotion dysregulation 
were found. 
                                                          
18 Two sets of 2 x 2 x 2 analyses were conducted, rather than one set of 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 in order to avoid 
overly complicated results. 
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To test H3b and H3c in this study, two sets of two-way ANOVAs were conducted on 
before-after UG change in negative emotions, with stress and emotion dysregulation as factors in 
the first set, and with partner type and emotion dysregulation as factors in the second set. First, a 
2 (stress: stress vs. control) x 2 (goal dysregulation: high vs. low) ANOVA, a 2 (stress: stress vs. 
control) x 2 (impulse dysregulation: high vs. low) ANOVA, and a 2 (stress: stress vs. control) x 2 
(strategies dysregulation: high vs. low) ANOVA were conducted on negative emotion change 
scores. Results showed a significant stress x goal dysregulation interaction, F(1,65)=10.35, 
p<.0119. Post-hoc ANOVAs revealed that among stressed participants, those low in goal 
dysregulation (n=21) reported a significantly higher decrease in negative emotions (M=-.14, 
SD=.29) than participants high in goal dysregulation (n=12, M=.14, SD=.47), F(1,33)=4.56, 
p<.05. In contrast, in the no-stress condition, participants low in goal dysregulation (n=18) 
reported a significantly higher increase in negative emotions (M=.10, SD=.29) than participants 
high in goal dysregulation (n=14, M=-.24, SD=.51), F(1,33)=5.79, p<.05.  
Second, a 2 (partner type: human vs. computer) x 2 (emotion dysregulation: high vs. low) 
ANOVA was conducted on negative emotion change scores. No significant main or interaction 
effects on negative emotions were found, p>.2. Additional analyses revealed no significant main 
or interaction effects when average scores for Goals Dysregulation, p>.2, Impulse Dysregulation, 
p>.5, and Strategies Dysegulation, p>.2, were entered separately. 
Finally, in order to examine the effect of stress on state impulsivity, a one-way ANOVA, 
with stress (stress vs. control) as the factor, was conducted on average state impulsivity. 
Interestingly, non-stressed participants (M=2.21, SD=.34) reported significantly higher state 
impulsivity than stressed (M=2.00, SD=.35) participants, F(1,65)=5.91, p<.05. Given the 
significant result, however, a 2 (state impulsivity: high vs. low) x 2 (offer: fair vs. unfair) 
ANOVA on rejection rates was conducted to examine whether state impulsivity, in turn, 
influenced rejections. This analysis revealed no interactive or main effects of state impulsivity on 
rejection rates, F<1. 
Reaction Times 
                                                          
19 A marginally significant Stress x Impulse Dysregulation interactivity, F(1,65)=3.30. p=.07. However, 
only 6 participants were classified as being high in impulse dysregulation, compared to 59 participants 
who were low in impulse dysregulation. Therefore, this interactivity may not be reliable. No significant 
Strategies Dysregulation x Stress interactivity was found, F(1,65)<1. 
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As in Study 1, the effect of stress on reaction times was tested with a one-way ANOVA 
on average reaction times, collapsed across trials, with stress (stress vs. control) as the factor. No 
effect of stress was found, F(1,65)<1.  
Discussion 
In the first study, there was an interactive effect of stress and offer amount on rejections, 
with mean rejections going in the predicted directions. However, Experiment 1 showed no 
mediation effect of negative emotions on the stress-rejection link, perhaps because stress did not 
influence the specific measure of negative emotions which was used in the study. In order to 
address the potentially problematic measurement, Experiment 2 addressed the mediation effect 
with a different method, namely by manipulating the negative emotions experienced. More 
specifically, Experiment 2 tried to address the mediation effect by adding the factor of partner 
type, which involved varying whether Responders received offers from human partners or 
computer partners. Since previous research has shown that Responders reject unfair offers less if 
they are made by a computer, relative to a human (Knoch et al., 2006; Sanfey et al., 2003), it was 
expected that in the stress condition, participants would not reject unfair offers more if they were 
made by a computer partner. This moderation of the stress-rejection link by partner type would 
lend support to the claim that emotions mediate the stress-rejection link.  
First, pain ratings confirmed that participants in the stress, relative to control, condition 
experienced more pain during the task. Moreover, unlike Experiment 1, no interaction effects 
involving stress condition on rejection rates was found, and no trend was found in mean scores 
indicating an effect of stress on rejections of unfair offers. Thus, the result of the first experiment 
was not replicated in the second experiment.  
Since no effect of stress on rejection rates was found, a mediation effect was not expected. 
Nonetheless, the hypotheses concerning a relationship between stress and negative emotions 
were examined, without the goal of showing mediation. Consistent with Experiment 1, no 
interaction or main effects of stress or partner type was found on explicit negative emotions. 
Thus, H6a and H6b could not be confirmed. However, unlike the first experiment, the present 
experiment indicated, when controlling for stress and partner type, a significant correlation 
between negative emotions and rejections of both unfair and offers. As with the mediation effect, 
since the stress-rejection link could not be established, the hypothesized moderation effect was 
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not expected, but analyses were nonetheless conducted. Results showed no interactive or main 
effects of emotion dysregulation on rejection rates. On negative emotions as well, no interactive 
or main effects of emotion dysregulation were found, with one exception. Specifically, 
participants in the stress condition who have high difficulty in regulating their goals during 
distress, relative to those with low difficulty, showed a higher increase in negative emotions from 
before to after the Ultimatum Game. In contrast, non-stressed participants with high difficulty in 
regulating their goals during distress, relative to those with low difficulty, showed a higher 
decrease in negative emotions. Thus, as in Experiment 1, trait emotion regulation interacted with 
stress to influence negative emotion, but no hypotheses concerning the moderation effect could 
be confirmed. 
Several unexpected but interesting findings emerged, especially in relation to the partner 
type factor. First, a significant Amount x Partner interaction revealed that participants in the 
human-partner condition rejected more unfair offers than those in the computer-partner condition. 
Furthermore, with the implicit emotion measure (i.e., emotional go/no-go task), a main effect 
revealed that participants in the human partner, relative to computer partner, condition made 
more commission errors for fear response (i.e., erroneous responses to neutral no-go stimuli). 
Such commission errors suggest that in the human partner condition, participants had more 
difficulty inhibiting a prepotent response for negatively valenced stimuli. Overall, it may be that 
participants in the human partner condition experienced a higher reactivity to negative stimuli, 
including unfair offers and faces expression negative emotion. Finally, state impulsivity was 
higher in non-stressed, compared with stressed, participants. 
 In sum, this experiment failed to replicate the core finding of Experiment 1 regarding the 
effect of stress on rejections of unfair offers. Furthermore, as in Experiment 1, there was no 
effect of stress on negative emotions. However, negative emotions were correlated with 
rejections of both fair and unfair offers, when stress and partner type were controlled. Regarding 
emotion regulation, of three subscales of emotion dysregulation, dysregulation of goals 
modulated the relationship between stress and negative emotions. Furthermore, unexpected 
findings suggest that interacting with a human partner, compared with a computer partner, during 
the Ultimatum Game is associated with stronger reactivity to negative stimuli. 
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Chapter V - General Discussion 
 
The current research examines the effects of acute stress on social decision-making 
behaviors. Although there is substantial research showing effects of acute stress on non-social 
decision-making (e.g., Lighthall et al., 2009), research concerning effects of acute stress on 
social decision-making is relatively new. Therefore, in two experiments employing the Cold 
Pressor Test and the Ultimatum Game, the effect of acute stress on social decision-making was 
examined. One of the main aims as well as contributions of the current research was to extend 
current literature on stress and social decision-making (see Van den Bos et al., 2013) by 
examining the mediating and moderating roles, respectively, of negative emotions and emotion 
regulation.  
During an acute stress response, it may be adaptive to engage in early as well as stimulus-
driven responses to environmental stimuli. This may help an animal to prevent a disturbance 
from potential threats, and to automatically activate responses which are appropriate for specific 
eliciting stimuli. As previously suggested (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999), these adaptive functions 
of the physiological mechanisms underlying an acute stress response may be carried out through 
an enhancement of emotional processing, but not cognitive processing. The rationale for this 
argument is that emotional processing is supposed to occur at an earlier time-point than cognitive 
processing (e.g., Murphy & Zajonc, 1993), and emotions are supposed to be generated in a 
stimulus-driven manner (e.g., Barrett et al., 2007), leading to stimulus-driven behavioral 
responses if control processes do not come into play. This assumption of the current paper that 
during an acute stress response, emotional processing is enhanced, is supported by empirical 
findings which show an effect of acute stress on reward salience (e.g., Lighthall et al., 2009) and 
emotional experience (Sinha et al., 2008). This effect of acute stress on emotions may be 
modulated, however, by emotion-regulation strategies related to cognitive processes (e.g., 
working memory; Schmeichel et al., 2008).  
This link between stress and emotional processing relates to social decision-making in 
that emotions, in particular negative emotions, are supposed to increase reciprocal behaviors 
which, in the context of the Ultimatum Game, would mean increased rejections of unfair offers. 
Indeed, this prediction has been confirmed by findings which have shown a strong relationship 
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between negative emotions and Ultimatum Game behaviors, namely rejections of unfair offers 
(e.g., Pillutla & Murnighan, 1999; Xiao & Houser, 2005). Putting the functional and information 
processing accounts of acute stress into the context of the Ultimatum Game led to the following 
hypotheses. 
The most general prediction of the current research was that acute stress would, relative 
to a control condition, lead to increased rejections of unfair, but not fair, Ultimatum Game offers. 
The rationale for this general hypothesis constituted the mediation hypothesis of the paper, 
namely that stress would increase rejections of unfair offers by increasing the negative emotions 
associated with such offers. Furthermore, individual differences in the use of emotion regulation 
strategies, such as reappraisal and suppression (Gross & John, 2003), were expected to moderate 
the effect of stress on rejection rates by reducing either the experience or expression of negative 
emotions. These three main hypotheses were examined in two experiments, using the Cold 
Pressor Test as the stress induction method, and a 24-round Ultimatum Game with six offers 
each of 50%, 30%, 20%, and 10% being offered to each participant (each participant played the 
game as the Responder).  
The general hypothesis that stress would increase rejections of unfair offers was partially 
confirmed in Experiment 1, with results showing a significant Amount x Stress interaction, with 
stress, compared to control, significantly affecting rejection rates. A previous study (von Dawans 
et al., 2012), however, found no significant differences in rejection rates between participants 
who experienced acute psychosocial stress and control participants, which contrasts with our 
finding. Foremost, since the result of the present paper was not replicated (discussed in more 
detail later), it should be noted that the result may not have been reliable. 
This discrepancy may, however, also be due to the fact that there were some differences 
between the two studies. For example, the current study allowed Respondents to make only one 
decision whereas in the previous study (von Dawans, 2012), Respondents were allowed to make 
decisions for both if they were offered a fair offer and if they were offered an unfair offer (i.e., 
the strategy method was used). Furthermore, the present study employed physical acute stress 
while von Dawans and colleagues (von Dawans et al., 2012) employed psychosocial acute stress. 
This may be an important difference, because different types of stressors may have different 
underlying physiological mechanisms (Pacak, 2000). For example, there was a difference 
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between stressors which required epinephrine release (e,g, formalin pain) and stressors which 
required metabolic activation (e.g., hemorrhage), with the former showing increases in 
catecholaminergic activity but not ACTH levels, and the latter showing the opposite pattern 
(Pacak, 2000). Cold pain (a type of physical stress) and restraint stress (a type of psychological 
stress) were also included in the study and showed different patterns of catecholamine and 
ACTH activities (Pacak, 2000). Although it is not clear what these findings would mean in terms 
of our study, they nonetheless seem to indicate that stress responses can be stressor-specific. 
These differences may indicate that the effect of stress on social decision-making is quite 
sensitive to the design of the experiment, as well as to which kind of stress is employed.  
With regard to the mediation and moderation hypotheses, neither hypothesis was 
confirmed by the results of this research. More specifically, neither experiment showed that 
stress increased negative emotions or was associated with rejection rates, although the second 
study did show a partial correlation between unfair as well as fair offer rejections and negative 
emotion. Furthermore, the partner type factor, which was designed to reduce the negative 
emotions in response to unfair offers, did not influence negative emotions. Trait emotion 
regulation did not interact with stress or partner type to decrease negative emotion or rejections 
of unfair offers.  
It should be pointed out that the mediation and moderation hypotheses could naturally not 
be confirmed, because the relationship between stress and rejection rates was not significant in 
the first experiment, and absent in the second one. There are, however, other potential reasons 
for why the expected relationships involving emotion and emotion regulation were not found. 
First, it may be that negative emotions as measured in our study do not increase with stress. 
Second, our specific method of stress induction, the CPT, may not lead to an increase in negative 
emotions. Consistent with this notion, in the studies reviewed earlier, the studies which found 
effects of acute stress on explicit emotion ratings (Sinha et al., 2008; Wang et al., 2005) 
employed psychosocial stressors, rather than physical stressors.  
The disconfirmation of the hypothesis that low emotion regulators would reject more than 
high emotion regulators (H3a, Experiment 1) seems to contrast with the result that experimental 
induction of reappraisal of Ultimatum Game offers led to lower rejections of unfair offers (van’t 
Wout et al., 2010). Two reasons for this may be that first, as suggested in the introduction, stress 
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may have reduced state emotion regulation abilities, thereby making even high emotion 
regulators unable to control their emotions under stress. Second, trait reappraisal tendency and 
state experimentally induced reappraisal, which was employed in the study by van’t Wout and 
colleagues (van’t Wout et al., 2010), may have different effects on Ultimatum Game decisions.  
Another disconfirmation was that reappraisal had no effect on self-reported negative 
emotions. This may mean that as measured in this experiment, trait reappraisal does not 
influence negative emotions (as measured here). Given previous findings showing that trait 
emotion regulation does correlate with negative emotions (Aldao et al., 2010; Gross & John, 
2003), however, an alternative explanation may be more plausible for these results. In particular, 
there were much fewer low reappraisers (n=10) than there were high reappraisers (n=43), with 
only seven low reappraisers in the stress condition. Thus, there may not have been enough low 
reappraisers to produce a reliable average rejection rate for that group. 
Although the mediation and moderation hypotheses could not be confirmed in either of 
the two experiments, other unexpected but interesting results emerged. First, high emotion 
regulators rejected significantly less fair offers, but not unfair offers, than low emotion regulators 
(Experiment 1). This result is interesting in that it contrasts with the initial hypothesis, which was 
that high emotion regulators would reject unfair offers less than low emotion regulators. The 
rationale for the initial hypothesis was that since people do not experience negative emotions 
toward fair offers, high emotion regulation would affect behaviors toward the emotion-inducing 
stimuli, that is, unfair offers. This argument implicitly assumed that negative emotions are not 
present for fair offers, but they are present for unfair offers. Therefore, emotion regulation 
strategies would reduce rejection rates only when there are negative emotions to regulate, but not 
when they are absent. Perhaps, the finding of a negative association between emotion regulation 
and rejection of relatively fair (but not equal) offers reflects that this assumption is inaccurate. 
Specifically, negative emotions, although present, may be weaker in response to 30% offers than 
the 20% and 10% offers. In that case, trait emotion regulation tendencies may be able to regulate 
the weaker emotional responses to relatively fair (but not equal) offers but not strong enough to 
control emotions from unfair offers. For unfair offers, an explicit instruction to regulate one’s 
emotions may be helpful for regulating stronger negative emotions, as in previous research (van’t 
Wout et al., 2010).  
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A second interesting finding involves the hypothesis concerning reaction times of 
stressed and control participants during the decision-making task. Based on the affective primacy 
principle (Zajonc, 1980, 1984) and the hypothesized functions of the physiological acute stress 
response, it was initially expected that acute stress would enhance early responding, reflected by 
faster decision-making in the stress, compared to control, condition. Experiment 1 showed, 
however, that the decision-making times were actually slower in the stress condition than control 
condition. A finding from previous research (Knoch et al., 2006) may help explain this 
discrepancy. More specifically, participants were faster to accept fair offers than they were to 
make a decision on unfair offers (Knoch et al., 2006). This finding was interpreted to mean that 
when there is a conflict between the selfish and fairness motives, such as when a person needs to 
decide whether to forfeit monetary reward for fairness, the decision is more time-consuming than 
when only one motive is active (Knoch et al., 2006). In the initial formulation of hypotheses, a 
stress response was thought to prepare an animal for engaging in behaviors with an early onset in 
order to prevent a disturbance. However, this function may only apply in situations with one 
clear motive, rather than multiple conflicting motives, such as when deciding whether to accept 
or reject an unfair offer. That is, when there is a conflict between motives, stress may not 
facilitate early onset of behavioral responses, and may even lead to slower resolution of the 
conflicting motives and decision-making. 
Finally, results from Experiment 2 seem to confirm previous findings that partner type 
influences emotional experience during the Ultimatum Game (e.g., Sanfey et al., 2003). First, a 
significant Amount x Partner interaction revealed that participants in the human-partner 
condition rejected more unfair offers than those in the computer-partner condition. Furthermore, 
analysis of the implicit measure of negative emotions revealed that participants who received 
offers from human, relative to computer, partners had more difficulty inhibiting a negative 
emotional response (i.e., a fear response) after the game. Overall, it may be that participants in 
the human partner condition experienced a higher reactivity to negative stimuli, including unfair 
offers and faces expressing negative emotion.  
Implications 
 Since the results of the present research were not reliably replicated in both experiments, 
it is difficult to discuss definitive implications of the findings. Nonetheless, from the interaction 
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in Experiment 1, it may be suggested that acute physical stress adversely influences social 
decision-making outcomes. One real-world application of this claim could be in the context of 
social interactions in the workplace, where stress management intervention programs have been 
implemented to reduce the negative work outcomes of stress (for reviews of such interventions, 
see Richardson & Rothstein, 2008; van der Klink, Blonk, Schene, & Van Dijk, 2001). Given that 
stress can negatively influence social interactions involving perceived fairness, stress 
interventions geared specifically towards improving the social impact of stress may be helpful 
for workers to get along well even under stress. The stress intervention programs developed so 
far seem to mainly focus on protecting the physical and mental health of individual workers (see 
Richardson & Rothstein, 2008; van der Klink et al., 2001), but stress intervention programs 
specifically targeting the social effects of stress seem difficult to come across. Some existing 
stress intervention techniques which may be relevant include techniques involving social support, 
which may modulate the negative effects of stress (Cohen & Wills, 1985). Although the benefits 
of social support are not specific to social outcomes, if employees can get social support from 
other coworkers in order to reduce their stress, relationships between coworkers may improve 
and interactions may become more positive even when employees are stressed.  
Aside from the practical implication, there are also some theoretical implications, 
especially with regard to implicit assumptions made by the current research. The theoretical 
framework regarding the function of a stress response was originally developed to describe 
mechanisms which occur in a prey-predator environment. Therefore, the theory had underlying 
assumptions, but those assumptions were not made explicit in this paper. These assumptions may 
have been true in the prey-predator environment, but not in the interpersonal negotiation 
environment, and that could have contributed to some of the hypotheses being incorrect. The 
following discusses three implicit assumptions of the theoretical framework which may not have 
been true in the experimental paradigm, and how these assumptions may have affected the 
results of the research. Specifically, the following discusses the certainty of the outcomes of 
decision, the nature of the decision, and the motives guiding the decisions. 
In the framework of Nesse (Nesse, 2005), there is uncertainty regarding the outcome of 
the behavior of running away from a predator. This can be illustrated by the fact that this theory 
incorporates probabilities of specific outcomes (Nesse, 2005), rather than positing a certain 
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outcome for a given action. In the experimental paradigm of this paper, however, the outcomes 
of behaviors were certain. That is, whereas the behavior of fleeing from a predator may or may 
not have resulted in the prey escaping, an accept decision would certainly result in a payment 
and a reject decision would certainly result in no payment. The claim that behavioral responses 
should be fast and stimulus-driven was developed under the assumption that outcomes of 
behaviors would not be guaranteed, but decisions in the Ultimatum Game do have guaranteed 
outcomes. This difference may make it more or less necessary for behaviors to be fast and 
stimulus-driven in the Ultimatum Game than in the prey-predator environment. 
The second difference is in terms of costs and benefits of a decision. In the prey-predator 
context, the costs and benefits of actions are qualitatively different from those in the Ultimatum 
Game. For example, the cost of being attacked by a predator is not in terms of money, but in 
terms of life or limb. That is, the cost in a prey-predator context is physical, whereas in the 
interpersonal negotiation context, it is monetary. Due to this difference, fast and stimulus-driven 
action may be very adaptive in the prey-predator context, but may not serve as adaptive of a 
function in the interpersonal negotiation context. It may be that the effect of a stress response on 
decision-making may depend on the type of costs or benefits associated with the decision. 
Third, in the prey-predator environment, the only goal of the prey animal is to survive 
and not be caught by a predator. In contrast to the prey-predator environment, in the Ultimatum 
Game, there are at least two goals, selfish and fairness goals (Knoch et al., 2006). Furthermore, 
when considering whether to accept or reject an unfair offer, the motives in the Ultimatum Game 
are competing, such that selfish motives would induce one to accept whereas fairness motives 
would induce one to reject. The competing motives in the Ultimatum Game may lead to a 
conflict which takes higher order cognitive processes (Lieberman et al., 2002) as well as time to 
resolve. In contrast, when there is only one motive, such as in the prey-predator environment, 
decisions may be made more quickly and more emotionally. 
Limitations 
The present research made an effort to address a gap in the newly emerging literature 
about stress and social decision-making by examining potential mediating and moderating 
factors of the relationship between acute stress and social decision-making. It also tried to bridge 
the functional and information processing perspectives regarding the effect of acute stress on 
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psychological functioning. Furthermore, both experiments were incentivized with money, and 
provided a physiological measure to confirm the occurrence of an acute stress response in the 
first experiment. These may be considered strengths of the present research. Nonetheless, there 
are several important limitations which should be discussed. 
First, the Stress x Amount interaction was not replicated in Experiment 2, with several 
possible reasons. First, the sample sizes of the second experiment were small, with three of the 
four between-group conditions having less than 20 participants.  Second, whereas a successful 
stress induction was confirmed with cortisol analyses in Experiment 1, the absence of cortisol 
level tests could not confirm whether the stress induction in the second experiment was 
successful. Therefore, it may be that the null results in Experiment 2 were due to an unsuccessful 
stress induction. The insufficient sample sizes and lack of stress manipulation check with cortisol 
levels in the second experiment were mainly due to limited resources for paying participants and 
paying for cortisol analyses. However, it may be that even with a sufficiently large sample size 
and a confirmed stress induction, the effect may not have been replicated. In that case, the State 
Impulsivity Questionnaire (STIMP; Wingrove & Bond, 1997), which was added in the second 
study to examine state impulsivity, may have primed participants to be more or less impulsive in 
their decisions. Furthermore, it should be noted that the results of Experiment 1may have been 
due to chance. These considerations underscore the importance of first, having sufficiently large 
samples and a cortisol manipulation check, and second, exercising care with potentially priming 
materials. 
Second, the participants may have differentially engaged in coping strategies during the 
stress task. This may be problematic, because coping strategies such as distraction have been 
found to be effective in reducing pain (McCaul & Malott, 1984), making the use of coping 
strategies a confounding factor which may have differentially influenced the effectiveness of the 
stress induction in the present research. In the current research, no instructions were provided for 
participants to focus on the pain or a distractor during the stress task, nor did we check to see 
whether participants distracted themselves during the stress task. Therefore, it is difficult to 
know whether participants were differentially engaging in coping strategies during the task, and 
whether such engagement may have reduced the effectiveness of the stress task in inducing a 
stress response. This highlights the importance of utilizing some method, for example, providing 
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instructions for all participants to focus on the sensation produced by the water, to ensure that 
participants will not differentially engage in coping strategies during the cold pressor task. 
As mentioned above, participants may have been primed by the questionnaires, including, 
but not only, the STIMP (Wingrove & Bond, 1997), which preceded the Ultimatum Game.  
Other relevant questionnaires included trait emotion regulation questionnaires given before the 
stress (or control) task as well as state emotion questions given just before and after the 
Ultimatum Game. It should be noted, however, that since the mediation and moderation 
hypotheses were important hypotheses for this research, it was necessary to include the emotion 
and emotion regulation questionnaires. Furthermore, having state emotion ratings only after the 
Ultimatum Game would have left unchecked a confounding factor, namely the initial emotional 
state of the participants. Nonetheless, it may be better in the future to include fewer emotion 
ratings (e.g., one valence rating) before the Ultimatum Game, and to ask participants to complete 
trait emotion regulation questionnaire on a different day, rather than during the experimental 
session.  
A fourth methodological limitation of the current research is the use of deception. This 
could be a serious limitation, because participants may not have felt real emotions toward the 
Proposers if they did not feel that they were interacting with real people. Given the difference in 
rejection rates between human and computer partner conditions (Experiment 2), however, 
participants seem to have felt emotions in response to the offers which were at least stronger than 
they would have felt if the offers were from the computer. Nonetheless, it is important to try to 
make the experiment as realistic as possible, for example, by using a group stress induction 
procedure (e.g., von Dawans et al., 2012), and having participants gather in a group experiment 
setting so they can feel certain that they are playing with real partners (von Dawans et al., 2012). 
In addition to methodological limitations, the present research contained some theoretical 
limitations. First, the theoretical framework of this research was very different from the 
experimental paradigm. For example, the evolutionary theory concerning the stress response was 
describing mechanisms which would take place in a prey-predator environment, whereas the 
experimental paradigm took place in an interpersonal negotiation environment. This may have 
been problematic in developing hypotheses, because some assumptions which may be true in the 
prey-predator environment may not be true in the interpersonal negotiation environment, leading 
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the theory to make inaccurate predictions of the results of the experiment. To give a concrete 
example, one may state that gravitational force is 9.81m/s2. The truth of this statement depends, 
however, on the specific location to which the statement is referring. More specifically, this 
statement is true on Earth, but may not be true in other locations, such as Mars, where 
gravitational force is only 38% of that on Earth (“Mars,” n.d.). Similarly, in the prey-predator 
environment, there may be only one motive, which is to avoid being caught by a predator, 
whereas in the interpersonal negotiation environment, there may be two motives, a selfish motive 
and a fairness motive. In using a theory which describes mechanisms that occur in the prey-
predator context, the present research made an implicit assumption that in the interpersonal 
negotiation environment, there is only one motive, and it may be because of this false implicit 
assumption that some predictions, such as the one regarding reaction times, were wrong. In the 
context of gravitational force, this would be equivalent to predicting how fast a ball would fall on 
Mars, assuming that the gravitational force on Mars is 9.81m/s2. This would, of course, lead to 
an inaccurate prediction. 
A theory which concretely defines the variables influencing social decision-making under 
stress as well as the relationships between the variables may help address this problem. Rather 
than creating a new model, the existing model by Rabin (Rabin, 1993), which includes both a 
monetary and fairness component, may be modified to include a stress variable. Previous 
research has made modifications to models, adding a weight to the fairness component, relative 
to the monetary payoff (e.g., Camerer & Thaler, 2003). The model of Rabin (Rabin, 1993) may 
also be modified to include weights for the monetary and fairness components as below. 
, , = ∗ , + ∗ , ∗ [1 + , ] 
 
α and β describe the weights for the monetary and fairness components, respectively. Stress may 
be incorporated into this modified model by making α and β functions of stress. For example, if 
stress is postulated to increase the weight of the monetary component, α could be defined as a 
positively correlated function of a person’s cortisol levels, and if stress is postulated to increase 
the weight of reciprocity, β could also be defined as a positively correlated function of a person’s 
cortisol levels. Although this paper does not attempt to develop a model linking stress with social 
96 
 
decision-making, the model above and the suggestion of defining α and β in terms of cortisol 
levels may be a useful beginning. 
Conclusion 
 The main claim of the present paper was that the physiological mechanisms underlying 
an acute stress response serves two adaptive functions, namely to quicken the onset of behavioral 
responses in the face of threat and to make the animal more sensitive and responsive to stimuli 
around it. These claims were based on previous assertions concerning the relationship between 
stress and emotional processing (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999). In turn, these adaptive functions 
could be achieved psychologically through an enhancement of emotional, relative to cognitive, 
processing (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999), because emotional processing is supposed to have an 
earlier onset (Zajonc, 1980, 1984) and be more stimulus-driven than cognitive processing. 
Functionally, these characteristics may help prevent disturbances to homeostasis and to activate 
adaptive innate or learned stimulus-response links, producing appropriate responses to eliciting 
stimuli.  
In the context of the Ultimatum Game, the enhancement of emotional processing would 
mean that people under stress would make more emotional decisions, namely rejecting more 
unfair offers. In other words, stress was expected to lead to higher rejections of unfair offers, and 
this effect would be mediated by negative emotions. Furthermore, personality differences in 
emotion regulation tendencies were expected to moderate the stress-rejection link by influencing 
the experience and expression of negative emotions during the game. These hypotheses 
comprised the three main hypotheses of the present research: the main effect of stress on 
rejection rates, the mediation of that effect, and the moderation of that effect. In order to test 
these hypotheses, two 24-round Ultimatum Game experiments were conducted. The results were 
mainly disconfirming the hypotheses. Nonetheless, a significant interaction between stress and 
fairness, with a confirmed stress induction, suggests that it may be worth looking into this effect 
in future research.   
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Appendix 
Experimental materials for Experiment 1 
 
Phone-screening:  
“Please do not consume any food or drinks (except water) within 3 hours, do not sleep within 
two hours, and do not exercise within one hour prior to your appointment. Do you have any 
questions about your eligibility?” 
 
Determining eligibility at recruitment  
“I will administer a short questionnaire at this time.” 
Prior to consenting: 
1. Stress prescreening form (aka: Exclusion questions) = We administer  
This is an absolute criterion. Participants must not have any of these conditions. This form can be 
administered over the phone prior to coming in. 
Prior to testing [does not have to be on testing day]: “Please complete the following 
questionnaires and let me know if you have any questions.” 
2. Health status form = Self-administered 
Participants must not have any of the conditions in the top section. Discretion used for the 
conditions listed in the following sections.  
3. “Morning-ness” question (wake/sleep patterns) = Self administered;  
 
*Note: After initial screening, we check over the same forms above (besides the consent form) 
before the experiment.  This is to ensure that nothing has changed since we last spoke with the 
participant. 
 
When participant arrives:  
“Welcome to our study. Before we start, I just need to ask a few questions. Have you consumed 
any food or drinks (except water) within 3 hours? Have you slept within two hours prior to 
coming in?Have you had vigorous exercise within one hour?” [If they answer yes to any of these, 
exclude or wait until appropriate time has passed if possible.]” 
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Explain to participants that we will get saliva samples from them and that they will drink water 
to create a cleaner sample. Ask if they’d like to use the restroom before drinking.  
Ask the participant to drink the 8 oz bottle of water. Start a timer for 10 minutes, first saliva 
sample can be no less than 10 minutes after finishing the water bottle.  
Side note: This will allow for a cleaner saliva sample 
 
3) Read the following introduction: 
 
You will complete 2 separate experiments today. In the first study, we are interested in the 
relationship between personality and stress levels. You will fill out a few personality 
questionnaires and then you will be randomly assigned to complete a stressful task or a non-
stressful task. In this task, half of the participants will hold their hand in ice water for up to three 
minutes in order to increase their stress hormones and the other half of the participants will put 
their hand in warm water. Holding one’s hand in ice water is a safe and effective way to 
temporarily raise cortisol levels. To test your cortisol levels we will be taking samples of your 
saliva into a small plastic cap for a minute or two.  I can’t tell you ahead of time which condition 
you’re in, but I need to make sure that you are fine with either one before we begin.  
 
Approximately 30 min after the first stress task, we would like to ask you to repeat the same 
stress task again to determine how stable your reactions to stressors are.  Thus, participants in the 
stress condition will be asked to put their hands in cold water twice, while those in the control 
condition will put their hands into warm water twice.   
 
It is known that it takes at least 30 min to return to the original mental states once you get stress.  
Therefore, we need to wait at least 30 min before the second stress task.  In the meanwhile, we 
would like you to work on a second experiment which is unrelated to the stress task.  
In the second experiment, you will participate in an economic experiment in which you can earn 
money. Because it is very difficult to get multiple participants in the same location at the same 
time, you will interact with partners who are participating from the LMU Economics building 
and the Technical University in Munich. Some people will be in groups, and some will be 
participating individually in separate rooms. Generally speaking, we are interested in people’s 
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decisions when interacting in close physical proximity and When interacting from distant 
locations. In the beginning of the experiment, you will be assigned to one of two roles by a 
computer lottery and will make decisions in that role for the rest of the experiment. For each 
round, you’ll see a picture of your partner in that round. If you are ok with it, we’d like to take a 
picture of you to show to your interaction partners as well. Your picture will be kept confidential. 
May we take your picture now and upload it into our computer? Please stand against the wall 
with a neutral facial expression. The other participants are also taking their pictures for the 
experiment.” 
 
“At this point, if you feel uncomfortable about any of these procedures, please let me know.” If 
they express concerns or hesitation, let them know that it is fine if they would prefer not to 
complete the experiment and that there will be no penalty if they want to leave at this point (of 
course, they will not be paid). “Also, please make sure if you have a cell phone with you that it is 
turned off.” 
 
4) Check over forms 1 and 2 (above): “Please look over your responses to the questionnaires 
to ensure that they are accurate and up-to-date.”   
5) HAND OUT THE CONSENT FORM. Collect the consent form and ensure that the 
participant has properly signed and dated the form.  
6)  “Please complete these forms. Some questions ask how you feel now and others ask how 
you feel in general, so please read the instructions carefully to understand which questions you 
are answering. I’ll upload your picture while you complete the forms.” 
 
Upload the picture and start getting BOTH water conditions ready. “I’m just preparing both 
conditions to save time, but I don’t know yet which condition you’ll get.” 
 
CES-D (20 items; Depression; validated German version available)  
Gross’s emotion regulation questionnaire (10 items; German version available) 
State and Trait Anger Expression Inventory (20 items; German version available) 
Norm of Reciprocity form (27 items: needs to be translated)  
Pain questionnaires (FRS and the VAS)  
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8)   Collect saliva samples and note the time  
*Note: Must do this before and after the water task 
Put on gloves 
Take 2 SaliCaps from the plastic bag.   
Ask participant to use the straw to place saliva into the tube (we need 1mL in total, so ask the 
participant to fill up at least.5 ml in each tube).  
Cap the container. Place tube in its properly marked container.   
Repeat steps 2-4 so that we collect 2 samples for each time point. 
Note: Make sure that the tube’s label has the following information: 1) participant’s ID number 2) 
the sample number 3) time of sample, and 4) date of sample..  The next saliva sample will be 
taken 15 minutes after the water task.  Please record the clock time for this 1st saliva sample. 
 
“We’re going to do the stress task now, and fifteen minutes after the stress task, we’ll collect 
another saliva sample.”  
Draw a paper from the cup to see which condition (warm or cold water) the participant is in, and 
let the participant know which condition they are in. 
 
9) Stress/no-stress water task 
Prepare the water condition you chose: either water at ice cold temperature (0-3°C) or water at 
room temperature (37-40°C).  Use a thermometer to ensure the proper water temperature is 
reached. 
Ask participant to submerge his/her non-dominant hand into the water pitcher and note the time.  
Instructions for all: “Please submerge your non-dominant hand into this water pitcher and hold 
your hand in this container of water for as long as you can up to 3 minutes. Make sure your 
whole hand is submerged up to your wrist.”  
 
Record the time that the participant puts their hand in the water. 
 
*Note: During this task, stay in continual eye contact with the participant.  Conversing with the 
participant is fine.  If you notice that he/she is struggling, tell him/her that they can remove their 
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hand after 1 minute if they want. You may also want to verbally encourage him/her to keep their 
hand in for at least 1 minute. 
After 3 minutes (or until the participant can no longer submerge his/her hand in the water), give 
him/her paper towels to dry off the hand.  If the participant was in the stress water task, their 
hand will likely be red.  Inform the participant that this is normal and that the redness will go 
away after 5-10 minutes.  
“If your hand is red, it is normal, and it will go away after five or ten minutes.” 
 
Note: Please record (1) water temperature just before participants submerge their hands into the 
pitcher, and (2) clock time when participants pull out their hands from the pitcher. 
 
10)  Start the timer.  Fifteen minutes after this task (as close as possible to this time), you  
should take the next saliva sample.   
 
11) PAIN QUESTIONNAIRES (FRS and the VAS):  
 
“Please complete the following questionnaire, reporting your peak pain during the water task.”  
 
“We need to wait fifteen minutes until collecting the second sample. In the meantime, we’ll get 
started on the second experiment. The new experiment will be conducted on the computer at the 
other table. Please take a seat there.” 
 
“You will complete a brief rating about your current emotion before starting and after 
completing the decision-making experiment. These ratings will be kept confidential and your 
partners will never see these ratings. Please listen carefully as I read the instructions.” 
 
READ THE INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE AFFECT GRID AND GIVE THE PARTICIPANTS 4 
EXAMPLES  
 
While showing the first slide of the experimental program: 
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“In each round of this experiment, you and an actual partner in one of several locations (the 
Economics building or the Technical University)will split 10 euros between the two of you. 
Some people are grouped together in the same room, whereas others are playing from different 
locations. Any of the participants can interact with each other, and they won’t know whether 
they are in a group or in separate locations.”  
 
While showing the second slide of the program: 
 
“Each of these rectangles represents a person who is available to play with you in that round. 
You can click on one of the rectangles with the mouse to select your partner.” 
  
“For every round, the same person will always decide how to split the money and the other 
person will always decide whether to accept or reject the offer. You will be assigned a role by a 
computer lottery, and neither you nor your partners will know how many rounds will be played. 
You will receive 10% of your earnings in cash at the end of the experiment. You will earn 5 
euros for your participation in addition to the money from the experiment. Please start reading 
the instructions now.” 
  
12) UG practice (Instructions from Moretti and diPellegrino, 2010) 
 
You are now taking part in an economic experiment.  
 
In this experiment, you will interact with real people via Internet who are now participating in 
this experiment from different locationsYou can earn some money depending on your decisions 
and those of the other participants. For this reason, it is very important that you read these 
instructions carefully. Please press the space bar to continue. 
 
You will participate in the same basic interaction for several rounds. There are two different 
participant roles in each round: Participant A and Participant B. In each round you will be paired 
randomly with one partner. You will see a picture of your partner and your partner will see a 
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picture of you. Importantly, you will NEVER play the game more than once with the same 
partner. 
 
In each round, the experimenter will provide a fixed amount of money that must be divided 
between you and your partner. The amount that must be divided between you and your partner 
will be €10 in each round. Participant A will propose how the €10 is to be divided and 
Participant B will decide whether to accept or reject the proposal. Participant A will be free to 
propose any possible division of the €10. Please press the space bar to continue. 
 
In the next slide, you will see two cards. The two cards represent a computer lottery which will 
determine whether you will be Participant A or Participant B in this experiment. Please click on 
one of the cards with the mouse to select which role you will take. You have a 50% chance of 
being Participant A and a 50% chance of being Participant B by choosing the card on the right 
side. The same is true for the card on the left side. In other words, you are equally likely to be 
Participant A or B. Please press the space bar to continue. 
 
You have been assigned to be Participant B in every round. In other words, you will decide 
whether to accept or reject your partners’ offers throughout the entire experiment. Press the 
space bar to continue. 
 
Each time you learn about the proposal of Participant A, you must decide whether to accept or 
reject the proposal. Please press the LEFT key to ACCEPT the offer and press the RIGHT key to 
REJECT the offer. If you accept the proposal, the €10 will be divided according to the proposal. 
If you reject the proposal, Participant A does not receive anything but you also do not receive 
anything. The division procedure is finished and the round ends. You will do this for several 
rounds, but neither you nor your partners will know the exact number of rounds. Press the space 
bar to continue. 
 
This game is played in real-time with multiple participants, and each participant will have up to 
10 seconds to make his/her decision in order to prevent other participants from waiting too long. 
If you take longer than 10 seconds, neither you nor your partner will earn money for that round. 
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Ten percent of your entire earnings (that is, the sum of your earnings from each individual round) 
will be paid in cash in private at the end of the entire experiment. The other participants will not 
know the amount of your earnings. This concludes the instructions. Please let the experimenter 
know that you have finished reading the instructions. 
 
Phone call: Ok, can you give me a minute to call the other research team? I just need to make 
sure our timing is coordinated. “Hi ____, about When do you think you’ll be ready? Ok, in about 
x minutes? Great! Thanks.” 
 
“We need to wait for the others for a few minutes. Here is some reading material for the time that 
we wait.” At this time, hand them the LMU history sheet. 
 
13) When the 15 minute post water stress timer goes off (probably after participants read the 
UG instructions), obtain the second saliva sample (explain to the participant that they should 
make chewing motions to quicken saliva production).  Hand the Salicaps to the participant while 
reading this script to the participant: “We will now take another saliva sample, the same way we 
did before. Please making chewing motions for about 30 seconds before giving your sample. 
Doing so will quicken your saliva production. Please use the straw to collect saliva. (Take the 
caps from the participant and place in the properly labeled container) Thank you.” 
 
Note: Make sure to record the clock time for the 2nd saliva sample. 
 
“Now, you’ll complete a few emotion ratings, do two practice rounds, and then start the actual 
rounds in which you will earn money for each round. Are you ready?”  
 
.At this time, please indicate your current emotion by clicking on the following grid with your 
mouse and by clicking on the appropriate circles for the questions following the grid  
 
Now you can do 2 practice rounds to familiarize yourself with how to play the game. You will 
not earn money for the 2 practice rounds but you will play with actual partners. Press the LEFT 
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key to ACCEPT the offer and press the RIGHT key to REJECT the offer. Please press the space 
bar to start the practice rounds.  
The practice rounds are finished. Now, you can start the actual rounds in which you will earn 
money. Press the space bar to start the actual rounds. 
 
14) UG game: 24 trials with 6 fair (5e) and 18 unfair (6 x 3e, 6 x 2e, 6 x 1e) offers.  
                                          
The next task involves completing a few more questionnaires. Please let the experimenter that 
you are ready for the next task. 
 
15)  Last saliva sample collection. Note the time. 
 
Post-experiment: 
“Please indicate how you currently feel.” 
 
State Anger Expression Inventory (10 items; German version available) 
Reward Sensitivity questionnaire 
Justice Sensitivity questionnaire 
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We would like to ask you some questions about your emotional life, in particular, how you 
control (that is, regulate and manage) your emotions. The questions below involve two distinct 
aspects of your emotional life. One is your emotional experience, or what you feel like inside. 
The other is your emotional expression, or how you show your emotions in the way you talk, 
gesture, or behave. Although some of the following questions may seem similar to one another, 
they differ in important ways. For each item, please answer using the following scale:  
 
1--------------2--------------3--------------4--------------5--------------6--------------7 
strongly            neutral     strongly 
disagree               agree 
 
 
1. ____ When I want to feel more positive emotion (such as joy or amusement), I change what 
I’m thinking about.  
 
2. ____ I keep my emotions to myself.  
 
3. ____ When I want to feel less negative emotion (such as sadness or anger), I change what I’m 
thinking about.  
 
4. ____ When I am feeling positive emotions, I am careful not to express them.  
 
5. ____ When I’m faced with a stressful situation, I make myself think about it in a way that 
helps me stay calm.  
 
6. ____ I control my emotions by not expressing them.  
 
7. ____ When I want to feel more positive emotion, I change the way I’m thinking about the 
situation.  
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8. ____ I control my emotions by changing the way I think about the situation I’m in.  
 
9. ____ When I am feeling negative emotions, I make sure not to express them.  
 
10. ____ When I want to feel less negative emotion, I change the way I’m thinking about the 
situation.  
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Indicate on the line below the amount of pain you are experiencing right now (experienced from 
placing your hand in the ice). The further your mark is to the right, the more pain you are 
experiencing (experienced).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fold on the dotted line! 
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"These faces show different degrees of pain.  
This face [point to left-most face] shows no pain. 
The faces show more and more pain [point to each from left to right] up to this    one [point to 
right-most face] – it shows very much pain. 
Point to the face that shows how much pain you are experiencing now (experienced while 
placing your hand in the ice).” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fold on the dotted line! 
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Please click on the cell that 
indicates your current emotion. 
EXTREMELY AROUSED 
EXTREMELY FATIGUED 
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INSTRUCTIONS 
In the next task, you will tell us about your current mood. For this purpose we will use a simple 
procedure (always have the matrix with you while giving these instructions). We are interested in 
two general types of states. First, we are interested in the emotional valence of your momentary 
mood - whether you feel quite good or quite bad. The degree of arousal is the second state we are 
interested in. The box in the center corresponds to a completely neutral state. From there, moving 
to the right indicates a more positive mood - from a little positive to moderately positive to very 
positive, and finally extremely positive. Moving to the left of the center, represents an 
increasingly negative mood – from a little to moderately to very negative and finally extremely 
negative. The same applies to the arousal assessment. For that assessment, your "energy state," 
so to speak, is important. The scale goes from there, very excited, full of energy, to extremely 
fatigued. Moving up from the center indicates an increasing level of excitement, and moving 
down indicates a decreasing state of arousal. During the second task, you will click with the 
mouse to indicate how you feel at that time. For example, if you feel just a little negative and feel 
a bit nervous, where would you click? If you however very happy and very excited, where would 
you click?  
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Experimental materials for Experiment 2 
 
“Please look over your responses to the questionnaires to ensure that they are accurate and up-to-
date and answer the questions on the 2nd and 3rd pages.”   
 
Prior to consenting: 
1. Stress prescreening form (aka: Exclusion questions)  
This is an absolute criterion. Participants must not have any of these conditions. This form can be 
administered over the phone prior to coming in. 
Prior to testing [does not have to be on testing day]: “Please complete the following 
questionnaires and let me know if you have any questions.” 
2. Health status form = Self-administered 
Participants must not have any of the conditions in the top section. Discretion used for the 
conditions listed in the following sections.  
3. “Morning-ness” question (wake/sleep patterns) = Self administered;  
 
When participants arrives:  
“Welcome to our study. Before we start, I just need to ask a few questions. Have you consumed 
any food or drinks (except water) within 3 hours? Have you slept within two hours prior to 
coming in? Have you had vigorous exercise within one hour?” [If they answer yes to any of 
these, exclude or wait until appropriate time has passed if possible.]” 
 
You will complete 2 separate experiments today. In the first study, we are interested in the 
relationship between personality and stress levels. You will fill out a few personality 
questionnaires and then you will be randomly assigned to complete a stressful task or a non-
stressful task. In this task, half of the participants will hold their hand in ice water for up to three 
minutes in order to increase their stress hormones and the other half of the participants will put 
their hand in warm water.   I can’t tell you ahead of time which condition you’ll be in, but I need 
to make sure that you are fine with either one before we begin.  
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Approximately 30 min after the first stress task, we would like to ask you to repeat the same 
stress task again to determine how stable your reactions to stressors are.  Thus, participants in the 
stress condition will be asked to put their hands in cold water twice, while those in the control 
condition will put their hands into warm water twice.   
 
It is known that it takes at least 30 min to return to the original mental states once you get stress.  
Therefore, we need to wait at least 30 min before the second stress task.  In the meanwhile, we 
would like you to work on a second experiment which is unrelated to the stress task.  
 
In the second experiment, you will participate in an economic experiment in which you can earn 
real money. In this experiment, the computer will randomly generate decisions in one of two 
roles. In the beginning of the experiment, you will be randomly assigned to one of the two roles 
and will stay in that role for the rest of the experiment, and the computer will stay in the other 
role for the rest of the experiment. The computer’s decisions will be randomly generated, 
independently of your own decisions.  
 
“At this point, if you feel uncomfortable about any of these procedures, please let me know.” If 
they express concerns or hesitation, let them know that it is fine if they would prefer not to 
complete the experiment and that there will be no penalty if they want to leave at this point (of 
course, they will not be paid). “Also, please make sure if you have a cell phone with you that it is 
turned off.” 
 
4) HAND OUT THE CONSENT FORM. Collect the consent form and ensure that the 
participant has properly signed and dated the form.  
5) “Please complete these forms. The questions ask how you feel in general, not at this moment. 
Please don’t think too long about the answers and give your answers as quickly as possible.” 
 
Start getting BOTH water conditions ready. “I’m just preparing both conditions to save time, but 
I don’t know yet which condition you’ll get.” 
 
Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (needs to be translated) 
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Eysenck Impulsiveness Scale 
 
PAIN QUESTIONNAIRES (FRS AND THE VAS)  
 
8)   “We’re going to do the stress task now, and have a short break. Then, we’ll start the second 
experiment.”  
 
Draw a paper from the cup to see which condition (warm or cold water) the participant is in, and 
let the participant know which condition they are in. 
 
9) Stress/no-stress water task 
Prepare the water condition you chose: either water at ice cold temperature (0-3°C) or water at 
room temperature (37-40°C).  Use a thermometer to ensure the proper water temperature is 
reached. 
Ask participant to submerge his/her non-dominant hand into the water pitcher and note the time.  
Instructions for all: “Please submerge your non-dominant hand into this water pitcher and hold 
your hand in this container of water for as long as you can up to 3 minutes. Make sure your 
whole hand is submerged up to your wrist.”  
 
Record the time that the participant puts their hand in the water. 
 
*Note: During this task, stay in continual eye contact with the participant.  Conversing with the 
participant is fine.  If you notice that he/she is struggling, tell him/her that they can remove their 
hand after 1 minute if they want. You may also want to verbally encourage him/her to keep their 
hand in for at least 1 minute (and if they are struggling, let them know when 1 minute has 
passed). 
 
After 3 minutes (or until the participant can no longer submerge his/her hand in the water), give 
him/her paper towels to dry off the hand.  If the participant was in the stress water task, their 
hand will likely be red.  Inform the participant that this is normal and that the redness will go 
away after 5-10 minutes.  
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“If your hand is red, it is normal, and it will go away after five or ten minutes.” 
 
Note: Please record (1) water temperature just before participants submerge their hands into the 
pitcher, and (2) clock time when participants pull out their hands from the pitcher. 
 
10)  Start the timer.  Twenty minutes after this task (as close as possible to this time), you  
should start the UG.   
 
11) PAIN QUESTIONNAIRES (FRS and the VAS):  
 
“Please complete the following questionnaire, reporting your peak pain during the water task.”  
 
“Now we’ll get started on the second experiment. The new experiment will be conducted on the 
computer at the other table. Please take a seat there.” 
 
“You will complete a brief rating about your current emotion before starting and after 
completing the decision-making experiment. These ratings will be kept confidential. Please listen 
carefully as I read the instructions.” 
 
READ THE INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE AFFECT GRID AND GIVE THE PARTICIPANTS 4 
EXAMPLES  
 
While showing the first slide of the experimental program: 
 
“In each round of this experiment, you will interact with the computer to split 10 euros. You will 
be assigned a role by a lottery, and for every round, you will do one of two things. You will 
either split the money in a way that is determined by the computer, or you will decide whether to 
accept or reject the offer made by the computer.”  
 
While showing the second slide of the program: 
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“A question mark will show up at the beginning of each round. You can click on the question 
mark to start the round.” 
  
“You will not know how many rounds will be played. You will receive 10% of your earnings in 
cash at the end of the experiment.” 
“A few different computers will generate decisions (pointing to the laptop and PCs next to the 
participant’s chair). The computer’s decisions will be generated completely randomly, and will 
not be influenced by your previous decisions. Please start reading the instructions now.” 
  
12) UG practice (Instructions from Moretti and diPellegrino, 2010) 
 
You are now taking part in an economic experiment.  
 
In this experiment, you will split a sum of money with the computer. You can earn real money 
depending on your decisions. For this reason, it is very important that you read these instructions 
carefully. Please press the space bar to continue. 
 
You will participate in the same basic interaction for several rounds. There are two different 
roles in each round: Participant A and Participant B. In each round, the experimenter will 
provide a fixed amount of money that must be divided between you and the computer. You can 
think of this as an interaction in which a sum of money is being split between you and a partner. 
The amount that must be divided between you and the computer will be €10 in each round. Press 
the space bar to continue. 
 
In the next slide, you will see two cards. The two cards represent a lottery which will determine 
whether you will be Participant A or Participant B in this experiment. Participant A will propose 
how the €10 is to be divided and Participant B will decide whether to accept or reject the 
proposal. Please click on one of the cards with the mouse to select which role you will take. You 
have a 50% chance of being Participant A and a 50% chance of being Participant B. In other 
words, you are equally likely to be Participant A or B. Please press the space bar to continue.  
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You have been assigned to be Participant B in every round. In other words, you will decide 
whether to accept or reject offers throughout the entire experiment. Press the space bar to 
continue. 
 
Each time you see a proposal, you must decide whether to accept or reject the proposal. Please 
press the LEFT white key to ACCEPT the offer and press the RIGHT white key to REJECT the 
offer. Press the space bar to continue. 
 
If you accept the proposal, the €10 will be divided according to the proposal. This would be 
equivalent to you accepting an offer from a partner, which would result in you and your partner 
receiving the proposed amounts of money. If you reject the proposal, the computer does not 
receive anything but you also do not receive anything. This would be equivalent to you rejecting 
an offer from a partner, which would result in neither you nor your partner receiving any money. 
Once you make your decision, the division procedure is finished and the round ends. You will do 
this for several rounds, but you will not know the exact number of rounds. Press the space bar to 
continue. 
 
Please remember that each decision made by the computer will be randomly generated and 
independent of your own previous decisions. You will have up to 10 seconds to make your 
decision to accept or reject the offer. Similarly, you will wait up to 10 seconds for the computer 
to make an offer. If you take longer than 10 seconds to make your decision, the trial will be over 
and neither you nor the computer will earn money for that round. 
 
Ten percent of your entire earnings (that is, the sum of your earnings from each individual round) 
will be paid in cash in private at the end of the entire experiment. This concludes the instructions. 
Please let the experimenter know that you have finished reading the instructions. 
 
 
“We’ll take a short break and start in a few minutes. Here is some reading material for the time 
that we wait.” At this time, hand them the LMU history sheet. 
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STATE IMPULSIVITY QUESTIONNAIRE 
  
“Please fill out this questionnaire now. This questionnaire asks you to indicate how you feel 
NOW.” 
 
“Now, you’ll complete a few emotion ratings, do two practice rounds, and then start the actual 
rounds in which you will earn money for each round. Are you ready?”  
 
At this time, please indicate your current emotion by clicking on the following grid with your 
mouse and by clicking on the appropriate circles for the questions following the grid  
 
Happy 
Angry 
Proud 
Anxious 
Ashamed 
Excited 
Sad 
Nervous 
Pleasantly relaxed 
Bored 
 
Now you can do 2 practice rounds to familiarize yourself with the experiment. You will not earn 
money for the 2 practice rounds but the practice rounds will otherwise be identical to the actual 
rounds. Press the LEFT key to ACCEPT the offer and press the RIGHT key to REJECT the offer. 
Please press the space bar to start the practice rounds.  
The practice rounds are finished. Now, you can start the actual rounds in which you will earn 
money. Press the space bar to start the actual rounds. 
 
14) UG game: 24 trials with 6 fair (5e) and 18 unfair (6 x 3e, 6 x 2e, 6 x 1e) offers.  
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After the actual rounds, participants will complete the emotion ratings AND perceived fairness 
ratings. 
 
You have finished all rounds. Once again, please indicate your current emotion by clicking on 
the grid and circles with the mouse. Press space bar to continue. 
 
One moment please... 
Our records indicate that you received offers of   
Please type the number that describes how you felt about the 
5€ offer 
Extremely unfair                             Perfectly fair 
                                          
The next task involves completing a few more questionnaires. Please let the experimenter that 
you are ready for the next task. 
 
Post-experiment: 
EMOTIONAL GO-NOGO TASK (on the computer) 
ATTENTIONAL NETWORK TEST (on the computer) 
 
Demographic information sheet  
 
Debriefing with the participant 
Have the participant complete the End-of-Study questionnaire  
Distribute payment for participating in the study and for the money earned during the decision 
making game. 
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Please indicate how often the items apply to you in general.  
 
PLEASE REMEMBER TO ANSWER EACH QUESTION 
 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
almost never    sometimes  about half most of the time almost always 
the time 
(0–10%) (11–35%) (36–65%)  (66–90%) (91–100%) 
 
 
 
_____ When I’m upset, I feel guilty for feeling that way. 
_____ When I’m upset, I feel ashamed with myself for feeling that way. 
_____ When I’m upset, I become embarrassed for feeling that way. 
_____ When I’m upset, I become angry with myself for feeling that way. 
_____ When I’m upset, I become irritated with myself for feeling that way. 
_____ When I’m upset, I feel like I am weak. 
_____ When I’m upset, I have difficulty concentrating. 
_____ When I’m upset, I have difficulty focusing on other things. 
_____ When I’m upset, I have difficulty getting work done. 
_____ When I’m upset, I have difficulty thinking about anything else. 
_____ When I’m upset, I can still get things done.  
_____ When I’m upset, I lose control over my behaviors. 
_____ When I’m upset, I have difficulty controlling my behaviors. 
_____ When I’m upset, I become out of control. 
_____ When I’m upset, I feel out of control. 
_____ I experience my emotions as overwhelming and out of control. 
_____ When I’m upset, I feel like I can remain in control of my behaviors.  
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Instructions: Please answer each question by putting a circle around the ‘YES’ or the ‘NO’ 
following the questions. There are no right or wrong answers, and no trick questions. Work 
quickly and do not think too long about the exact meaning of the question. 
 
 
Would you enjoy water skiing?       YES  NO 
Usually do you prefer to stick to brands you know are reliable, to trying new ones on the chance 
of finding something better?        YES  NO 
Would you feel sorry for a lonely stranger?      YES  NO 
Do you quite enjoy taking risks?       YES  NO 
Would you enjoy parachute jumping?      YES  NO 
Do you often buy things on impulse?      YES  NO 
Do you generally do and say things without stopping to think?   YES  NO 
Do you often get into a jam because you do things without thinking?  YES  NO 
Do you think hitch-hiking is too dangerous a way to travel?   YES  NO 
Do you like diving off the highboard?      YES  NO 
Are you an impulsive person?       YES  NO 
Do you welcome new and exciting experiences and sensations, even if they are a little 
frightening and unconventional?       YES  NO 
Do you usually think carefully before doing anything?    YES  NO 
Would you like to learn to fly an aeroplane?     YES  NO 
Do you often do things on the spur of the moment?     YES  NO 
Do you mostly speak without thinking things out?     YES  NO 
Do you often get involved in things you later wish you could get out of?  YES  NO 
Do you get so ‘carried away’ by new and exciting ideas, that you never think of possible snags?  
          YES  NO 
Do you find it hard to understand people who risk their necks climbing mountains?   
          YES  NO 
Do you sometimes like doing things that are a bit frightening?   YES  NO 
Do you need to use a lot of self-control to keep out of trouble?   YES  NO 
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Would you agree that almost everything enjoyable is illegal or immoral?     
          YES  NO 
Generally do you prefer to enter cold sea water gradually, to diving or jumping straight in? 
          YES  NO 
Are you often surprised at people’s reactions to what you do or say?  YES  NO 
Would you enjoy the sensation of skiing very fast down a high mountain slope?    
          YES  NO 
Do you think an evening out is more successful if it is unplanned or arranged at the last moment? 
          YES  NO 
Would you like to go scuba diving?       YES  NO 
Would you enjoy fast driving?       YES  NO 
Do you usually work quickly, without bothering to check?    YES  NO 
Do you often change your interests?       YES  NO 
Before making up your mind, do you consider all the advantages and disadvantages?   
          YES  NO 
Would you like to go pot-holing?       YES  NO 
Would you be put off a job involving quite a bit of danger?    YES  NO 
Do you prefer to ‘sleep on it’ before making decisions?    YES  NO 
When people shout at you, do you shout back?     YES  NO 
Do you usually make up your mind quickly?     YES  NO 
 
PLEASE CHECK TO SEE THAT YOU HAVE ANSWERED ALL THE QUESTIONS 
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Instructions: The following section includes a series of statements with which one can describe 
him/herself. Please read each statement and select from the four choices the choice which 
indicates how you feel now, at this moment. For each statement, please mark the number below 
your chosen answer. 
 
There are no right or wrong answers. Please don’t think too long and remember to select the one 
response that describes your present state best. 
 
PLEASE REMEMBER TO ANSWER EACH QUESTION 
 
 
Über- Ein Ziem- Sehr 
haupt wenig lich 
nicht 
 
I behave spontaneously      1    2    3     4 
It is hard to control my actions     1    2    3     4 
I say whatever comes into my head      1    2    3     4 
I do things in a slap-dash way      1    2    3     4 
I tend not to think about consequences of actions    1    2    3     4 
It is hard to think straight       1    2    3     4 
It is hard to take in what’s going on around me   1    2    3     4 
I am easily caught off guard       1    2    3     4 
I am easily distracted        1    2    3     4 
It is difficult to concentrate       1    2    3     4 
I tend to be impatient        1    2    3     4 
I feel restless         1    2    3     4 
I find waiting difficult       1    2    3     4 
I want to get things done quickly      1    2    3     4 
 
PLEASE CHECK TO SEE THAT YOU HAVE ANSWERED ALL THE QUESTIONS  
